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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
According to social psychologist Muzafer Sherif, one of the most I cha 11 engi ng human prob 1 ems of contemporary 1 ife is that of "intergroup 
I relations" which refers to "the states of friendship or enmity, coope-
1 
~ 
I 
i j 
I ~ 
~ 
1 
I 
~ j 
~ ~ 
I ~ 
ration or competition, conflict or harmony, alignment or nonalignment 
between groups and combinations of groups, small or lar~e." 1 
With the advent of collective bargaining in pub1ic education in 
the early 1960s, the state of intergroup relations between teachers, 
administrators, and school boards has become increasingly characterized 
by competit~on and conflict. Teachers, traditionally a passive group in 
reference to welfare and working conditions, school policies, and 
educational programs, are now via the social system of collective bar-
gaining, abandoning this posture by becoming active, equal partners in 
determining these decisions. This revolutionary power relation change 
from unilateral school management control to the bilateral decision-
making found in the collective bargaining process has strained the 
employment relationship in the education industry, a stress which is 
frequently manifesting itself in bitter controversy, bargaining deadlocks 
lMuzafer Sherif,.In Common Predicament: Social Ps cholo Of 
Intergroup Conflict And Cooperation Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1966 j' p .1. 
------------------·~------M----5----~~~----=-----------------~ 
rand a series of trial-and-error conflict resolution schemes which include 
mediation, fact-finding, third-party umpiring systems, court injunctions, 
2 
1 strikes, and teacher firings. 
It can be assumed that collective bargaining in the American school 
I system is here to stay and indeed will continue to grow at an accelerated 
1 pace.l Moreover, since conflict is the basic ingredient in the collective 
I bargaining process, it can furthermore be assumed that there will be a con-
ll current growth in the number of school bargaining disputes and teacher strikes. 
~ Acceptance of these two assumptions clearly necessitates a search for methods 
~ which facilitate the resolution of negotiations conflict between teachers and I school management. To phrase the problem another way, public education 
l negotiators, unsure about what conflict management schemes to use in the event I of a bargaining dispute, are in need of viable machinery which can serve to 
~ control the conflict which is inherent in the collective bargaining process. 
1 Several labor relations authorities maintain that the impasse resolution 
~ problem is one of the key issues in public education labor relations. Robert I Doherty, for example, emphasizes that all other issues in teacher bargaining 
~ are ••relatively insignificant issues when contrasted with the problem of 
resolving negotiating impasses.••2 Relative to this contention, a fundamental 
question can be asked: 11 Hhat conflict management or conflict resolution 
1James D. Koerner, Who.Controls American Education? (Boston: Beacon 
. Press, 1968), p. 42. 
i 1 2Robert E. Doherty, 11Teacher Bargaining: The Relevance Of Private Sector 
~ Experience, .. The Collective Dilemma: Ne otiations In Education, ed. by Patrick 
I) 
1 W. Carlton and Harold I. Goodwin Worthington~ Ohio: Charles A. Jones Publish-i ing Co., 1969), p. 193. 
~ 
L--------------------------------------.. -·s-·~re..........-...~ ..... --------------1 
____ .. ~.:lll';lo5.__..~.,..~~--:• ?WT••a.a.arrl! • WD2U£ _________ ~_..., ___ ,.ms,_·----=---
. I processes function to bring about more agreement, less conflict, and posi-3 
:I ~ tive negotiatory relationships between teachers and school management? 11 I 
~ 
I 
• I ~ 
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This question is diffiCult to answer because the impasse resolution probl~m 
in school negotiations is still in the laboratory experimental stages of 
trial-and-error, and therefore, little empirical data exist on the use or 
effectiveness,of the various procedures utilized to resolve public education 
bargaining disputes. As a consequence to the noteable lack of research on 
this critical problem, participants in the school bargaining process remain 
ignorant of how to effectively resolve, manage, or prevent collective bar-
gaining impasses which may arise during at-the-table negotiations. In sum, 
because teachers and school management representatives are adrift without 
adequate information, it is logical to research and analyze the alternate 
social technologies for impasse resolution. This study is such an attempt. 
PURPOSE 
The general purpose of this study was to analyze the various impasse 
resolution strategies which are available to public education negotiators. 
Specifically, the study included: (1) a description of five alter-
native methods available to negotiators for resolving school bargaining 
disputes; (2) a presentation and analysis of the perceptions held by 
teacher negotiation representatives and school management representatives 
towards the five alternate impasse resolution methods for the purpose of 
It should be noted that both 
___ ... _______ M"""'"_._... mr,llllj---------------------~~~WA;C----~ 
school systems to ~iscover what significant factors influenced the 
success or failure of particular impasse resolution strategies. 
RESEARCH METHOD AND PROCEDURE 
In correspondence to the three purposes listed above, three 
approaches or phases were utilized in this study: First, a research 
4 
of the relevant literature was conducted to ascertain from authorities 
what impasse resolution procedures can or should be employed in school 
bargaining disputes. In the second phase, the author tested several 
hypotheses in order to identify the impasse resolution method that 
public education negotiators prefer to use in the event of a collective 
bargaining deadlock. The hypotheses, derived by searching professional 
literature for the opinions of authorities who have worked in either 
the field of collective bargaining or other environments where inter-
group conflict may exist, were as follows: 
I. Teacher negotiation representatives agree that the· human 
relations strategy would function to minimize, prevent, or 
resolve collective bargaining disputes. 
II. School management negotiation representatives agree that the 
human relations strategy would not function to minimize, pre-
vent, or resolve collective bargaining disputes. 
III. Teacher negotiation representatives and school management 
negotiation representatives both agree that the mediation 
strategy is an appropriate mechanism to use in resolving 
school bargaining disputes. 
IV. Teacher negotiation representatives and school management 
negotiation representatives both agree that the fact-finding 
strategy.is not an effective procedure for resolving public 
education bargaining disputes. 
___ ..-________ ....._.. ____ ...,_..,...,.,_. ______ ,.,_..,.. __ .._..__ ----· -- 5 "l 
v. Teacher negotiation representatives and school management negotiation 1 
representatives both agree that the arbitration strategy would not 1 
be an.a~pro~riate dispute settlement mechanism in public education 1 
barga1n1ng 1mpasses. j 
VI. Teacher negotiation representatives agree that the strike strategy 
should be available as a means to resolve collective bargaining 
disputes. 
VII. School management negotiation representatives agree that the strike 
strategy should not be available as a means to resolve collective 
bargaining disputes. 
To test the above hypotheses, the author devised a series of questions 
related to the hypotheses and placed them in a fixed-response questionnaire 
{see APPENDIX A) which v1as personally administered to forty-two negotiation 
representatives. The negotiators, twenty-one representing teacher organi-
zations and twenty-one representing school boards, were for the most part, 
at-the-table-negotiators during bargaining disputes which occurred in seven 
school systems in the fall of 1972. 
The population studied during phase two covered selected schools. That 
is, the research focused on all Illinois school systems which in 1972 used I at least two of the impasse procedures available to public education negotia-
J. tion teams. In order to preserve anonimity, the school districts are identi-~ The .school systems are listed in TABLE 1. i,: fied by number rather than by name. 
~ The third phase of the study included a case study analysis of three 
~ ~ 
't of the seven school systems for the purpose of clarifying or identifying any ~ I salient factors which influe~ced the impasse resolution process in those 
i school systems. This information was collected in an interview by using 
~ an open-ended questionnaire or interview guide (see APPENDIX B). This guide I was administered to eighteen negotiation representatives who also had 
~,'Oi,,.Nii ________ !I:I: __ ~--------........ ---_.,,..,._"*WD<~---·--------· 
' ~ Schoo 1 Sys tern Length of Strike · Impasse Procedures Used 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
4 Days 
6 Days 
3 Days 
5 Days 
2 Days 
3 Days 
1 Day 
Mediation, Fact-:Finding, Strike 
Mediation, Fact-Finding, Strike 
Mediation, Fact-Finding, Strike 
Mediation, Fact-Finding, Strike 
Mediation, Fact-Finding, Strike 
Mediation, Strike 
r~edi ation ~ Strike 
~-··-----
j participated in the phase two interview. The data are placed in a modified 
:.t 
l ~ case study form·. 
~ 
4 ~ ; 
i j 
J 
, ways: 
~ 
l 
·l 
SIGNIFICANCE l\i'!O .EJ~1CTICAi"'- ASPECTS OF THE STUDY 
It is anticipated that this study will be beneficial in the following 
(1) The amount of intergroup conflict generated by the momentum of 
' teacher negotiations will be more easily managed. While social conflict is 
inevitable when individuals and groups work together, it is nevertheless, 
imperative to search for and develop appropriate social technology for 
the management of collective bargaining conflict. If, through research, 
functional conflict management strategies can be determined, the dynamics of 
I 
l 
I 
'I 
I 
l 
i 
l 
I j 
l 
I the negotiating processs could produce more efficient results with less overt l 
confl; ct. ;, 
:· . 
·~w.~-~~·~·~~t...•""~".JJ••'L<t.'~~*"'".t".>rr,."';~~~;;,.~<Blo't-l>,. ... ~.·..;,.;.~~:w~.:.t~'i.,.~.,-,~T.> .. treft.na:•~~~.:.o::t"-'U'..ltil:l'ff'~~.,.._.\.'m..":'>'""'·""'"'~&.:::.~..:l!lllr..V..t.:::~~~jl,jQ~;;.',..,..,. .. ;~t~• 
r:~-:tudy should be beneficial to those teach=~:~-:anag~l 
5 ment personne 1 who are! i nvo 1 ved in negotiating 1 oca 1 contracts by pro vi ding a I 
' clue or answer to the following question: 11 Hhat impasse procedures function I i to increase the probability of peaceful settlement and conversely decrease the 
~ possibility of a disruptive confrontation? 11 Hopefully, an analysis of the 
I ; experience of negotiators involved in crisis bargaining situations will ! suggest what impasse procedures or dispute settlement techniques should be 
! utilized in public education labor conflicts. Stated otherwise, the outcome 
l I of the study may provide knowledge that may reveal new alternatives to more 
I 
' effectively accommodate bargaining conflict between teacher organizations and I 
' school management. 
I (3) The research should assist legislators formulate appropriate school law relevant to the topic of collective bargaining in public education I and specifiCally to the key issue in this arena, namely, the resolution of 
ti impasse disputes. Regarding the importance of relevant school bargaining 
I statutes, it is questionable if we can legislate ourselves into decades of 
I ~ industrial harmony. 
for disturbed human relations. 
No matter how wisely formulated, laws are not cure-alls 
In the short run, laws tend to destroy or to 
change established patterns and to impose unfamiliar techniques and restrict-
ions of the parties; thus the period of adjustment to a maj~r labor law is a 
turbulent one. However, while maturity and peace in collective bargaining 
are not established by legislative fiat, labor law can be justified indirect-
I ly. That is, long run constructive collective bargaining can be facilitated 
~ 
~ 
fi ~ 
~ 
~ 
L 
through statutory ground rules which govern the activities of both the employ-
ees and management. The effect of such rules is to promote, in the long run, 
\ .. 
,.........,.1\t: r , .. w.-•··er· l._.<U""WW'« _ __,...,=.._,_, ______ ...,..,. • ,..,ll:~~&~:..,,.,""',.:il ___ -----1 
rmatur~ty of the bargaining relationship,! 8 
(4) Notwithstanding the concept that conflict can sometimes function to 
~effect positive social change, certain forms of conflict, such as collective I bargaining disagreements, can be viewed as dysfunctional in the educational 
setting. Restated, it seems justifiable to assume that quality education for 
students is best achieved in an atmosphere of reasonable peace and harmony and 
that disruptive, acrimonious bargaining conflicts between teachers and school 
management do not contribute to this end. It follows that anything which can 
be done to reduce the potentia 1 for overt conflict or pro.mote successful 
~negotiatory relationships between these two groups would contribute to the 
~well being of students. 
(5) The study may provide direction for universities as they plan 
~training programs for school administrators and teachers in the collective 
I bargaining process. . 
LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS 
Limitations of the study would be the ones that are inherent in the 
j interview method itself. Although there are limitations with the interview 
~method, it is a desirable method to use when perceptions, opinions, and values 
i . . ; are be1ng examined. The ability to probe vague responses, obtain clarifica- . 
! 
~ tion, and cross-check reactions are advantages of the personal interview. In 
I [addition, "~1any people are more willing to communicate orally than in writing, 
~ ~and therefore, will provide data more readily and fully in an interview than 
J ~-----------------
1 1c. Wilson Randle and Max S. 
~ Principles and Practic~ (New York: 42, 
~--------------------------------
· c:nnaire."1 From=nden:~~ncidental c=~=· facial andg 
I bodily expressions, and tone of voice, the interviewer was able to acquire I information that could not be conveyed in written replies. 
TltlO instruments were used to collect data. A fixed-respon_se question-
naire was incorporated because it is more definitive in nature than open-ended 
questionnaires, yet the respondents were given the opportunity to express 
'their thoughts freely. An open-ended questionnaire was also used which gave 
the respondents complete freedom to communicate their opinions. Both quest-
ionnaires were administered during personal interviews. 
One limitation of the interview method depends on the interviewer's 
·insight into the respondent's situation. Relative to this problem, the inter-
viewer has participated in teacher-school mangement negotiations for several 
years and thus has developed insights into the conditions under which the 
respondents work. He is not alien to the role of the respondents, having 
been employed as both a teacher and school administrator. In brief, .the 
I
, respondent's situation was not unfamiliar to the interviewer. 
A further limitation of the interview method concerns the employment of 
a common vocabulary with the respondents. Since the interviewer has represent 
ed both teachers and management in the collective bargaining process, it 
~appears that this qualification was met. The interviewer in this research is I conversant with the language and had no difficulty relating the conceptual 
I framework of the interview to the operating conditions of the respondents. 
I 1oeobold B. Van Dalen, Understanding Educational Research (New York: 
·McGraw Hill Book Co., 1966), p. 306. 
i~rM ~-.. -------....... 
10 
The study was_~elimited to negotiation representatives of both 
teacher groups and school management who participated in collective bar-
gaining situations in which two or more impasse procedures had been used 
to resolve the bargaining dispute. It was further delimited by the fact 
that it confined itself to seven school systems in the state of Illinois, 
a state which has neither (1) enacted a comprehensive collective bargaining 
statute for public school teachers or (2) legalized teacher strikes. Any 
inferences, conclusions, or recommendations will be limited to school dis-
tricts \~ith the same characteristics as those under the study. 
Conflict Resolution 
Collective Bargaining 
1writer 1s definition. 
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
An academic field developed in recent years by 
social scientists; sometimes used interchangeably 
with the term "conflict management" but techni-
cally different because conflict resolution 
carries with it an air of finality. Relevant to 
this study, the term will be used to describe 
those methods, strategies, or social technolo9ies 
which can be employed to resolve or manage (1) 
the covert conflict which is inherent in the 
collective bargaining process and (2) the overt 
conflict which may manifest itself in collective 
bargaining impasses.l 
In the private sector, collective bargaining is 
the legal obligation of the employer and the 
representative of his employe~s to negotiate, 
administer, interpret, and enforce a written 
contract with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment.2 
2c. Wilson Randle and Max S. Wortman, op.cit., p. 8. 
collective Bargaining--cont. 
Teacher Negotiation 
Representatives 
School Management Negotiation 
Representatives 
11 
In the public education sector, collec-
tive bargaining (alternatively called 
"collective negotiations" and "profes-
sional negotiations") is a process where-
by employees as a group and their em- · 
players make offers and counter-offers 
on good faith on the conditions of their 
employment relationship for the purpose 
of reaching a mutually acceptable agree-
ment, and the execution of a written 
document incorporating any such agreement 
if requested by either party. Also, a 
process whereby a representative of the 
employees and their employer jointly 
determine their conditions of employment.! 
In both the private and public sector, 
collective bargaining is a power rela-
tionship accommodation. The essence of 
bargaining is compromise and concession-
making on matters where there is conflict 
between the parties and the relationship.2 
Teachers who represent a teachers' organi-
zation by negotiating \"ith administrative 
representatives at the bargaining table.3 
Broadly defined, these are individuals 
designated to represent the board of 
education in contract negotiations with 
teachers. Relevant to this study, such 
individuals include school superintendents 
principals, business managers, and school 
board.members.4 
lMyron Lieberman and Michael H. Moskow, Collective Negotiations for 
Teachers, (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1966), p. 418. 
2Wesley A. Wildman, "Aspects of Teacher Collective Action,'' Theory 
Into Practice, (April, ·1965), -56. 
3writer's definition. 
4writer's definition. 
Terms and Cqnditions of 
Employment 
Strike 
Collective Bargaining 
Agreement 
12 
Synonymous with the te.rm 11worki ng condi-
tions 11 and refers to such items as school 
calendar, the school day, promotion and 
transfer procedures, class assignment; 
class size, etc.1 
A concerted teacher activity involving 
two or more employees for the purpose of 
seeking to influence, pressure, or coerce 
a school board to make changes in working 
conditions or compensation.2 
Labor contracts or agreements negotiated 
in collective bargaining. These agreements 
are reduced to writing. That is, they are 
signed statements that indicate what each 
of the parties can and will do to make the 
cooperation of employers and employees 
effective. In short, the collective agree-
ment records what the parties have agreed 
to in their negotiations and it may deal 
with a wide range of subjects, from sick 
leave pay to grievance procedures and 
wages.3 
Iwesley A. Wildman and Fred B. Lifton, Analysis Of Education Associa-
tion Pro osed Com rehensive, 11 Level IV 11 Teacher Bar aining Agreement, 
Illinois Association of School Boards, Preliminary Edition, May 1972) p.66. 
2Adapted from Donald H. Wollett and Robert H. Chanin~ The Law and 
Practice of Teacher Negotiations, (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National 
Affairs, 1970), p.6:81. 
3Herbert G. Heneman, Jr. and Dale Yoder, Labor Economics, (Chicago: 
South-Western Publishing Co., 1965), p. 175. 
Mediation 
Fact-Finding 
Compulsory Binding 
Arbitration 
13 
Mediation is the process where a neutr.al 
individual, usually with the consent of 
the parties, attempts to reconcile or 
conciliate the differences between them, 
usually in joint or individual sessions 
with the parties. It is a direct extension 
and part of the collective bargaining pro-
cess since any settlement reached in media-
tion must be one mutually agreed upon by 
the parties. May be used in both preven-
tive and remedial ways.l 
Fact-finding is a procedure whereby an 
individual or a panel (the latter consis-
ting of at least one neutral person) con-
ducts a formal hearing wherein represen-
tatives of the teacher organization and 
the school board are given the opportunity 
to present evidence material to the im-
passe and negotiations, to make arguments 
with regard thereto, and to file briefs 
in support of their positions. The fact 
finder or panel thereafter issues a 
formal documument, setting forth recommen-
dations for the settlement of the impasse. 
These recommendations are advisory in~na­
ture and not2final and binding upon any of · the parties. 
An impasse mechanism in the ~ublic se~tor 
in which unresolved disputes are legally 
required to be submitted to a neutral 
judicial body which d2ter~ine a final 
solution to the conflict. 
1Ad2pted from Morris Slavney, "Impasse Procedures i~ Public Education,.! 
Readings On Collective Negotiations In Pt1bl ic Education. Edited by Stanley I 
M. Elam, ~1yron Lieberman, and Michael H. ~loskm'l (Chicago: Rand McNally & I 
Company, 1967), p. 426. 
2Ibid., p. 428. 
3Adapted from Ar.nold t~; Zack, 11 Dispute Settlement in the Public 
Sector, 11 Industrial Relations Law Digest, July, 1969, p.5. 
Voluntary Binding 
Arbitration 
Human Relations 
Strategy 
Conflict Strategy· 
1Writer's definition. 
~riter's definition. 
3Writer•s definition. 
14 
Unlike compulsory binding arbitration, this 
form of arbitration is not a preordained, 
predesigned, or legally required method of 
resolving a bargaining dispute. In contrast, 
this method of impasse resolution is some-
thing that the parties at the particular 
time in their negotiations willfully and 
voluntarily undertake as a means to culmi-
nate their dispute.l 
Alternatively called the 11 Cooperation 11 or 
11 integrative 11 approach to intergroup con-
flict. It is generally characterized by 
such integrative processes as involvement, 
continuous dialogue, and joint decision-
making. Underlying these processes are 
attitudes of trust, cooperation, and 
gestures of good will. Relative to collec-
tive bargaining, this strategy manifests 
itself in (1) pre-study committees; (2)post-
negotiation committees; and (3) continuing 
joint committees.2 
A means of resolving intergroup disagree-
ment which is advanced by game theorists, 
diplomatic strategists, students of revo-
lutions, and community organizers. Rela-
tive to the bargaining process, the con-
flict strategy focuses on threat, coercion, 
and the collective adversary procedures 
such as sanctions, boycotts, picketing, 
and strikes. This approach is sometimes 
called 11 power politics 11 because it makes 
use of3~ower to resolve intergroup dis-putes. 
Impasse 
Injunction 
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When in an effort to reach a collective 
bargaining agreement, the parties are either 
unable or unwilling to reach agreement. 1 Also, 
a disagreement between the parties so serious 
that further meetings and conversations seem 
fruitless. 2 
Court order restraining a strike by employees.3 
SUMr~ARY 
In summary, the reader is reminded that the general purpose of the 
study was to analyze dispute settlement procedures in public education forth 
specific aim of identifying an ansv-1er to this critical question: What im-
passe resolution methods should be employed to resolve school bargainitig dis-
putes? To answer this question the writer has (1) described alternative 
methods for resolving disputes as found in professional literature; (2) iden-
tified what methods are preferred by forty-two teacher and school management 
negotiation practitioners; and (3) investigated three districts with respect 
to factors which may have facilitated or impeded the resolution of the bar-
gaining impasses. 
lArthur A. Halinowski, private interview held at Loyola University 
Chicago, Illinois, September, 1973. 
2oonald H. Wollett and Robert H. Chanin, The Law and Practice of 
Teacher Neqotiations, (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, 
Inc., 1970), p. 64. · 
3Writer's definition. 
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CHAPTER I I 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION STRATEGIES IN PUBLIC EDUCATION BARGAINING: 
A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 
All forms of intergroup conflict--international, racial, or industrial--
necessitate a search for methods which facilitate the resolution of that 
conflict. In the industrial setting, it is especially evident that there is 
a need for· machinery into which employee unrest and dissatisfaction can be 
channelled. As a result, a formal institutionalized device for managin~ 
employee-employer conflict has been invented, namely, the mechanism of 
collective bargaining. 
Since.ninety-five percent of the labor contracts negotiated annually 
are terminated without the occurrence of a strike, it can be concluded that 
the collective bargaining process, at least in the private sector, is an 
effective technique for managing intergroup conflict in the industrial 
environment. However, in the situations where agreement is not reached and 
negotiations conflict escalates into overt labor dispute, it is important 
to investigate those methods which can be used to terminat~ the bargaining 
impasse. This chapter deals with phase one of the study and will describe 
some major dispute resolution strategies or social technologies which can 
be employed to resolve school bargaining impasses. these include the human 
relations strategy, mediation; fact-finding, arbitration, and the strike. 
l !6 
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THE HUMAN RELATIONS APPROACH 
The human relations approach to dispute resolution is alternatively 
called the "cooperation," "collaboration," "problem solving," or "integrative" 
approach. Professor Richard Wynn of the University of Pittsburgh has also 
termed this approach "collective gaining. 111 
The Nature of Conflict 
To understand this approach to school bargaining conflicts, it is 
necessary to define what a conflict is, and to specify its source. Stagner 
defines conflict as ''a situation in which two or more human beings desire 
goals which they perceive as being attainable by one or the other but not 
both. 112 To clarify this definition, there must be at least two parties; each 
party is mobolizing energy to obtain a goal, a desired object or situation--
be it food, territory, power, or economic affluence; and each party perceives 
the other as a barrier or a threat to the attainment of this goal. In other 
words, social conflict such as a school bargaining impasse will arise if 
Party A really prevents Party B from achieving a goal, or it will evolve if 
Party A perceives B as an obstacle even though there is no realistic basis 
for this view. Coser defines conflict as 11 a struggle over values and claims 
1Richard Wynn, "Collective Gaining ,11 
pp. 415-419. 
Phi Delta Kappan, April, 1970, 
2Ross Stagner, The Dimensions of Human Conflict (Detroit: University 
Press, 1967), pp. 136-138. 
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to scarce status, power, and resources in which the aims of the opponents 
to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals."l · N are 
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While the sources of conflict were a 11 uded to in the above paragraph, 
Bennis and associates 2 explain that human conflict may arise from at least 
two sources. One kind of conflict stems from different or incompatible goals 
held by persons or groups. These goals may reflect different values and 
concerns held'by the conflicting parties, and they may be grounded reli-
giously, politically, economically, or in some other way. During industrial 
conflict, for example, a school management may seek the goal of no wage 
increase for their employees. Conversely, the laboring component (teachers) 
desires a definite change in their economic life. In this illustration, 
incompatible goals become a source for conflict. 
A second kind of conflict reflects not incompatible outcomes to be 
achieved, but rather struggles over the allocation of commonly prized but 
scarce goods-- whether money, material goods, political power, or prestige 
and status. To clarify, this kind of conflict grows out of a situation in 
which needs and values are similar, but resources required to satisfy these 
values are limited and consequently, undistributable. Stated otherwise, 
conflict will occur when two or more people or groups strive for the same 
1Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: Macmillan, 
1956), p. 8. 
2warren G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne, and Robert Chin, editors. 
The Planning of Change (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), p. 151. 
goal or compete for the same space (space can be either physical or psy-
chological). To illustrate, teachers and school management both desire 
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to use a portion of state aid school monies for teachers• salaries. Teacher 
wage demands~ however, exceed the level which the board of education is 
willing to pay. By definition, the two groups are in conflict because 
there is a similarity of values in the presence of scarce resources. 
Game Theory 
The human relations approach to resolving bargaining disputes con-
siders the relationship among the nature of conflict, game theory, and 
. . 
the contrasting bargaining strategies known as distributive bargaining 
and integrative bargaining. 
Game Theory, which is a mathematical technique for analyzing conflict, 
advances the idea that collective bargaining is a game which can be played 
from at least two viewpoints.1 Bargaining can be approached as a "zero-
sum game" (\'tin-lose) in which any gains by the teachers• organization 
must be recorded as losses for school management and vice-versa;.that 
is, what one group wins, the other must lose. In a zero-sum bargaining 
game, the interests of the parties are diametrically opposed and oppo-
nents are, therefore, termed "adversaries".2 Zero-sum bargaining can 
happen in situations where goals are similar or dissimilar and resources 
1Anatol Rapoport, "The Use and Misuse of Game Theory," Scientific 
American, December, 1962, pp. 108-110 
2Thomas C. Schell~ng, The Strategy of Conflict (Mass.: Harvard 
University, 1960), p. 84 · 
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such as money, power, time, space, or position are scarce. 1 
Collective bargaining can conversely be approached as a "positive 
sum game." From this orientation, the parties have identical rather than 
conflicting interests and are concerned with coordinating their actions 
toward a common outcome. Because common interests underlie this approach, 
the parties are referred to as "partners." Popularly, this kind of bar-
gaining can be thought of as a 11 \'lin-win 11 game in contrast to the "win-lose 11 
2 
approach. 
Distributive Bargaining Vs Integrative Bargaining 
Collective bargaining conflict can be resolved or accommodated by 
using a variety of strategies. These strategies may be placed on a con-
tinuum bounded by pure distributive bargaining (the zero-sum approach) 
and pure integrative bargaining (the positive-sum approach). 3 Walton 
and McKersie4 indicate that when teachers and school management are directly 
competing for or claiming scarce resources like tax money, such conflicts 
are resolved by using a "distributive bargaining" strategy. This term 
1oavid W. Johnson, The Social Psychology of Education (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p. 159. 
2schelling, op.cit., pp. 4, 83. 
3Charles R. Perry and Wesl.ey A. Wildman, The Impact of Negotiations 
In Public Education: The Evidence From The Schools (Worthington, Ohio: 
Charles A. Jones Publishing Co., 1970), p. 61. 
4Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theor of 
I 
Labor Negotiations: An Analysis of A Social Interaction System 
- McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 11. 
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f rs to the activity of dividing limited resources. When the partici-re e . 
pants are faced with allocating, dividing, or distributing limited re-
ces inherent bargaining conflict is accelerated because each party sour ' 
is trying to win from the other party a favorable division of tbe limited 
S,. nee neither party wants to 1 ose and both wish to win, a resources. 
stalemate or hegotiations impasse is likely to occur. 
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Since win-lose bargaining often intensifies bargaining conflict, a 
different approach to negotiations is needed. This is "integrative bar-
gaining" or "problem-solving bargaining" because the parties try to 
integrate their resources toward a common task by using the problem 
solving approach. In this bargaining· process, the task of the negotiators 
is to discover the high payoff possibilities or the potential benefits 
for both parties. To reach this objective, the adversaries become 
"partners•• and proceed deliberately to discover the alternatives which 
increase joint gain. The negotiator behaving integratively is not con-
cerned about the payoff available for him at the expense of his opponent. 
Instead, his primary concern is to increase the total sum, and therefore, 
this bargaining approach is popularly thought of as a "win:-wi.n" game. To 
achieve a win-win outcome, he chooses matters where there is mutual 
interest and high joint gain, and he is always asking the question, "Does 
it have potential for integration of interests?" 1 
lwalton and McKersie, op.cit., p. 16. 
------------------·--------------------~-----
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Characteristices of Ihe Human Relations Approach 
The human relations approach to resolving collective bargaining 
deadlocks is characterized by the following intergroup behavior: {l)col-
laborative, ·intergroup problem-solving in which both teams search for 
superordinate goals; (2) post-negotiation committees; and (3) continuing 
joint committees. These three features are explained below. 
Collaborative, intergroup problem-solving. Blake and asso-
ciates1 list seven steps which characterize this style of decision 
making: 
1. Problem definition. An important first step in collaboration is 
to define the problem which needs to be solved. In ordinary \'lin-lose 
negotiating, each group defines the problem in isolation, but in this 
type of problem-solving, the problem is not defined prior to contact. It 
is developed by and through intergroup contact. "Both groups, or their 
representatives, together search out the issues that separate them. By 
joint effort, the problems that demand solution are identified.~2 This 
bilateral definition is an advantage because both sides agree to the 
"facts." This eliminates the individual or autonomous problem-soiving 
I phenomena in which it frequently happens that the "facts" seen by one 
I group are vastly different from the "facts" the other group has in des-
~ I criblng the same set of events. 
i 
I 1Robert R. Blake; Herbert A. Shepard, and Jane S. Mouton, Managing I ~tergroup Conflict In Industry (Houston: Gulf, 1964), pp. 90-93. 
22 
L 2Blake, Ibid., p. 90. 
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2. Full problem review. At this step, the problem is reviewed 
by as many members of the groups as is possible--not by subcommittees 
from the two groups. This review 11 COmmunicates the fundamental facts 
and issues to all members who eventually will commit themselves to a 
•t• ul final pos1 10n. 
3. Developing a range of alternatives. At this level joint 
committees or subgroups develop a range of possible alternatives for 
dealing with the previously defined and identified problems. This step 
is particularly important because the joint investigation of solutions 
avoids one or two alternatives that could propel the group into win-lose 
deadlock. 
4. Debate of alternatives by the whole intergroup. At this step, 
the committees report the reasons and rationale for each alternative to 
the larger combined groups. 
5. Searching for solutions. At this point, the joint groups or 
joint subcommittees test those alternatives that seem realistic and 
feasible and which the groups agree upon as having some prospect of being 
effective. 
6. Exploration and evaluation of solutions by the intergroup. 
Following joint subcommittee exploration or the solutions, the combined 
intergroup evaluates each of the proposed solutions. At this point, 
"Combinations of solutions or new solutions previously not seen may be 
lslake, op.cit., p. 91. 
23 
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discovered through the rich interchange possible in a large intergroup 
• 11 1 
""' discuss1on 
7. Weighing alternative solutions. At this step in intergroup prob-
lem solving the entire intergroup rank the tested solutions in ~ sequence 
from best to poorest. However, this ranking may be accomplished in joint 
subcommittees .. If this step is taken, then the ranked solutions are 
returned to the combined intergroup for review, discussion, and selection. 
11 The solution that seems best in the light of all facts and events can then 
be sifted from the rankings 11 , 2 
To summarize the foregoing outline or sequence of intergroup pro-
blem solving, Blake points out the following: 
The important feature of this sequence, however, is that the joint subgroups define the problem, search for alternative 
solutions, and evaluate each possible solution for the pro-
blems identified. In contrast, the common approach is to retain 
group boundaries where each group does its own work privately 
and separately form the group with who it eventually must find 
agreement. 
When the joint group step is taken, conditions produce facts, 
not misunderstandings, to serve as the basis for finding a 
solution. Omission of such joint effort invariably leads to 
the use of power or compromise. Dysfunctional approaches to 
intergroup relations are applied when two independent positions 
are developed from a full set of different circumstances. The 
inevitable result is that the two viewpoints are understood 
only partially by both of the groups since neither has the 
opportunity to assess fully3the thinking or the reasons behind the other group's analysis. 
1Blake, 012.cit., p. 92. 
2Ibid., p. 92. 
3Ibid., p. 93. 
Post-negotiation Committees. The human relations strategy assumes 
that some negotiation issues are not amenable to the style of decision 
making just described, and therefore, other mechanisms are available. 
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One common device is to defer final resolution of some particularly thorny 
crisis bargaining issue to a post-negotiation committee. In brief, it is 
a labor-management committee which may shorten or avert a strike by 
referral of a controversial issue to a more thorough, reasoned conside-
ration than is possible jn a crisis climate. 1 
Continuing Joint Committees. Another type of joint committee is 
one which meets intermittenly or regularly throughout the life of the 
contract. Such a corrmittee may study specific subject matters referred 
to it by the negotiators or it may establish its agenda as it goes along.2 
Continuing committees of this type can promote intergroup communication 
as well as resolve immediate problems which should not be postponed for 
regular bargaining sessions. 
In final analysis, pure, integrative human relations bargaining is 
a limited phenomenon in collective bargaining relationships, and more often 
than not, the parties become entangled in the win-lose distributive appraach 
to conflict resolution. The ultimate manifestation of distributive 
bargaining is the strike which is discussed next. 
lwilliam E. Simkin, 11 Positive Approaches To LaborPeace, 11 Critical 
Issues In Labor, ed. Max S. Wortman, Jr. (New York: t1acmil1an Co., 1969), 
p. 342. 
2Ibid., pp. 342-243. 
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THE STRIKE: AN APPROACH TO RESOLVING BARGAINING IMPASSE 
The haman relations appro~ch to dispute settlement is a strategy 
urged by many social psychologists who believe that the exercise of "win-
win" group dynamics such as collaboration and trust will serve to resolve 
bargaining impasses. Another group of social scientists offer quite 
different advice to the·problem of impasse resolution. They focus on the 
concept of pm·1er-- i • e. , the abi 1 i ty of one group to determine or influence 
the behavior of another group--and the strategic use of power instruments 
such as the strike.l 
The Role Of The Strike In The Private Sector 
Many experts in the field of labor relations concur on the funda-
mental idea that resolution of collective bargaining conflict is promoted 
in an environment where the bargaining adversaries can exert equal pres-
sure on each other. In particular, these authorities see the pressures 
of the strike as the common denominator that underlies successful group-
to-group interaction because such a tactic elicits potential economic 
and political "costs 11 which the parties want to avoid; in turn, the dangers 
and inconveniences prompt concession-making and compromises which culmi-
nate in a mutual agreement. Goulard explains how pressure can prevent 
bargaining conflict from escalating into overt conflict: 
. 
1Richard E. Walton, "Two Strategies of Social Change And Their 
D1lemmas," The Planning Of Change, edited by Warren G. Bennis, Kenneth.D. 
Benne, & Robert Chin (Chicago: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969), pp. 167-168. 
~------------------,---------------~=~·--~----------------------' 
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... it is a generally held belief that true collective bargaining 
flowers luxuriantly where the contending forces enjoy reasonably 
comparable economic power. The reasoning is that where mutual fear 
or respect exists, each party is loath to test its economic strength, 
and instead explores at length the merits and equities of the oppo-
sing party's position. The resultant joint analysis of the issues· 
is supposed to bring about just and reasonable solutions, without 
resort to economic warfare in the vast majority of cases.l 
Bakke and associates also explain that when the dangers of a potential 
strike permeate the bargaining atmosphere, settlement behavior is facilitated 
The right to bargain collectively ... rests ultimately on the right of 
the workers to strike, or that of the employer to "lock out" his 
workers. Yet calling a strike, like any declaration of war, involves 
a grave risk because there is no quarantee that the union will win. 
The employer is, of course, faced with an equal uncertainty. Hence 
a strike or even the threat of a strike offers a strong inducement 
to the parties to come to an understanding rather than to risk defeat. 
Consequently, the right to strike, if used wisely and responsibly, 2 performs a useful function in the system of collective bargaining. 
Another who is representative of authorities who look upon the strike 
as a means to generate agreement is Jack Stieber, Director of the School 
of Labor and Industrial Relations at Michigan State University: 
... the threat or actual use of these economic weapons is supposed to 
perform a useful function by exerting reciprocal pressures upon the 
parties to modify their positions to the extent necessary to bring 
about an agreement. Throughout the dispute both parties are subject 
to market pressures where the consumer's power of choice is exercised. 
Jobs can and have been lost and markets seriously depleted by long 
strikes or settlements leading to non-competitive price increases~3 
lEverett ~1. Goulard, "The Collective Bargaining Environment In Two 
Sectors: The Environment In Industries Regulated by Statute," Collective 
Bargaining Today (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, 1970), 
p. 281. 
2E. Wight Bakke, Clark Kerr, and Charles W. Anrod, Unions, Mana ement, 
And The Public, 2nd Edition (New York: Harcourt, Brace an Co., 1960 , p.231. 
3Jack Stieber, "Collective Bargaining In the Public Sector," Challenges 
To Collective Bargaining, ed. by Lloyd Ulman {Ne\'1 Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 
1967), pp. 82-83. 
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The Rol_f_gL.!I~e Strike In Public Education 
collective bargaining, whether in the private or the public sector, is 
a power relationship beb1een two parties. As Wesley Wildman of the University 
of Chicago has written, collective bargaining in public education is a ''power 
relationsh·ip and a process of power accommodation, the essence of which is 
compromise ana concession-making on matters over which there is conflict be-
btee11 the teacher organization and the board." 1 Accord-ing to this statement, 
power, or the capacity to influence the opponent through such means as re't'tards 
and punishments, must pervade the school bargaining atmosphere too. Theoret-
ically, wlien both sides live in fear of being economically or politically 
disadvantaged, they are motivated to seek agreement and compromise. Each 
side weighs the costs of agreeing to a proposal or making a concession against 
the risks and costs--i.e., loss of salary for teachers and loss of community 
support and/or state aid for school employers--of a strike or unilateral 
employer action at impasse. As in the private sector, when mutual dangers or 
costs exist, "agreement is usually reached prior to impasse without outside 
intervention and pressure. 112 David Seldon of the American Federation of 
Teachers capsu.lizes the value of the strike in teacher collective bargaining 
by stating, "Where the right--and the willingness--to strike exists, most 
disputes ~rill be settled without an actual walkout. Both sides then have an 
1wesley A. VJildman, "What's Negotiable?" The Collective Dilemma: 
, ~eg?tiatio!"!~tn Education, ed. by Patrick W. Carlton and Harold I. Goodwin 
Oh1o: Charles A. Jones Publishing Co., 1969), p. 70. . 
2oonald H. Wollett and Robert H. Chanin, The Law And Practice Of Teacher: 
Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1970) ' 
p. 6:46. - . 
------------•----«---~~~~--w----------------------1 
29 
endorses the strike as a force which promotes the resolution of intergroup 
. bargaining conflict: 
The most serious single obstacle to effective functioning of collective 
negotiations in public education is the absence of a bargaining force 
which motivates the school board toward bona fide bargaining and a 
genuine effort to reach an agreement which the teacher representative 
can accept with some degree of enthusiasm ... Most, although not all, 
school boards are not •deal-minded.• They are not disposed to accept 
the process as one of give-and-take. They have no sense of crisis and 
no feeling of urgency. They are content to let •negotiations• drag 
toward budget submission deadlines, comfortable in the thought that if 
no agreement has been reached by then, they are free to act unilaterally 
in accordance with the tradition of managerial sovereignty to which they 
are accustomed.z 
While the foregoing authorities have indicated that power and the strike 
are relevant to the problem of impasse resolution in school bargaining, some 
. writers argue that the strike cannot be transplanted into the public education 
I negotiations scene without problems. The problems focus on (1) the monopolis-
. tic status of public education and (2) the 11 essential services .. argument. 
The public Education Monopoly. Like many governmental services, public 
education is monopolistic in nature. That is, there are few substitutes for 
such services and virtually no fear on the part of school management that they 
I will 11 90 out of business 11 during a strike. Due to a lack of competition, 
·economic and market pressures which operate in the private sector do not 
1oavid Seldon, 11 Needed: More Teacher Strikes, .. Saturday Review, May 15, 
1965, p. 75. 
2wollett and Chanin, op. cit., p. 6:46. 
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the strike weapon with its concurrent reciprocal pressures are, therefore, 
reduced because the strike is not a pure economic weapon. In contrast, when 
private sector unions use the strike and the strike threat, equal economic 
costs are imposed on the parties because there is a competitive· market 
place.l It should be noted, however, that a teacher strike can be an effect-
ive economic weapon in a monopolistic setting when the school employer loses 
state aid money during a work stoppage, thus insuring reciprocal dangers. In 
sum, notwithstanding the fact that pure economic distinctions do exist between 
private employment and public education, mutual economic pressures or costs 
can be generated which motivate the parties to move toward settlement. 
Essential Services Argument. While the strike is the basic component 
in private sector dispute machinery, the unique characteristics of public 
employment preclude the immediate application of the labor model to all public 
sector impasses.2 Specifically, it is frequently maintained that public 
services like education, police, and fire protection are essential, and con-
tinuity of service must be guaranteed. Succinctly, disruption of such serv·i ces 
due to a strike jeopardizes the health and safety of the publ'ic welfare. Be-
cause of the 11 essential services 11 argument, other impasse resolution proced-
ures--mediation, fact-finding, and in some cases, even arbitration--have been 
lHarry H. Wellington and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., 11 Structuring Collective 
Bargaining In Public Employment," Yale Law Journal, April, 1970, pp. 846-847. 
2stieber, op. cit., p. 79. 
. -...... 
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developed to eliminate reliance upon the strike as a means of resolving 
employment di_sputes. These strike substitutes will be discussed 
shortly. 
While the essentiality argument is easily applied to such critical 
public sector areas as police and fire service, it can be overcome with re-
spect to public education simply because a teachers' strike, though inconven-
ient, does not create imminent peril or risk to the health and safety of a 
community. Lost school days can be recaptured, and obviously, a health crisis 
is not precipitated when schools close for holidays, weekends, or summer 
vacation .. Stieber quotes Professor Myron Lieberman, a nationally recognized 
expert on teacher-board negotiations, on this point: 
... schools are closed for summer, Christmas, Easter and thanksgiving 
vacations, for football games, basketball tournaments, harvesting, 
teachers' conventions, inclement weather, presidental visits, and for 
a host of other reasons without anyone getting excited over the harm 
done to the children.1 
Furthermore, it should be noted that four states have legislatively 
made an essential-services distinction--i.e., they have recognized the diff-
erence in public sector work stoppages and have consequently relaxed the pro-
hibition against teacher strikes. In 1969, Vermont enacted a teacher negotia-
tions statute which evidenced the idea that a blanket ban on all public 
employee strikes is unrealistic. While this statute does ~ot explicitly 
prohibit or permit strikes--it is silent on this matter--the law does contain 
the following important language relevant to strike injunctions: 
1stieber, op. cit., p. 79. 
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No restraining order on temporary or permanent injunction shall be 
granted in any case brought with respect to any action taken by a 
representative organization or an official thereof or by a school board 
or representative thereof in connection with or relating to pending or 
future negotiations, except on the basis of findings of fact make by a 
court of competent jurisdiction after due hearing prior to the issuance 
of the restraining order on injunction that the commencement or contin-
uance of the action poses a clear and present danger to a sound program 
of school education which in the light of all relevant circumstances it 
is in the best public interest to prevent. Any restraining order of 
injunction issued by a court as herein provided shall prohibit only a 
specific act or acts expressly determined in the findings of fact to 
pose a clear and present danger.1 
In 1970, Hawaii and Pennsylvania became the first states to authorize strikes 
by public employees. In these two laws, teachers were granted "conditional 11 
strike rights because mediation and fact-finding procedures must be exhausted 
first: 
The Hav.1aii law provides for mediation and fact-finding first. 
Then, if an impasse still exists, employees may strike upon ten-day notice 
and after a mandatory 60-day cooling-off period. The state labor relation 
board set up under the law may set requirements that the union must comply 
with regarding essential services or to avoid imminent or present danger 
in strike situations. 
The Pennsylvania law permits strikes by all employees except securi 
forces--police, fire, and guards in prisons and mental hospitals--and 
court personnel. It also mandates mediation and fact-finding first. 
Then, if an impasse still exists, the employees may strike unless there is 
a "clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety, or welfare 
of the gublic." When such a threat is found by a court, an injunction is 
issued.2 
The most recent legislative breakthrough relevant to teacher strike 
rights occurred in Oregon•s 1973 legislative session when lawmakers amended a 
1vermont, Certificated Employees Bargaining Act, § 2010. 
2committee On Executive Management And Fiscal Affairs, National 
Governors• Conference, 1970 Supplement To Report Of Task Force On State And 
Local Government Labor Relations (Chicago: Public Personnel Association, 
1971), p. 52 •. 
bargaining statute legalizing the right to strike. Similar to Hawaii and 
Pennsylvania~ teachers may strike only after the exhaustion of mediation 
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and fact-finding, and then only if a strike would not be harmful to the 
community. In addition, if the strike is restrained by a court order because 
of public peril, binding arbitration is used to terminate the dispute. 
Notwith~tanding the .argument that (1) collective bargaining based on 
the right to strike can move the parties toward more equal bargaining power 
and greater labor peace, and (2) that both the monoply and essential ser-
vices problems can be mitigated in the public education sector, the con-
troversy surrounding the strike will continue to muster strength for alter-
native impasse-resolving machinery in the form of mediation, fact-finding, 
and arbitration. These structures for dispute resolution, sometimes re-
ferred to as 11 conciliation and appeal strategies, 11 \'lill be examined shortly. 
To fully appreciate these strategies, however, it is necessary to discuss 
the most desirable format for dispute settlement--that of 11 direct negotia-
tions. 11 
DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS 
Arnold Zack, an experienced mediator, fact-finder, and arbitrator 
in both public and private sectors, categorically states that voluntary 
dispute settlement directly between the parties is the best means for 
resolving conflict in an industrial relationship; 
Direct negotiation, is, without doubt, the most desirable for-
mat for dispute settlement; for if there is to be a workable agree-
ment, it must come directly from the partners to the relationship. 
Even if there is outside neutral intervention through recommenda-
tions, or an arbitration award, such reports are not ating· 
or self-enforcing and, in the last analysis, must 
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the parties themselves before implementation. Thus, since the parties· 
must finally accommodate language with which they must live for the 
period of the agreement, direct negotiation remains the keystone of 
collective bargaining. 
Nonetheless, while it is a preferable goal that the disputants work 
out their conflict alone, direct negotiations between the parties may fail 
to culminate in agreement, and since the legal strike is not usually in 
the background as pressure for direct settlement, teachers and school man-
agement can avail themselves of a long ladder of procedures to resolve 
collective bargaining disputes. These are the appeal devices or reconcilia-
tion strategies of mediation, followed by fact-finding with nonbinding 
recommendations, and binding arbitration. 
t1EDIATION 
The most common device used to bring disputing parties to agreement 
is mediation, in which a neutral third party functions as an extension of 
the direct negotiations process. 2 Joseph R. Crowley, of the New York State 
Public Employment Relations Board, characterizes the process in this manner: 
... Essentially mediation is the interjection of a third party to act 
as a catalyst in reaching agreement. Mediation is unstructured. The 
process of mediation varies with the parties, the personalities, and 
the state of negotiations. A mediator does not dictate; he persuades 
and advises. Depending upon the circumstances, he will sometimes meet 
with each party separately, other times with both pa~ties, and still 
1Arnold M. Zack, 11 Impasses, Strikes, and Resolutions, 11 Public Workers 
And Public Unions, edited by Sam Zagoria (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1972)' p. 106. 
2Arnold M. Zack, ·11 Dispute Settlement In The Public Sector, .. Industrial 
Relations Law Digest, July, 1969, p. 4. 
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other times with the chief negotiator for each side. Occasionally, 
he will simply be present and silent. 
Mediation does serve one important function: It does result in 
the clarification or reduction of the issues in impasse.! 
According to Zack, the mediation machinery is perceived to be an 
effective means of resolving disputes between labor and management in the 
private sector. 2 However, while it has been generally successful as'a way 
to produce agreement and salvage a relationship, the mediation procedure 
may fail to make a contribution in resolving conflict because of the 
following reasons: 
(1) Hostility or the noncommunicativeness of the parties.3 
(2) Unacceptability of the mediator.4 
(3) The mediation process may be rejected on political grounds. 
While mediators have no legal authority to impose a settlement--they play a 
role of suggesting compromises and alternative settlements--their unoffi-
cial power can be so great that it becomes politically impossible to reject 
their recommendation. This is one reason why management teams tend, more 
1Joseph R. Cro\'1ley, 11 Impasse Procedures In Collective Negotiations, 11 
Collective Bargaining Today (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 
1970), pp. 158-159. 
p. 4. 
2Arnold M. Zack, 11 Impasses, Strikes, and Resolutions, 11 op.cit., p. 108. 
3Arnold M. Zack, 11 Dispute Settlement In The.Public Sector, 11 op.cit., 
4Ibid., p.4. 
-------~~~~---------~----------·----·----------·--------~------------------------~ 
than teachers, to avoid mediation; they fear that mediation will exert 
pressure on the board to modify its position."1 
(4) Public sector mediation takes place in a different economic 
environment than private sector mediation: 
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... the private sector mediator works in the context of a free labor 
market, business competition, profit levels, and the like. These 
factors,are not controlling in the public sector where tax structure, 
legislative controls on budgets, state aid formulae, and civil 
service rules tend to be more pertinent standards. The mediator must 
learn to work within a context that forbids the employer from going 
out of business or immediately passing on the increased cost of 
settlement to the consumer.2 
(5) Mediators have little or no prior experience in public sector 
bargaining. As Zack explains, 11 the issues in dispute tend to be quite 
different from the traditional privat~ sector problems of wages, hours, 
seniority, and the like. The public sector mediator must learn not only a 
wholly new vocabulary, he must also learn to deal with questions of class-
room size, tenure, curriculum development, police-fire parity, and the 
1 ike. u3 
(6) Public sector mediation takes place in a different psychological 
context. 11 In the private sector the pressures for direct settlement are 
perhaps greater with the legal strike lurking in the background. 11 4 In 
lt~yron Lieberman, 11 What To Do When The Talks Break Down,- 11 School 
Management, April, 1969, p. 26. 
2Arnold M. Zack, 11 Impasses, Strikes, and Resolutions, op.cit., p. 108. 
3 I b i d • , p • 1 08 • 
4 Ibid . , p. 106. 
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contrast, public education bargaining usually occurs without the silent 
partner of the strike; and with the absence of such pressure, communication 
as well as movement between the parties stagnates. In brief, the lack of a 
strike threat tends to dilute the effectiveness of a public sector mediator. 
"If the strike ... were legalized in the public sector as the alternative to 
settlement at mediation, this would most certainly tend to increase the 
number of settlements in mediation.ul 
(7) Another deterrent to effective mediation is that it is too often 
imposed on one or both parties rather than being mutually desired. Zack says: 
If a jurisdiction does not provide for a formal impasse procedure, 
the parties are free to negotiate one between themselves, provided that 
collective bargaining is authorized for the state. Such self-developed 
procedures benefit from a positive orientation of the parties toward 
settlement, and are likely to be more effective than if one of the 
parties is dragged screaming into an appeal procedure that it considers 
imposed from on high. 
The success of any machinery is related to the extent to which 
the parties voluntarily accept it. Thus as direct negotiation is more 
desirable than third party intervention, mediation or conciliation 
with its emphasis on voluntarism must be deemed to be more desirable 
than fact-finding. And fact-finding, since it is advisory· and requires 
consent of the parties for implementation of any rec~mmendations, is 
considered more acceptable than binding arbitration. 
Charles R. Perry, who researched impasse resolution experience in eight 
public school systems, concurs that mediation should be used only if both 
~ parties agree to seek and accept the services of a mediato~.3 
lArnold M. Zack, 11 1mpasses, Strikes, and Resolutions, 11 op.cit., 
pp. 106, 109. 
2 Ibid., p. 107. · 
3charles R. Perry,. 11 lmpasse Resolution In Education 11 (unpublished 
Ph.D dissertation, University of Chicago, 1968), p. 246. 
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Due to the influence of some of the foregoing factors, mediation may 
fail to successfully conclude negotiations. Other steps such as fact-find-
ing and arbitration may then be invoked in an effort to resolve the bar-· 
gaining conflict. 
FACT FINDING 
Fact-finding is typically the second procedure used to resolve impas-
ses over new contract terms in pub 1 i c emp 1 oyment, and it is spe 11 ed out 
in various forms in at least twenty-four state statutes. 1 Usually, fact-
finders review the intergroup conflict by conducting hearings where each 
party has an opportunity to state its case. The fact-finders then issue a 
report which in.cludes a recommendation for settlement. In most instances, 
these recommendations are not binding on the parties.2 In Nevada, the fact-
finder can act in either a recommendatory or binding capacity, depending 
upon the will of the bargaining parties. 3 Because of its non-binding nature, 
the term 11 fact-finding 11 is synonymous with the term 11 advisory arbitration" 
in that the recommendations of the fact-finder or advisory arbitrator are 
advisory only and are not binding on either party. 4 If the parties fail to 
1Arnold r~. Zack, 11 Dispute Settlement In The Public Sector, op.cit., 
p. 5. 
2Lieberman, op.cit., p. 28. 
3state Labor Laws 38:228. 
4wayne F. Anderson, R. Theodore Clark, Jr., and John T. Weise, Fact-
Findin In The Public Sector--A Case Stud (Chicago: Public Personnel-----
Association, 1970 , p. 2. 
~W?ClT 
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abide by the recommendations, further procedures are sometimes available. 
For example, ·under the New York Taylor Act, \'/hen the bargainers refuse the 
recommendations, the dispute is given to the local legislature--i.e., board 
of education--for final determination. 
Zack further explains the basic characteristic of fact-finding: 
Fact-finding is procedurally akin to arbitration in terms of 
providing a forum for the presentation of diverse views of the parties 
as well as providing a neutral individual or board to weigh the claims 
of both the employer and the employee organization in the light of 
equitable or reasonable standards for the positions involved. But it 
lacks the finality of either voluntary or compulsory arbitration and 
as a result neither side is bound to do more than receive and hope- 1 fully respect, embrace and agree to the recommendations of the board. 
As a substitute for the economic weapon of the strike, fact-finding 
is based on the conviction that the political process can be used to resolve 
public sector bargaining disputes. In theory, fact-finders who are empower-
ed to make recommendations or advisory avmrds will be able to provide an 
effective political substitute for the strike. That is, fact-finding is 
premised upon the assumption that the recommendations or decisions of neutral 
parties will be persuasive to the community, as well as to the teachers' 
organization, and the board of education. 2 
How effective is the power of political persuasion through the utili-
zation of fact-finding accompanied by public recommendations? With respect 
to public employees in general, Professor James Stern has analyzed the first 
1Arnold ~1. Zack, 11 Dispute Settlement In The Public Sector, op.cit., 
p. 6. 
2Arvid Anderson, 11 Strikes And Impasse Resolution In Public Employment, .. 
Michigan Law Review, March, 1969, pp. 953-954. 
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three years of experience with fact-finding in Wisconsin, a state which has 
had the most experience with fact-finding in public employee disputes, and 
concluded that over seventy percent of the fact-finding awards have served 
as a basis for settlement of disputes. 1 With respect to fact-finding in 
public education, Perry notes that fact-finding should be available as a 
mechanism for resolving teacher-board bargaining disputes. Moreover, Perry 
maintains that the substitution of a political process of impasse resolution 
for the strike weapon would facilitate more stable bargaining relationships 
in the public education environment. 2 
As just noted, fact-finding has received approval from some experts in 
the labor-management field. Nevertheless, the fact-finding with recommen-
dations route, for one reason or another, does not always bring about the 
end of a negotiations dispute. The problems inherent in this dispute 
settlement ~recess are discussed as follows: 
(1) One condition which impedes fact-finding success is that "Both 
parties ... have a convenient dodge, because of their advisory nature, to· 
avoid compliance with the recommendations. 113 That is, the fact-finder has 
no mandatory power of ordering compliance with his decision as is found in 
1
stieber, op.cit., p. 75. 
2Perry, op.cit., p. 244-246. 
3Arnold M. Zack, 11 0ispute Settlement In The Public Sector," op.cit., 
p. 6. 
.. 
binding arbitration. To state the problem in another way, fact-finding 
success is measured by "the acceptability of recommendations."1 
(2} A second reason for fact-finding failure is related to the ide~ 
that the very presence of such appeal machinery may itself interfere with 
settlement via the route of either direct negotiations or mediation. More 
precisely, it interferes. with the normal bargaining process: 
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... Fact-finding has, in fact, come to be accepted as yet another 
appeal beyond mediation. It is evident that the parties increasingly 
seek to utilize all the available steps of the procedure, to get their 
11 little bit more." The very availability of fact-finding tends to 
assure its invocation, and consequently diminishes to some degree 
the likelihood of settlement in mediation. Mediation, with fact-find-
ing waiting in the wings, sometimes takes on the appearance of a rite 
which must be gone through before the parties get to real crisis 
bargaining. The problem is made somewhat worse by the fact-finder's 
tendency .to delve enthusiastically into what transpired at mediation 
so he can gauge the area of acceptability of his own report. If this 
happens in one year's impasse, it assuredly will lead the parties the 
next year to hold offers of compromise close to their chest during 
mediation, recognizing that they will have to yield even more when they 
get to fact-finding, or beyond. 
Unquestionably the effectiveness of mediati~n would be improved if 
fact-finding were not so readily available.... · 
In short, fact-finding, as a method of resolving negotiations impasse, can 
be criticized because the parties may wait for fact-finding rather than 
seriously endeavoring to reach direct agreement by themselves. 3 
1Anderson, op.cit., p. 966. 
2Arnold M. Zack, "Impasses, Strikes, and Resolutions," op.cit., p. 112. 
3crm'lley, op.cit., p. 159. 
As indicated above, closure of impasse may not be achieved through 
the fact-finding process, thus necessitating the additional step of arbi-
tration. 
BINDING ARBITRATION: COMPULSORY AND VOLUNTARY 
Because mediation and fact-finding may not be accepted as final, 
strikes may still occur. Another dispute settlement mechanism has, there-
fore, been invented to prevent the strike. This device is called binding 
arbitration and is characterized as follows: 
Binding arbitration incorporates many of the virtues attributed 
to fact-finding: (1) the expert neutral; (2) taking evidence from 
both sides on the merits of their positions in a judicial manner; 
(3) issuing a report based on \'/hat the arbitrator determines to be 
the appropriate resolution of the dispute. The prime difference 
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of course is that the arbitrator's award is final and binding. This, 
the advocates of arbitration assert, is what is necessary to bring 
a finality to employer-employee disputes, to protect the public inter-
est, and to assure that the neutral •s report is accepted. It is at 
the same time the device to bring into line the militant employee 
groups, as well as the reluctant 11 king can do no '.'Jrong 11 employers.l 
To further describe binding arbitration, it is necessary to distin-
guish between two arbitration techniques used in the area of new contract 
dispute settlement. The first is compulsory binding arbitration, and the 
second is called voluntary binding arbitration. 
Zack explains compulsory arbitration in this manner: 
Compulsory arbitration presupposes a legal requirement that an un-
resolved dispute be submitted to a judicial body at a certain time in 
the process of negotiation, presumably prior to the bud~et deadline. 
1Arnold M. Zack, 11 Impasses, Strikes, and Resolutions, .. op.cit., p. 118. 
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At that point there would be solicitation of the parties• views and· 
thereafter a binding determination by a single or group of neutrals, 
provided for under the enabling legislation. The details of such com-
pulsory arbitration systems vary. The essentia) element of compulsory 
arbitration is that it is? predesigned final solution to the conflict,· 
which the parties are required to utiliLe if they are unable to re-
solve their disputes by direct negotiation. 
The effectiveness of compulsory arbitration as a substitute for the 
right to strike in the public employment field depends upon the expertise 
of neutral decision makers. The Pennsylvania collective bargaining law, 
which utilizes arbitration as a method of resolving disputes involving 
police an~ firemen, provides for a neutral tripartite board, with the 
neutral to be agreed upon by the parties, or to be selected from a list 
provided by the American Arbitration Association. 2 
In the second kind of arbitration--voluntary binding arbitration--we 
discover that it is not 11 preordained 11 as in compulsory arbitration. That 
is, this means of impasse resolution is 11 Something that the parties at a 
particular time in their negotiations willfully and voluntarily undertake r 
as an alternative to the impasse or economic force (of a strike)· or even· as 
an alternative to the labor court. The essence of voluntary arbitration 
is that, although the award is legally binding, it is something the parties 
themselves have agreed to utilize and they are thus morally comri1itted to it 
as well. 113 
1Arnold M. Zack, 11 Dispute Settlement In The Public Sector, op.cit., 
p. 5. 
2Pennsylvania, P~blic Employee Relations Act, Article XX, Section 
2002. 
3Arnold M. Zack, 11 0ispute Settlement In The Public Sector, op.cit., 
p. 5. 
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Both arbitration processes have proponents as well as opponents. 
ManY who advance the "essential services" argument endorse compulsory 
arbitration because it preserves the continuity of necessary public services; 
i.e., it assures that any impasse will be resolved without interruption of 
. 1 
serv1ces. 
Compulsory arbitr~tion also has its critics. Indeed, it seems to have 
more enemies than proponents. These people attack this conflict resolution 
process for a variety of reasons: 
(1) Some authorities claim it has a negative impact on direct negotia-
tions between the parties; that is, this kind of third party determination 
can frustrate the negotiating process. Specifically, Zack argues that when 
this device is provided, there is that chance that "the parties with unten-
able positions would assume and hold to extreme postions in order to force 
compulsory arbitrat1on. 2 Furthermore, he says that the parties may adhere 
to their extreme positions in hope that "the more extreme their position, 
the closer to their real goals will come the split-the-difference award."3 
Lieberman writes, "reliance upon third party arbitration weakens the in-
centive to agree at the negotiating table."4 
lzack, 11 Dispute Settlement In The Public Sector, 11 op. cit., p-. 7. 
2 Ibid . , p. 7 . 
3Arnold M. Zack, "Impasses, Strikes, and Resolutions," op.cit., p. 118. 
4Lieberman, op.cit., p. 28. 
-x -. :t:l 
·f" crowley also regards compulsory arbitration as detrimental to the negoti:: 
I ting process because if third party determination is at the end of the ne-
i. 
I 
I 
gotiating road, the "parties will not engage in meaningful negotiations.~! 
Virgil B. Day concurs by stating that, 11 Any time one party to n~goti ati ons 
sees potential gain in intervention, he will make no serious effort to 
settle without it. 112 Perry and Wildman say that compulsory binding arbi-
tration has not proven to be an effective impasse resolution mechanism in 
contract negotiations because it tends to undermine collective bargaining 
and encourage bargaining impasses. 11 This is a function of the fact that the 
imposition of arbitration relieves the parties of the ultimate responsibil-
ity for decision-making and the consequences of any failure to reach agree-
ment, thereby eliminating the incentive to seek or accept compromise in the 
course of bargaining. 113 In short, authority consensus seems to say that 
compulsory arbitration is a deterrent to direct negotiations. 
(2) A second objection to compulsory arbitration is that 11 it is a 
delegation of legislative power to arbitrators--who are not elected offi-
cials and who are not responsible directly to the people--to decide the 
cost of government or to determine the methods to be used in carrying out 
1crowley, op. cit., p. 161. 
2virgil B. Day, 11The Responsibilities-of Labor and ~1anagement: Will 
The Private Sector Serve The Public Needs?" Collective Bargaining Today 
(Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, 1970), p. 28. 
3
charles R. Perry and Wesley A. Wildman, The Impact Of Negotiations In 
Public Education: The Evidence From The Schools (Worthington, Ohio: Charles 
A. Jones Publishing Co., 1970), p. 91-92. 
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the responsibility of elected officials."1 
(3) Thirdly, some discredit the machinery because it can lead to 
11 fully controlled labor management relationship, and, indeed, even to a 
fully controlled economy ... 2 While this device might be the answer to re-
solving impasses in such essential services as police and fire, compulsory 
arbitration may spread to other less essential services in the public sector, 
namely, public education, as well as to services in the private sector, thus 
creating a threat to free collective bargaining. 
(4) . A fourth argument is psychological in nature. Experiment£ in 
intergroup conflict have clearly revealed that when two groups reach im-
passe, the solution provided by an outside third-party consultant is not 
really a 11 Solution 11 • Harold J. Leavitt3 says that while the winning group 
readily accepts the third-party decision, the losing group, by contrast, 
will usually feel disgruntled. In particular, 11 Strikes by employees dis-
satisfied with an arbitrator's award are likely to occur or, even if there 
is no actual strike, there is likelihood of slowdown, blue flu, mass res-
ignation, etc. The machinery is valuable only to the extent to which the 
parties wish to abide by it. 114 Decisions are best implemented when they are 
1crowley, op. cit., p. 161. 
2Arnold M. Zack, "Dispute Settlement In The Public Sector," Industrial 
Relations Law Digest, July, 1969, p. 8. 
3Harold J. Leavitt, Managerial Psychologt_ (Chicago.: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1964), p. 292. 
4zack, "Dispute Settlement In The Public Sector," op. cit., p. 7. 
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formulated by the two negotiating parties themselves. 
Zack: 
(5) Another argument, related to the foregoing, is explained by 
... if compulsory arbitration is not truly desired by either or 
both of the parties, how can it be effectively administered? Is 
there really any way to compulsorily impose good faith compliance 
with detested procedures? A proceeding that goes on v1ithout the 
cooperation of.one of the parties can hardly be likely to result 
in a tenable settlement.! 
(6} Zack presents a further problem: 
the nature of the neutral as a governmental appointee, is such 
that he is likely to be instructed to serve as the protector of 
the public interest. He is not likely to be committed to the 
development of mutuality and rapport between the parties, or to 
serving as their agent. Thus, he is likely to be subject to leg-
islative and public pressures. Therefore, the traditional role 
of the neutral~ as one both parties have faith in to help them 
reach their settlement, is sacrificed to the expedient of keeping 
tax rates down. This orientation is likely to further detract 
from acceptability of the neutral, and increase the prospects of 
non-cooper~tion, or worse, non-compliance with his awards.2 
lzack, "Dispute Settlement In The Public Sector," op.cit., p. 8. 
2zack, Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
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{7) A final objection to the umpiring system of compulsory binding 
arbitration is advanced by Abel who feels that the resolution of bargaining 
disputes via arbitration will only 11 destroy the existing system of com-
munication by causing the parties to communicate with the public, or the 
arbitrator, or the governmental intervener, rather than with each other. 111 
Indeed, he reminds us that collective bargaining has worked because ''it has 
provided workers with an effective means of communicating their complaints 11 
2 to management. 
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION 
In at least one way, the voluntary arbitration procedure is similar to 
compulsory arbitration: an expert neutral is essential to both and can be 
selected either by a neutral organization such as the American Arbitration 
Association or by the parties directly. However, in either case 11 the par-
ties would be provided with the choice of the individual and with the right 
to establish the scope of his authority, 113 
In reference to its value, the most pragmatic reason for utilizing 
voluntary arbitration is that the bargaining opponents are usually more 
committed to adhere to the neutral •s findings than is the case in compulsory 
1r.w. Abel, 11 The Collective Bargaining Environment in Two Sectors: In 
Private Nonregulated Industry, .. Collective Bargaining Today, bp. cit., 
p. 280. 
2Ibid., p. 279. 
3zack, 11 Dispute Settlement In The Public Sector, .. op. cit., p. 9. 
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arbitration. Paraphrased, since the parties are willing to undertake it, 
theY are, therefore, morally obligated to abide by a third-party determi-
1 
nation. 
As a substitute for strikes, voluntary arbitration machinery may seem 
more valuable than compulsory arbitration. Zack, however, reminds us that 
this method of conflict resolution is not an absolute answer, and refers .us 
to certain limitations: First, because its nature is voluntaryism, there is 
no assurance that this process will be used. Second, while the parties are 
more inclined to abide by third-party intervention, there is still no firm 
assurance that the award will be complied with by the parties. A third 
problem has to do with the question of cost consequences of voluntary arbi-
tration. On one hand, for example, the umpire's award may result in higher 
wages than through direct negotiations regardless of the ability of the 
employer to pay. And on the other side, the decision may set wages at a 
less than desirable level in spite of the muscle of the particular employee 
. . . 1 d 2 organ1zat1on 1nvo ve . 
Despite these dangers, Zack concludes that 11 V01untary arbitration 
appears to have fewer obstacles to it than compulsory arbitration, and 
greater finality than does fact-finding with recommendations. Indeed, 
voluntary arbitration appears to be the only truly effective way of resol-
ving many of the serious problems that we are increasingly being confronted 
with by contracts in the field of public employment. 113 
1
zack, 11 Dispute Settlement In The Public Sector, .. op. cit., p. 10. 
2Ibid., p. 11. 
3Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
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SUMMARY 
In reviewing the various procedures for resolving bargaining impasses 
public education, professional literature suggests the following: 
(1) The most ideal solution is that the parties learn to negotiate 
with each other in good faith and mutual respect. This is called the 11direct 
negotiations .. approach to dispute settlement. 
(2) The direct negotiations approach to impasse resolution should be 
based on the 11 human relations 11 strategy which emphasizes cooperative efforts, 
joint-committee problem solving, post-negotiation committees, and regular 
joint study meetings throughout the year. 
(3) A strike ban in public education is not essential and limits the 
resolution of negotiations conflict because reciprocal pressures are re-
moved from the bargaining atmosphere. Mutual capacity for injury is the 
constant prod to compromise and settlement psychology. While the strike 
seems antithetic to the human relations approach, the two strategies can be 
complimentary. The strike has been and will continue to be an effective 
stimulus for both direct negotiations or mediated settlements. 
(4) Notwithstanding the factors wh.ich may impede mediation success, 
mediation would seem to make a genuine contribution toward school bargaining 
peace primarily because it is an extension of the direct negotiations 
approach. 
(5) Fact-finding does not seem to be a proper vehicle for dispute 
resolution in public education labor negotiations. Authority opinion sug-
gests that appeal steps, such as fact-finding and arbitration, tend to 
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minimize the value of direct negotiations and propel the parties toward 
these other dispute settlement procedures. That is, there is a tendency for 
the parties to escalate towards third-party interventions· because they are 
available. Fact-finding, ironically, can encourage bargaining impasses. 
(6) Compulsory binding arbitration has many serious defects. A major 
problem is that the availability of this device may tempt the parties to 
use it as a crutch. The 11 Let-George-Do-It 11 syndrome weakens the possibility 
that the parties will use the direct negotiations route to dispute settle-
ment. Teachers and school management must look to themselves for solutions 
to bargaining problems, not to a third-party arbitrator. 
(7) Voluntary binding arbitration has fewer flaws than compulsory 
arbitration. Nevertheless, it may make the collective bargaining process 
less effective because the parties abdicate their responsibilities for con-
flict resolution to a third party. 
(8) According to authority opinion, the best social technology for 
resolving teacher-school board bargaining disputes seems to be a combination 
of the human relations approach, mediation, and the strike. 
To conclude this chapter, the reader will note that TABLE 2 summarizes 
the public education collective bargaining laws which have been enacted to 
date as they relate to the problem of impasse resolution. It can be ob-
served that most of the laws provide for m~diation and/or fact-finding. 
State 
Alaska 
California 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Florida 
Hawaii 
TABLE 2 
A SUMMARY OF STATE BARGAINING LAWS 
RELEVANT TO IMPASSE RESOLUTION 
IN TEACHER NEGOTIATIONSa 
Impasse Resolution Procedure 
11 Mediation 11 with recommendations made public.b 
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By any procedure mutually acceptable. If no procedure 
is agreed upon, a tripartite committee reports its find-
ings at a public meeting of the parties. Non-binding 
recommendations. 
Mediation by State Board of Education; either party may 
request advisory arbitration. 
Either party may request mediation by any method agreed 
upon; either party may request fact-finding with 
recommendations. 
Advisory Arbitration. 
Public Employee Relations Board appoints mediator or 
mediators and fact-finding boards. Parties may agree 
to submit unresolved issues to binding arbitration. If 
the parties have not mutually agreed to submit the dis-
pute to final and binding arbitration, either party 
shall be free to take whatever lawful action it deems 
necessary to end the dispute. This means that the 
employees could strike but only after mediation and 
fact-finding procedures have been exhausted.c 
asource of this summary, except for others indicated, comes from a sum-
mary of state labcw· laws in Government Employee Relations Report (Washing-
ton, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, December, 1971), pp. 11-31. 
bThe term 11mediation 11 as used in the Alaska teachers statute (amended 
in 1971) is the same procedure as most other jurisdictions refer to as 
11 fact finding. 11 The mediation board under the Alaska statute hears evidence 
and issues findings and recommendations. 
estate Labor Laws (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, 
1971), 21: 231-232. 
--
.... .,..,.. 
-----------------~~-~-·-----·-·--~----------~~--------------------------------~ 
State 
Idaho 
Indiana 
Kansas 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
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TABLE 2--Continued 
Impasse Resolution Procedure 
Mediation followed by fact-finding with recommenda-
tions. 
Mediation and fact-finding supervised by Indiana 
Educational Employment Relations Board. 
None 
Mediation; upon request of parties, Board of Arbit-
ration and Conciliation or Commisioner of Department 
of Labor and Industry provides fact-finding with re-
commendations. If parties fail to reach agreement, 
may request arbitration services. Binding determina-
tions except on matters. concerning salaries, pensions, 
and insurance. Either party may seek review of any 
binding determination in the Superior Court. 
11 ~1ediation 11 panel appointed upon request of parties; 
if impasse not resolved, panel makes report and 
recommendations.a 
Fact-finding with non-binding recommendations. Fact-
finder may function as mediator.b 
Mediation and fact-finding with non-binding recommen-
dations. 
Adjustment panel of three persons conducts informal 
conference and hearings upon request of parties. 
~lakes findings. 
aThe term 11mediation" as used in the ~1aryland Teachers Lav/ (1969) is 
the same procedure as most other jurisdictions refer to as 11 fact-finding". 
The mediation board under the ~laryland statute hears evidence and issues 
findings and recommendations. 
bstate Labor Laws, op.cit., 31: 248-249. 
------·----------·~-------n-·--a--~-------------·-------
State 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New York 
North Dakota 
TABLE 2--Continued 54 
Impasse Resolution Procedure 
Senior District Judge submits list to parties for 
selection of third member of impasse panel. Panel 
makes findings of fact and recommendatio~s which are 
made public. Either party may call for the three-
member fact-finding panel. 
Dispute submitted to ad hoc fact-finding board which 
makes non-binding recommendations. 
Parties can construct their own impasse machinery or 
mediation by mutual agreement of parties. Either 
party can request fact-finding; the parties may agree 
to make fact-finder's recommendations final and .bind-
ing. Thus fact-finder can act in either a recommen-
datory or binding capacity. Voluntary arbitration 
can be either advisory or binding.a 
Parties may establish procedures for mediation, 
fact-finding. 
Voluntary mediation; Public Employment Relations 
Commission recommends or invokes fact-finding with 
recommendations; voluntary arbitration. 
Local determination allowed for resolving disputes 
or Public Employment Relations Board provides media~ 
tors, fact-finding boards upon request of parties or 
on its own initiative; recommendations of the fact-
finding board may be made public; if fact-finding 
recommendations are not accepted, the local legis-
lative body--i.e., school board--or committee there-
of conducts hearing and makes final determination. 
Parties may agree to mediation. On request of either 
party, the Education Fact-finding Commission adminis-
ters fact-finding amd makes recommenda~ions. Such 
recommendations are made public. 
astate Labor Laws, op.cit., 38: 228. 
State 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Is.land 
South Dakota 
Texas 
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TABLE 2--Continued 
Impasse Resolution Procedure 
Ad hoc fact-finding committee makes recommendations. 
Mediation provided by State Mediation and Concilia-
tion Service; fact-finding. Strike is legal unless 
there is a violation of health, safety, or welfare. 
If strike is enjoined, compulsory binding arbitra-
tion is envoked. Voluntary binding arbitration 
available at any time during the collective bargain-
ing process.a 
The parites may submit dispute voluntarily to media-
tion. If no agreement, the Pennsylvania Bureau of 
Mediation shall be called in. Fact-finding panel of 
one to three people may be appointed by Pennsylvania 
Labor Relations Board. Recommendations made public. 
Teachers may strike if (1) a danger to public health 
is not created, and (2) mediation and fact-finding 
procedures have been exhausted. At any time, the 
parties may submit impasse issues to voluntary 
binding arbitration.b 
Either party may request mediation by the state 
department of education. A panel of arbitrators 
makes findings which are binding on·all matters not 
involving the expenditure of money.c 
Upon request of either party, Commissioner takes steps 
as may be necessary for dispute resolution. 
None. 
auH.B. 2263: Fundamental New Bargaining Rights For Teachers, 11 Oregon 
Education Association, Vol. 48, No. 3, (October, 1973), 8-9. 
bstate Labor Laws, op.cit., 48: 226-228. 
estate Negotiation Statutes: Special Memo M-4, (Washington, D.C.: 
National Education Association, May, 1972). 
State 
Vermont 
washington 
Wisconsin 
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TABLE 2--Continued 
Impasse Resolution Procedure 
Mediation; fact-finding. Fact-finding committee 
makes findings which are made public. Strikes are 
permitted unless such action poses a clear and 
present danger to a sound program of school education. 
Ad hoc committee of educators and school directors 
for dispute settlement; makes written report with 
non-binding recommendations. 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board functions as 
mediator, administers fact-finding cases and appoints 
fact-finders upon receipt of petition from parties. 
The fact-finding process may precede or follow 
mediation. 
---~\iia!'-~-a• n•• ~·--------------------------. 
CHAPTER III 
A REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT RESEA.RCH . 
The previous chapter has been a description of at least five major 
remedies for preventing or resolving school bargaining impasses. For 
the most part, that discussion was a review of authority opinion. In 
addition to authority viewpoints, a summary of research relevant to the 
critical problem of impasse resolution in public education labor nego-
tiations will be presented. The only pertinent research which has been 
accomplished in this area is by Charles R. Perry1 and has subsequently 
been reported in a volume co-authored by Perry and Wesley A. Wildman 
entitled The Impact of Negotiations in Public Education: The Evidence 
From The Schools. 2 This chapter,will be a discussion of this important 
work by summarizing both the specific research of Perry and the signifi-
cant concepts presented in the book. 
1charles R. Perry, 11 Impasse Resolution In Education .. (unpublished 
Ph.D dissertation, University of Chicago, 1968). 
2charles R. Perry and Wesley A. Wildman, The Impact Of Negotiations 
In Public Education: The Evidence From The Schools (Worthington, Ohio: 
Charles A. Jones Publishing Co., 1970). 
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Three Alternate Approaches For Impasse Resolution: Research Evidence 
From The Schools. 
Since conflict is inherent in the collective bargaining process, 
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the ultimate goal of bargaining is a search and discovery for compromise 
and concession-making between the adversaries. In this goal, a wide range 
of strategies is open to the parties in their effort to accommodate or 
manage the conflict. These strategies may be placed on a continuum bounded 
by pure distributive bargaining and pure integrative bargaining. Between 
these twq polar strategies, the parties to a collective bargaining rela-
tionship in public education can choose several alternative bargaining 
strategies as vehicles to effect settlement. In analyzing the various 
approaches to dispute settlement, three theoretical power bases have 
been defined. That is, any conflict resolution device must rest on one 
f h b . 1". 1 . 1 1 o t ree ases--econom1c, po 1t1ca , or rat1ona . 
(1) Economic Approaches. Economic approaches to impasse resolution 
are based on a withholding of resources required or desired by the adver-
sary. The basic mechanism for an economic approach is the strike weapon 
in which both the teachers and school management withhold something 
essential. For example, teachers can refuse to provide services on the 
terms and conditions offered by management, and they can picket to publi-
cize the existence of a labor dispute as a means to inhibit management 
access to alternative sources of labor. At the same time, school manage-
ment may exercise the power to refuse to grant the changes in those terms 
and conditions demanded .bY teachers, and they can exercise the right to 
1Perry and Wildman, op.cit., p. 87. 
hire strike-breaking substitute teachers.1 
As shown more completely in the previous chapter, the strike is 
theoretically a highly effective and very efficient mechanism for the 
settlement of disputes primarily because it imposes sufficient costs 
on both parties which prompt them to accept compromise rather than con-
tinued conflict. These ~osts include for the employees, the loss of sal-
ary and risk of sacrificing their job rights, and for school manage-
ment, the costs involve public hostility because of a reduction in the 
quantity of education, and a loss of state aid money because schools are 
not open the requisite number of school days. 
(2) Political Approaches. Political approaches to impasse resolu-
tion are based on an explicit appeal to public opinion by the parties to 
an impasse, either directly or through a third party. If political 
approaches are to serve as an effective mechanism for impasse resolu-
tion in the short run, they require both public interest in the issues 
of dispute and disputant sensitivity to public opinion for either econ-
2 
omic or political reasons. 
The basic mechanism for a political approach to impasse resolu-
tion in the public education sector is fact-finding with advisory public 
1 
Perry and Wildman, op.cit.,p.87. 
2 
Ibid., p. 89 
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recommendations. As noted in Chapter II, several theoreticans and prac-
titioners in ·private sector industrial relations claim that fact-finding 
is a questionable procedure for resolving bargaining disputes. In parti-
cular, these experts suggest that the existence and assured availability 
of a strike substitute--e.g., fact-finding--promises to mitigate or 
eliminate the economic costs associated with a failure to reach agreement, 
I 
and therefore, reduces the incentive for the parties to compromise and 
seek accommodation. 11 The result is settlement avoidance and the appear-
ance of a type of crisis bargaining which the parties prepare for an 
impasse rather than attempt to narrow the differences between them. The 
primary characteristics of this approach to bargaining are (1) early 
commitment to extreme positions; (2) refusal to compromise on even minor 
issues; and (3) public debate rather than private negotiation. This 
approach undermines collective bargaining as a decision-making process 
and shifts the initial responsibility for decisions to an outside party.ul 
Nevertheless, fact-finding leading to public recommendations is currently 
the most widely accepted procedural alternative to the strike in the 
resolution of public school bargaining impasses. As shown in TABLE 2, 
it is authorized or required by law in at least twenty-four states, and 
i where bargaining legislation is absent, it has been adopted on a volun-
2 
i tary basis in many local school district collective bargaining ·agreements. 
1 
Perry, op.cit., pp. 4-5. 
2 
Perry and Wildman, op.cit., p. 90. 
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(3) Rational Approaches. Rational approaches to impasse resolu-
tion are based on the-factual determination of the balance of equity in a 
dispute and takes place in a context of private decision-making. Fund-
amentally, a·rational settlement requires both a ruling on the conflict 
issues by an impartial third party and a legal or moral sanction for the 
1 
final decision of that third party. 
The basic mechanism for a rational approach to impasse resolution 
is binding arbitration. As explained in the previous chapter, an arbit-
ration process involves adversary pleadings before a third party who is 
empowered to make a formal decision on the issues. Binding arbitration 
requires that the parties be bound by the decision of the third party 
2 
either by mutual agreement or legal compulsion. As was shown, it is gen-
erally criticized as an impasse resolution mechanism. 
Regarding the actual research completed by Perry, the reader should 
be aware that he analyzed the early experience with impasse resolution 
mechanisms in eight school systems where impasses occurred prior ·to the 
end of the 1964-65 school year. In studying the problem of impasse rel-
elution in educational bargaining, Perry, among other goals, speci-
fically desired to answer the following question: How effective are the 
various strategy approaches to the resolution of bargaining impasses in 
establishing the basis for compromise in the final short run settlement 
of issues? As indicated, these alternatives include one, the rational 
1 
Perry and Wildman,·op.cit., p. 90, 
2 
Ibid., p. 91, 
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approach--based ultimately on compulsory binding arbitration; two, public 
or political approach--based on fact-finding leading to formal public 
recommendations; and three, economic approach--based finally on the 
strike.l 
From studying the experience with c_onfl i ct management in these 
eight school systems, Perry concluded the following; First, when conflict 
exists between teachers and school boards over the use of scarce fiscal 
resources--e.g., salary issues--private reason in the form of direct 
negotiations, mediation, or binding arbitration does not function to 
narrow the differences between the bra parties. Perry explains that 
private approaches fail to produce agreement because the constituents of 
the two parties are not involved in the decision-making activities. 
Stated otherwise, some impasse mechanism must be available which permits 
constituents--teacher organization members and community--to influence 
their respective ~egotiation representatives.2 Secondly, impasse reso-
lution strategies are effective in forcing compromise by one 6r both 
parties only if they have ability to threaten or impose sufficient costs 
on constituent groups. Perry explains that costs can be achieved through 
either public or economic methods: 
... The required level of such pressure for compromise can be 
achieved through either public or economic approaches, but is 
not likely to be achieved through such purely rational approaches 
as compulsory binding arbitration. The required balance of such 
pressure for compromise can be achieved through economic approaches, 
but only if the long strike option exists or if the application of 
economic sanction against individual strikers is feasible. In 
lrerry and Wildman, op.cit., pp. 28, 240. 
2rbid., pp. 218-234. 
the absence of these conditions, public approachesbased on a 
rational appeal to the community as stockholder of the public 
school .system constitute the most efficient means of impasse 
resolution. 1 
63 
Thirdly, since economic pressures for compromise are absent in most 
school bargaining impasses, the public pressures such as those which accom-
pany fact-finding would tend to facilitate the resolution of collective 
bargaining imp,asses. Perry•s study indicates that fact-finding with public 
recommendations is effective in forcing a change in the parties• position 
only when the dispute is centered on the allocation of existing re-
sources within the school system, and the community is sensitive to the 
recommendations exercised by a neutral third party: 
Public approaches are highly effective in inducing compromise by 
boards of education in conflict over the internal allocation of re-
sources. Taxpayers are likely to be uninterested in changes in the 
in the allocation of existing resources within the school system, 
despite the fact that such changes may imply accelerated future in-
creases in local support, thus leaving the ultimate community decis-
ion to consumers. Consumers are likely to be ambivalent about such 
changes in the absence of criteria for assessing the impact of such 
short run changes in resource allocation on the long run quality of 
education. Thus, the co~sumer group should be willing to accept the judgment of a neutral third party with respect to such changes and 
to exert pressures on the board of education to do the same or to 
move in the direction indicated by the judgment.2 
Fourth, fact-finding as a public approach has limited productivity in 
1 effecting compromise, however, where the dispute centers on the size of the 
school system•s budget; i.e., the fact-finding approach does not elicit 
1Perry, op.cit., pp. 218-219. 
2rbid., pp, 236-237. 
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new money benefits for teacher·s. Once again, its ineffectiveness is re-
lated to the sensitivity of the community to the rational persuasion of 
the fact-finder's report: 
The.weakness of public approaches in establishing a basis for 
the resolution of conflict over the size of the school system bud-
get is a reflection of the fact that the majority of the community 
has a strong negative short run economic interest in the outcome of 
such conflict. Taxpayers are generally opposed to any immediate 
increase in the level of local support of public education. Thus, 
where the impasse centers on the level of local support and where 
the formal recommendations of the fact-finder call for or imply some 
immediate increase in school tax rates, the majority of the commun-
ity will either not respond or respond negatively to those rec-
commendations, thereby forcing or permitting the board of education 
to reject at least those elements of the recommendations which would 
require a short run increase in local support.l 
Notwithstanding the limited effectiveness of fact-finding, Perry 
finally concludes that the experience in the systems studied indicates 
that fact-finding with advisory public recommendations can create a basis 
for meaningful collective bargaining in public education primarily because 
such a procedure places the final decision on impasse issues directly in 
the hands of the community.2 In short, political pressure from·consumers 
generates resolution for the bargaining impasse. 
Fifth, like the public strategies of fact-finding, the economic mech-
anism for dispute settlement, namely the strike, also has contrasting 
effectiveness. In the school systems researched, Perry discovered that 
the exercise of economic power by teachers failed to force any immediate 
1 Perry, op.cit., pp. 235-236. 
2 I b i d • , p • 2 44. 
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increase in local s·upport. In analyzing this phenomenon, Perry notes: 
The inability of economic approaches to provide teachers with a 
basis for forcing immediate increases in local support is a reflec-
tion of the fact that taxpayers are not directly effected by the 
exercise of economic power by the teachers in the short run. Thus, 
even in the face of a strike or professional sanctions, the majority 
of the community-at-large can remain unsympathetic or hostile · 
toward the demands of teachers.! · 
However, a teachers• strike did increase the extent to which boards 
of education agreed to reallocation of existing internal resources, thus 
prompting a resolution of the bargaining conflict: 
The ability of economic approaches to provide teachers with a 
basis for forcing compromise by a board of education in conflict 
over internal resource allocation is a reflection of the obvious 
sensitivity of consumers to any real or threatened interruption in 
the flow of basic public school services. In the absence of any 
countervailing pressure from taxpayers, this consumer sensitivity 
and the short run political reaction which it fosters are normally 
sufficient to force a board of education to capitulate to the de-
mands of teachers. The onl~ alternatives to capitulation open to 
boards of education are: 1) to ignore the consumer reaction to the 
exercise of economic power by teachers and accept the long strike; 
and 2) to insulate consumers from the economic power of teachers by 
keeping schools open through the use of teacher replacements. The 
former option is generally both personally and politically dis-
tasteful to board members; the latter option is generall~ unfeasible 
given the labor-intensive character of public education. 
In spite of the mixed effectiveness of the strike, Perry leans away 
from its use as a means to resolve teacher-school board bargaining conflict: 
The experience in the systems studied indicates that reliance on 
the strike weapon and economic approaches as the basis for the 
resolution of impasses can foster crises bargaining and compromise 
avoidance. This is a reflection of the fact that such approaches 
tend to involve the community in the impasse resolution process 
in its role as consumers of school services. The natural reac~ 
tion of consumers to an interruption in the flow of educational 
lPerry, op.cit., p. 239. 
2rbid., p. 239. 
66 
services weakens the incentives for a teacher organization to com-
promise on its demands short of either acceptance of those demands 
or a test of power, particularly since such consumer reaction makes 
the long strike unlikely. In this context, boards of education 
have a real incentive to withhold any concessions in anticipation 
of a strike and the resultant consumer pressure for settlement at 
any price. 
Economic approaches to impasse resolution are likely to result 
in a series of short run decisions based primarily or only on the 
desire of consumers for peace in the public schools.l 
To compl'ete the summary of Perry's research on what mechanisms 
should be used to resolve bargaining impasses, he concludes that public 
approaches to impasse resolution have advantages over either rational or 
economic approaches. Specifically, he recommends the following impasse. 
resolution policies: 
(1) Provision for fact-finding leading to the issuance of formal 
public recommendations well in advance of budget deadlines; 
(2) Provision for mediation prior to fact-finding but only if both 
parties agree to seek and accept the services of a mediator. 
This is called voluntary mediation; 
(3) Inclusion of a clear statement of the obligation of boards of 
education to bargain and of the legal ban on strikes by 
teacher organizations. 2 
As a brief critique of these three recommendations, the reader will 
notice that Perry's viewpoints, especially with respect to fact-finding 
and the strike, are in disagreement with the conclusions drawn.in Chapter II. 
1Perry, op.cit., p. 24~ 
2Ibid., p. 246. 
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The next chapter will attempt to reconcile some of these discrepancies 
by analyzing the effectiveness of impasse resolution mechanisms in seven 
Illinois school systems where impasses and strikes occurred in 1972. 
-
Jb.- -
CHAPTER IV 
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF 
FIXED-RESPONSE QUESTIONNAIRE DATA 
This chapter covers the second phase of this study and is aimed 
at determining what impasse procedure negotiators prefer to employ in 
a school bargaining dispute by testing the following hypotheses: 
I. Teacher negotiation representatives agree that the human 
relations strategy would function to minimize, prevent, or 
resolve collective bargaining disputes. 
II. School management negotiation representatives agree that the 
human relations strategy would not function to minimize, pre-
vent, or resolve collective bargaining disputes. 
III. Teacher negotiation representatives and school management 
negotiation representatives both agree that the mediation 
strategy is an appropriate mechanism to use in resolving 
school bargaining disputes. 
IV. Teacher negotiation representatives and school management 
negotiation representatives both agree that the fact-finding 
strategy is not an effective procedure for resolving public 
education bargaining disputes. 
V. Teacher negotiation repres·entatives and school management 
negotiation representatives both agree that the arbitration 
strategy would not be an appropriate dispute settlement 
mechanism in public education bargaining impasses. 
VI. Teacher negotiation representatives agree that the strike 
strategy should be available as a means to resolve collective 
bargaining disputes. 
VII. School management negotiation representatives agree that the 
strike strategy should not be available as a means to resolve 
collective bargaining disputes: 
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To test the hypotheses, a forty-five minute to one hour interview \'/as 
conducted with negotiators representing both teacher organizations and 
school management in seven Illinois school districts where strikes occurred 
in 1972. The i ntervi e\'lees tota 1 ed forty-two, twenty- one representing 
teacher groups and twenty one representing school management. All of 
these negotiators were involved in leadership positions and/or participated 
. 
in collective bargaining sessions during the 1972 teacher strike situations 
and thus were knowledgeable about the impasse procedures used throughout 
the conflict. In each of the strike situations, three negotiation leaders 
from each side of the bargaining table were interviewed, thus making a 
total of six interviewees from each school system. Regional Directors for 
the Illinois Education Association were asked to help in identifying the 
negotiation representatives or major participants from each of the seven 
school districts. The purpose of the interviews \o.Jas to discover what 
dispute settlement method (or methods) these negotiators prefer to use in 
the event of a public education bargaining impasse. Responses of the 
negotiators and reasons for their particular choices will be presented 
along with an analysis of these data. 
An interview instrument was el'nployed in this phase of the study to 
elicit information. Specifically, a structured, fixed-response (closed-
ended) questionnaire, designed especially for this study, was used to 
complete the data collection for phase two (see APPENDIX A). During the 
administration of this questionhaire, the interviewee was asked certain 
questions or propositions, the responses to which were weighted to place 
the interviewee in a general category of reactions. 
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To further explain the use of the questionnaire, it should be noted 
that the responses of the negotiation representatives to the propositions 
were categorized by using a modified Likert scale.· The respondents were 
asked to expr·ess their feelings about impasse procedures in one of the 
five following degrees: Strongly Agree {SA), Agree {A), Undecided {U), 
Disagree (D), and Strongly Disagree (SO). To score the scale, there-
sponses are weighted +2, +1, 0, -1, -2, respectively, from Strongly Agree 
to Strongly Disagree {see APPENDIX A for the phase two questionnaire). The 
analysis of the forty-two interviews was divided into three parts: 
{1) an analysis of the teacher negotiation representatives' preference 
for what impasse procedure should be used in a dispute; (2) an analysis 
of the school management negotiation representatives' preference for what 
impasse procedure should be used in a dispute; and (3) a combined analysis 
of teachers• and school management negotiators' responseswhere appropriate. 
In analyzing parts one and two above, if all the school management 
negotiators or teacher negotiators Strongly Agree to a proprisition, th~ 
proposition would receive +42 points. If all the management negotiators 
or teacher negotiators Strongly Disagree to a proposition, the proposi-
tion would receive -42 points. As the number increases to +42, so does 
the representatives' agreement with the proposition. As ~he number 
decreases negatively to -42, so does the representatives' disagreement 
with the proposition. 
In the combined analysis of responses of representatives of teacher 
groups and school management, a division factor of two is used to maintain a 
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42 point base. If all teacher negotiators and school management negotia-
tors strongly Agree to a proposition, the proposition would still receive 
+42 points. If all teacher representatives and school management repre- · 
sentatives Strongly Disagree to a proposition, the proposition would re-
ceive -42 points. Again as the number increases towards +42 so does the 
representatives• agreement with the proposition. As the number decreases 
negatively to -42, so does the representatives• disagreement with the 
proposition. An example of how to interpret the data for one group is 
below: 
SA A U 
.. { 14) 6 6 . 6% --r.;;c 3"") -.1,..4.,.....,. 2~%--~.....-.-:;(1,..) __,4,__. =-=7 %~a -,--
(Total points received +27) 
D 
(2} 9.5% 
1. SA--Strongly Agree, A--Agree, U--Undecided, 0--Disagree, and 
SO--Strongly Disagree. 
2. The number in parenthesis represents the number of negotiation 
representatives selecting that particular response. 
3. The number next to the parenthesis is the number of negotiators 
selecting that particular response converted to a percentage. 
so 
(1) 4. 7% 
4. ·The above graphical representation would read, fourteen negotiators 
or 66.6% of the respondents selected the alternative Strongly Agree. 
Three or 14.2% selected the alternative Agree. One or 4.7% was 
Undecided. Two or 9.5% selected the response Disagree. One or 
4.7% selected Strongly Disagree. 
5. The total weight o.f the proposition would be calculated as follows: 
------------------------------------=-"~-~--------------·--~--------~--------
Response 
SA 
A 
u 
D 
so 
Number of Negotiation Representatives 
14 
3 
1 
2 
1 
Height 
+2 
+1 
0 
-1 
-2 
Total Points 
72 
Points 
+28 -
+3 
0 
..:2 
-2 
+27 
A word should be mentioned about the validity and reliability of 
the questiorynaire instrument used in phase two. The t\'lenty-five propo-
sitions developed to test the hypotheses were formulated by the author 
after reviewing professional literature and related research and were 
scattered throughout the questionnaire to minimize the possibility of 
influencing the responses. The questionnaire containing the propositions 
was pretested to determine validity of questions and proper phrasing by 
initially asking five authorities in the field of labor-management rela-
tidns to judge the appropriateness of the propositions. The judges 
include a mediator from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, 
three university professors in industrial relations, and one management-
personnel consultant. Additionally, the academic training of the five 
experts include two with doctoral degrees, one with a master's degree 
in business administration, one with a bachelor's degree in industrial 
relations, and one having earned a law degree. Total years of labor-
management experience is nearly sixty-four years. After pretesting, 
the questionnaire was administered to five educators who had· been involved 
in a teacher strike situation. Following these interviews, the reliability 
of the questionnaire was determined by using both the Kuder-Richardson 
internal consistency test and Rulon's reliability method. The relia-
bility coefficients for the questionnaire ranged from .60 as computed 
by the Kuder-Richard~on formula 20 test to .88 as computed by the Rulon 
method. Reliability of the questionnaire was determined before it 
was formally administered to the forty-two respondents. A letter of 
introduction from the director of the dissertation preceded the actual 
interview for the purpose of establishing rapport and credibility with 
the interviewee (see APPENDIX C). 
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Criterion for acceptance or rejection of the hypotheses was deter-
mined by using net total points amassed by each group. That is, an 
algebraic sum of the pluses and minuses was utilized. Hypotheses I, III, 
IV, V, and VI must receive positive points to be accepted. Hypotheses 
II and VII must receive negative points to be accepted. In addition, when 
more than one impasse strategy was preferred, the T-test statistic, which 
I 
is spmetimes called the ''Student's" t distribution, was employed to deter-
/, . 
. mile if significant differences exist between the mean response on one 
strategy and the mean response on another strategy. Computations were 
carried out at the .05 level of significance. This indicates that we are 
95% confident that preference differences between strategies are not due 
to chance factors. 
---------··~*=~--·--------~----·------,~~----------------------------~ 
I 
I 
I 
HYPOTHESIS I 
Teacher negotiation representatives agree that the human relations 
strategy would function to minimize, prevent, or resolve collective 
bargaining disputes. 
Hypothesis I de a 1 s with a method for managing· both the covert 
intergroup conflict inherent in the bargaining process as ·well as 
overt conflict manifested at the point of impasse or bargaining dead-
lock. Propositions one, six, eleven, sixteen, and tv>~enty-one pertain 
to this hypothesis. 
fropos iti on 1: To reduce conflict and promote agreement during 
actual negotiations, the parties should meet regularly throughout the 
year outside the bargaining table to study problems. 
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
SA A u D SD 
(5) 23.8% (13) 61.8% 0 {3) 14.2% 0 (Total points received +20) 
Almost 86% of respondents agreed with this proposition. Nany of 
the teacher negotiators felt that regular meetings would improve 
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communication betv-;een teachers, administrators, and school board members. 
Increased communication could particularly help in .the following ways: 
(1) it would provide additional opportunity to understand the viewpoints 
of each s·ide; (2) it vwuld be an appropriate time to clarify problems 
such as school finance; and (3) regular meetings between the parties could 
deal with problems of immediate concern thus preventing issues from 
smoldering or festering throughout the year. That i~, immediate resolu-
tion of problems might prevent open and outright "civil war" at the 
opening of the collective bargaining season; and (4) mutual conflicts 
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could be explored and resolved easier outside the adversary process of 
formal collective bargaining sessions; formal negotiations may interfere 
with issue-solving because both sides tend to become entrenched as they 
defend their respective positions. In sumt regular meetings throughout 
the year would increase communication and thus accelerate intergroup 
rapport. 
One respondent disagreed with this proposition because he felt 
\'that agreements do not develop until the "crisis 11 time of school opening 
approaches. Another respondent did not favor the approach because such 
meetings had not worked successfully in the district. 
Proposition 6: As a mechanism for dispute resolutiont teacher and 
school management negotiators should attempt to make decisions which 
permit both sides to gain in contrast to decisions where one party gains 
at the other party•s expense. 
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVEs• RESPONSES 
SA A u 0 so 
(2) 9.6% (13) 61.9% ( 4) 19% (2) 9.6% 0 (Total points received +15) 
Almost 72% of the teacher respondents agreed with this proposition. 
Several of those who agreed stated that the 11Win-win" approach to school 
bargaining is a psychologically sound principle. From this viewpoint, 
it was indicated that the art of negotiations is to consider the human 
factors involved in the negotiations interaction; that is, no one likes 
to lose or feel like a loser. One teacher suggested that school boards 
could protect themselves from being losers by negotiating a "board•s 
rights 11 clause into the collective agreement. Others agreed to the 
proposition because they felt the win-win approach was theoretically or 
philosophically valid. However, a few respondents admitted that this 
approach is difficu_lt to achieve in practice because some issues are 
not amenable to mutual gain. For example, when teachers gain more in 
salary money, school management loses money to purchase school buses, 
textbooks, etc. Those who disagreed with the proposition labeled this 
approach impractical because there will always be losers and winners 
~hen scarce resources like money are involved. 
·· Proposition 11: To settle differences amicably, the style of 
bargaining should resemble mutual problem solving rather than inde-
pendent decision making in which school management unilaterally sets 
salaries and other terms and conditions of employment. 
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
SA A u D 
(13) 61.8% (8) 38% 
(Total points received +34) 0 0 
so 
0 
As might be expected, all teacher negotiators agreed with the con-
76 
cept of teacher-school management negotiations. Most of the respondents 
justify the school bargaining process because it promotes positive teacher 
morale. More specifically, the collective bargaining process facili-
tates morale for the following reasons: (1) it is consistent with other 
labor-management sectors of the American economy in which employees 
have a voice in determining the reward systems under whfch they work. 
One teacher argued that the school employer does not have the ethical 
right to dictate salaries and terms and conditions of employment because 
it is not done that way in other employee-employer re1ationships. 
Another teacher maintained that negotiations is a means of increasing 
the economic well-being of teachers and economically satisfied teachers 
77 are an essential requirement for quality teaching; (2) collective 
bargaining is a political process that recognizes teacher viewpoints 
relative to such school problems as class size and educational programs. 
several teacher negotiators expressed the idea that teacher expertise 
is needed in shaping educational decisions because school management 
lacks knowledge of the real classroom problems. In sum, teacher nego-
\ tiators believe that unilateral decisions by school management are not 
~ally 11Solutions 11 because such action destroys employee morale. 
Proposition 16: A joint sub-committee approach, in which there 
are joint study teams composed of an equal number of teachers and school 
management representatives, would be a useful means of facilitating 
collective bargaining agreements. 
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVEs• RESPONSES 
s D SD 
(Total points received -3) 
Therewas a divergence of thinking among teachers on the statement. 
Some of the respondents who agreed admitted that they have not utilized the 
joint sub-committee method in negotiations but state that it might be a 
positive approach to school bargaining. Others who agreed claimed that the 
negotiation spokesmen for the respective sides jointly worked out an 
agreement which eventually settled a teacher strike situation. 
Teacher negotiators who have not experienced this approach disagreed 
for the following reasons: (1) such approaches to collective bargaining 
may be a waste of time because a ttmini-impasse might occur in the sub-
committees; (2) mistrust among team members could develop. Other 
teachers recited previously unsuccessful attempts with similar joint 
committee approaches. 
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Proposition 21: Post negotiation committees, in v1hich final resolu-
tion of some particularly thorny bargaining issue is discussed, would 
tend to diminish future bargaining conflict. 
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVEs• RESPONSES 
u 
(1) 4. 7% 
0 . 
(12) 57.1% 
so 
(1) 4. 7% SA A -a (7) 33.3% 
(Total points received -7) 
Teacher negotiators held different viewpoints towards this proposition .. 
Some respondents who agreed ·were essentially expressing some ambivalence 
toward such committees; that is, while post negotiation committees 
successfully resolved extra-duty pay issues during one year, similar. 
committees \'mrking on similar issues resulted in 11mini-impasses 11 in a 
subsequent year. Other teachers who agreed with the proposition indi-
cated that post negotiation committees would provide additional time 
for communication, and as one teacher articulated, 11 Time and talk help 
resolve problems." 
Approximately 61% of the respondents disagreed with the use of post 
negotiation committees. Some disagreed because they felt that such 
committees would carry on the intergroup conflict without a means for 
resolving the issues; that is, this procedure would be absent the pressure 
which is often needed to prompt agreements. Others lacked confidence 
in these procedures because similar committees had not functioned 
successfully in the past. Several teachers explained that issues like 
teacher evaluation procedures and extra duty pay schedules had been 
discussed in post negotiation committees only to see agreements 11 axed 11 
by a board of education thus placing the issues in a situation of quasi-
impasse. 
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SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIS I 
The information obtained from the twenty-one teacher negotiation· 
representatives and depicted in TABLE 3 suggests that the human relations 
approach would be an appropriate social technology for minimizing or re-
solving school bargaining impasses. These negotiators showed a particular 
value for (1) regular meetings throughout the year, (2) a "win-win'' approach 
to collective bargaining; and (3) bilateral rather than unilateral deter-
mination of salaries and other terms and conditions of employment. Since 
authority opinion found in professional literature supports these three 
elements of the human relations approach, it can be said that teacher 
negotiators and the experts are in agreement. Notwithstanding teachers' 
positive opinions of regular meetings and win-win approaches, these two 
components seem to be used in only a limited way in actual school bargain-
ing practice. Training in these two areas, therefore, seems advisable. 
Two other elements of the human relations strategy--joint sub-commit-
tees and post-negotiation committees--were not as highly respected by 
teacher negotiators as the other elements. The fact that teachers have 
historically experienced frustration with such committees would suggest 
that school management shoulg strive more earnestly to make joint teacher-
administrator committees function successfully. 
In spite of some ambivalence toward the human relations strategy, 
net total points received were positive and, consequently, permit acceptance 
of hypothesis I. Incidentally, the mean points received on this hypothesis 
equal +11.5. The human relations strategy is a method preferred by 
teacher negotiators. 
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TABLE 3 
SUMMARY GRAPH FOR HYPOTHESIS I INDICATING THAT 
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES ACCEPT THE 
HUMAN RELATIONS STRATEGY AS A MEANS TO MINIMIZE 
OR RESOLVE SCHOOL BARGAINING IMPASSES 
Propositions And Total 
Points Received Amount Of Agreement Or Disagreement 
Proposition 1 
{+20 points) 
Proposition 6 
(+15 points) 
Propositi on 11 
(+34 points) 
Proposition 16 
(-3 points) 
Proposition 21 
(-7 points) 
+42 +40 +30 +20 +10 0 -10 -20 -30 -40 -42 
AGREE DISAGREE 
ao 1 
HYPOTHESIS II 
School. management negotiation representatives agree that the human 
relations strate~y.woul~ not function to minimize, prevent, or resolve 
collective barga1n1ng d1sputes. 
Proposition 1: To reduce conflict and promote agreement during 
actual negotiations, the parties should meet regularly throughout the 
year outside the bargaining table to study problems. 
SCHOOL MANAGEt~ENT REPRESENTATIVES• RESPONSES 
A u D so 
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SA 
-n;}28.9% {9) 42.8% 0 (3) 14.2% (3) 14.2?l 
(Total points received +12) 
Nearly 72% of the school management negotiators agreed with this 
proposition. Negotiators agreed with this statement for two basic rea-
sons: First, regular study of problems increases communication between 
the parties which subsequently decreases both immediate conflict as 
well as future conflict at the bargaining table. Some .. agreed that the 
increased communication would alert or acquaint both parties to the 
needs felt by each side and such an understanding would facilitate 
solutions. Secondly, some management negotiators expressed the idea 
that it would be easier to solve inter-group problems in a less threat-
ening atmosphere than that found at the formal bargaining table. One 
school system has implemented the idea found in this proposition by 
negotiating into the contract machinery for regular meetings v-1hich 
serve to (1) avoid grievances, (2) eliminate or minimize collective 
bargaining issues, and {3} solve problems immediately rather than 
allow them to 11 fester 11 throughout the year. The contractual clause 
t 
I 
I 
i 
I 
~ , 
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is shovm as fallows: 
MONTHLY CONTRACT MEETINGS 
Representatives of the superintendent and the Association will 
meet once a month during the regular school year at a time con-
venient to both parties for the purpose of discussing the admini-
stration of the contract and to resolve problems that may arise. 
These meetings are not intended to bypass the negotiations or the 
grievance procedure. Further, each party \vi 11 submit to the other, 
at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to the meeting, an agenda 
covering what they wish to d·iscuss. This agreement shall be sub-ject to change or supplement at any time by mutual consent of the 
parties hereto. Any such change or supplement agreed upon shall 
be reduced to writing, signed by the parties hereto, and submitted 
to the Board and the Association for approval, the same as this 
Agreement. 
School management negotiators who disagreed with the proposition 
expressed three problems: One, there isn•t time to meet outside the 
bargaining table; two, regular study meetings would turn into continuous 
bargaining sessions; and three, agreement during study meetings would 
be inhibited because such meetings lack the pressure environment which 
surrounds the collective bargaining table. 
Pro~osition 6: As a mechanism for dispute resolution, teacher 
and schoo management negotiators should attempt to make decisions 
VJhich permit both sides to gain in contrast to decisions where one 
party gains at the other party•s expense. 
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES• RESPONSES 
SA A U 
TIT 4. 7% (16) 76.1% (4) 19% 
(Total points received +18) 
D 
0 
so 
0 
As shown, nearly 80% of the management negotiators agreed with the 
'---•-••-wm---------------------------------------------------------------
proposition. Theoretically, school management representatives agreed 
that negotiators should whenever possible aim for a "win-win" decision 
in contrast to a ''win-lose" decision. Decisions of this nature would 
tend to diminish the adversary nature of the collective bargaining 
process. In addition, mutual gain, win-win decisions are psycholo-
gically easier to live up to. 
While no one disagreed with this proposition, four management 
negotiators were undecided. These respondents claimed that a mutual 
gain approach to collective bargaining is idealistic and difficult to 
achieve; in practice, school bargaining becomes a win-lose situation 
with the organized teacher winning more power while school management 
loses power. ·Furthermore, one undecided negotiator stated that there 
are few issues in public education bargaining which allow both sides 
to gain. "Usually," he said, "the teacher organization is the asker 
and the board of education is the giver. The teachers can't give 
anything to make it a mutual gain situation." 
Proposition 11: To settle differences amicably, the style of 
bargaining should resemble mutual problem solving rather than inde-
pendent decision making in which school management unilaterally sets 
salaries and other terms and conditions of employment. 
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
SA A u D so (2) 9.6% (18) 85.6% (1) 4.7% 0 0 (Total points received + 22) 
Almost 95% of the individuals who represent the school management 
side in public education bargaining agree with the above proposition. 
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Most of the agreement centers around the concept that teachers and 
school management should bilaterally set salaries and terms and con-
ditions of employment. According to several respondents, teacher 
employees know and understand their needs better than the school employer 
does and, therefore, need a mechanism to communicate their problems to 
management: The collective bargaining process then becomes an appropri-
ate system for resolving such problems. Related to the belief in the 
bargaining process, several management negotiators expressed an opinion 
that individuals who are affected by a decision should be involved in 
the determination of those decisions; collective bargaining, as a deci-
sion-making process, thus provides a way to involve individuals. Fur-
thermore, some of the respondents stated that job satisfaction and in-
creased teacher morale would result from a bilateral rather than a 
unilateral determination of salaries and working conditions. Notwith-
standing the high level of agreement on this proposition, several neg-
tiators qualified their response by claiming that some school system 
issues should not be negotiated between teachers and school management; 
for example, such issues as curriculum, teacher evaluation procedure~, 
and class size are non-negotiable and cannot be determined democratically 
at the collective bargaining table. 
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Proposition 16: A joint sub-committee approach, in which there. 
are joint study teams composed of an equal number of teachers and school 
management representatives, would be a useful means of facilitating 
collective bargaining agreements. 
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
SA A U D so 
(1} 4.7% {3) 14.2% (5) 23.8% (5} 23.8% (Total points received +2) 
(7) 33.3% 
School management negotiators showed a difference of thinking on 
this proposition. Those who agreed indicated that joint sub-committees 
would foster intergroup communication during the collective barga~ning 
process. Specifically, such committees could facilitate (1) the clari-
fication of issues, and (2) the exchange of facts and attitudes. One 
group of management negotiators acknowledged that the teacher strike in 
their district was terminated after a form of the joint sub-committee 
approach was utilized; more precisely, the chief spokesmen for the 
respective parties worked out an agreement which in turn was agreed to 
by the remaining members of the bargaining teams. Ultimately, this 
11 Side-bar 11 agreement was ratified by the constituencies of both parties 
bringing settlement to the bargaining dispute. Those who disagreed 
with this proposition felt that the joint sub-committee method \'Jould 
interfere with, or violate, the integrity of the team approach. That 
is, the joint sub-committee method would fragment their bargaining 
team thus making them more vulnerable to poor decisions. In sum, while 
most school management negotiators have not personally experienced this 
approach, it is percejved as having both advantages and disadvantages. 
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Proposition 21: Post negotiation committees, in which final 
resolution of some particularly thorny bargaining issue is discussed, 
would tend to diminish future bargaining conflict. 
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
SA A U D SD 
(2) 9.6% (7) 33.3% (2) 9.6% (Total points received +1) 
(10) 47.6% 0 
As to this proposition, school management negotiators are in 
discord. Among those who agreed, negotiators from two school systems 
pointed out the fact that provisions for post negotiation committees 
have been incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement. In 
one district, "Monthly Contract Meetings" take place while in a second, 
"Joint Discussion Committees" occur. These contractual clauses exist 
for the purpose of (1) resolving ·immediate problems and (2) facilitating 
intelligent preparation for the forthcoming bargaining season. In the 
first district, the monthly contract meetings had served to resolve 
some ''left-over" bargaining issues but had failed to settle an extra-
duty pay problem for women coaches. Respondents who disagreed with 
post negotiation committees offered these reasons: (1) such committees 
are time consuming; (2) they only protract or drag out bargaining; and 
(3) post negotiation committees may deal with issues which ultimately 
result in "mini-impasses~ .. 
f ------------w-----------------·----·---------·-·------~~----•-••--·----·---------------1· 
87 SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIS II 
The data collected from the twenty-one school management negotiation 
representatives, which is depicted in TABLE 4, suggests that the human rela-
tions strategy would be an appropriate social technology for minimizing or 
resolving school bargaining impasses. These negotiators showed a particular 
value for (1) regular meetings throughout the year to facilitate intergroup 
communication; (2) a mutual gain approach to school negotiations; and (3) bi-· 
lateral rather than unilateral determination of salaries and other terms and 
conditions of employment. These three areas apparently indicate that school 
management perceives the importance of on-going communication, ''win-win" in-
teraction, and sharing power and decision-making with teachers, all of which 
would tend to reduce teacher-management conflict as well as increase teacher 
morale. 
Since the actual net points amassed by the school management negotia-
tion representatives places them on the "agreement'' side of the TABLE 4 
graph; hypothesis II is; therefore, rejected. Rejection of the hypothesis, 
however, means acceptance of and preference for the human relations approach. 
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIS I AND HYPOTHESIS II 
Hypothesis I and hypothesis II suggest that teachers and school manage 
ment assume different viewpoints towards the human relations strategy. How-
ever, since the two groups responded to the same propositions, it is approp-
riate to show the combined responses~ TABLE 5 reveals that the groups resp 
ond quite similarly to the propositions and suggests that the human relation· 
strategy is preferred as an impasse resolution method. In particular, TABLE 
5 indicated the following: 
(1) Both groups perceived regular meetings as a means to improve inter-
TABLE 4 
SUMMARY GRAPH FOR HYPOTHESIS II INDICATING THAT SCHOOL MANAGEMENT 
NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES REJECT THE HYPOTHESIS AS STATED BUT 
ACCEPT THE HUMAN RELATIONS STRATEGY AS A MEANS TO MINIMIZE OR 
. RESOLVE SCHOOL BARGAINING IMPASSES 
Propositions And Total 
Points Received 
Proposition 1 
1+12 points) 
Proposition 6 
1+18 points) 
Propositi on 11 
(+22 points) 
Proposition 16 
(+2 points) 
Proposition 21 
(+1 point) 
Amount Of Agreement-Or Disagreement 
+42 +40 +30 +20 +10 0 -10 ·20 -30 -40 -42 
AGREE DISAGREE 
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group communication. 
of crisis bargaining. 
89 
That is, scheduled meetings can reduce the possibilty 
(2} The two groups agreed that a 11 Win-win 11 approach to negotiations 
is appropriate. In particular, group representatives felt that this style 
of bargaining has psychological justification because it would tend to re-
duce the adversary nature of the collective bargaining process. However,, some 
of the teacher respondents maintained that it is impossible to convert all 
bargaining issues into mutual gains especially where scarce resources exist. 
(3) Teacher and school management negotiators seemed to believe in the 
cortcept of collective·bargaining. Obviously, teachers endorse negotiations, 
but it is surprising to note the high percentage of management negotiators 
who demonstrated respect for teacher participation in decision-making via 
the collective bargaining process. The two groups agreedprimarily because 
they believe in bilateral rather than unilateral determination of teacher 
salaries. 
(4) Both groups of negotiators showed discord with the use of 
' . 
joint sub-committee approaches in actual bargaining sessions even though some 
negotiators from both sides of the table acknowledged that a joint sub-com-
mittee of bargaining spokesmen did effect an agreement which resulted in the 
termination of a teacher strike. Negotiators were suspicious of this approach 
because it would fragment the team approach to school bargaining thus making 
the team vulnerable to 11mini-'impasses 11 and low quality decisions. 
(5) With respect to the use of post negotiation committees, teachers 
and school management are both in discord. Some negotiators stated that such 
committees have in the past successfully resol~ed issues like student disci-
pline and extra duty pay schedules. Also, post negotiation committee con-
90 
epts have been incorporated into collective bargaining agreements in at 
c . 
least two of the seven school districts involved in this study. Negotiators 
disagreed with the concept because (1) it would protract bargaining and . 
(2) such committees would lack the pressure needed to effect settlement and 
thus terminate in informal impasses. 
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TABLE 5 
SUMMARY GRAPH FOR HYPOTHESIS I AND HYPOTHESIS II COMPARING TEACHER 
NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES WITH SCHOOL MANAGEMENT 
NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES RELATIVE TO THE USE OF THE 
HUt1AN RELA.TIONS STRATEGY AS A t1EANS TO RESOLVE BARGAINING DISPUTES 
Propositions, Respondents 
And. Total Points Received 
ProQosition 1 
Teachers (+20) 
Management (+12) 
Pro2os iti on 6 
Teachers (+15) 
Management (+18) 
Pro2osition 11 
Teachers (+34) 
Management (+22) 
Proposition 16 
Teachers (-3) 
r~anagement (+2) 
Proposition 21 
Teachers ( -7) 
Management (+1) 
Amount Of Agreement Or Disagreement 
~··· ~· 
+42 +40 +30 +20 +10 0 -10 -20 -30 -40 -42 
AGREE DISAGREE 
-~-----------------------------------------~"-a~---=-·-----------------~ 
I 
I 
I 
HYPOTHESIS II I 
Teacher negotiation representatives and school management negoti-
ation representatives both agree that the mediation strategy is an 
appropriate mechanism to use in resolving bargaining disputes. 
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This hypothesis deals with the most common type of impasse machinery, 
namely, mediation, and attempts to discover how negotiators perceive 
this procedure. Investigation of this hypothesis will also attempt to 
ascertain the most effective form of mediation. Propositions two~ seven, 
bJelve, seventeen, and twenty-two pertain to this hypothesis. 
Proposition 2: In the event of a negotiations impasse, mediation 
should be used as a means to resolve the dispute. 
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
SA A U D SO --r(~2 )r---;:;--9 .-r::-5-;;;-% ---~(r:;-1.,1 )r-;::;-;52.-.~3%"o----(r-.4-.-) -.1~9"::%cr-o --13) 14,2% \1.,..) --,4,...-,, 7=%,--
(Total points received +10) 
The data show: that a majority of the teacher negotiators agreed 
with the proposition. This high agreement figure is surprising in view 
of the fact that the mediation process failed to resolve the negotiations 
dispute in any of the seven school systems investigated. Notwithstanding 
its ineffectiveness, teacher negotiators felt that mediation can be a 
therapeutic process for at least two reasons: First, because of the 
accelerated hostility and entrenched postures which often occur during 
crisis bargaining, an objective third party such as a mediatm· can pro-
mote intergroup communication and subsequent understanding by accurately 
advising each party of the other party's intentions and positions. 
Secondly, as the mediator "closets" or meets privately with each side, 
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the parties may find it psychologically easier to modify their positions 
and thus save face. In contrast, the face-to-face negotiations of the 
impasse environment may interfere with a party•s ability to make con-
cessions. Briefly, it is easier to yield a position to the outsider 
than to the opponent. Those who opposed mediation did so on·the basis 
that it simply was not effective in terminating the negotiations deadlock. 
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES• RESPONSES 
SA A u 0 so (1) 4.7% (16) 76.1% 
(Total points received +16) 
(2) 9.5% (2) 9.5% 0 
A high percentage of management negotiatorssupported this proposition 
from several perspectives. First, mediation is helpful because it 
solves some of the group dynamics problems which arise during the bar-
gaining interaction. For example, because of the competitive nature of 
the negotiations process, the parties hold rigidly to their respective 
positions. However, as a mediator works with the parties independently, 
the bargaining teams find it psychologically easier to give up their 
bargaining positions, thus saving face. Secondly, the mediation process 
can assist the parties to politically pacify certain groups within their 
constituency. Specifically, when negotiation representatives can report 
to their membership, "The mediator told us that our position was inap-
propriate or faulty," constituency sub groups can be persuaded to reduce 
political pressure on their representatives, thus giving their negotiators 
freedom to concede specific bargaining issues. Thirdly, a mediator can 
facilitate group-to-group communication by (1) translating feelings and 
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and (3) allowing the parties to be candid without anything ••going on 
the record.'' Final)y, as to the particular form of mediation, management 
negotiators agreed that mediation and fact-finding· should not be used ·as 
sequential steps in school bargaining dispute settlement. The few nego-
tiators who either disagree or are undecided do so on the basis that 
mediation did not resolve the 1972 dispute. 
COMBINED RESPONSES 
SA A u 0 so 
(6) 14.2% (5) 11.9% (1) 2.3% ~3) 7.1% (27) 64.3% (Total points received +12) 
Notwithstanding the fact that mediation did not resolve the bargain-
ing disputes in the seven districts investigated, nearly 71% of the 
negotiators interviewed agreed that mediation should be an established 
cog in school bargaining impasse machinery. Mediation won enthusiastic 
reception because it increased candid communication and decreased some 
of the group dynamics problems which arise during negotiation~. Mediation 
was also cited as an effective procedure because it can serve to dimini~h 
intra-organizational or political pressures which impinge on the bar-
gaining process. 
Prooosition 7: Mediation, as an impasse resolution procedure, tends 
to promote rather than retard meaningful, sincere negotiations between 
the parties. 
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
SA A u 0 so 
0 (8) 38% (5) 23.8% (8) 38% 0 {Total points received 0) 
95 
Teachers are equally divided on this proposition. Those whoagreed 
stressed the idea that the mediator aids communication. One teacher pointed 
out that as a mediator listens to both sides he can help measure which · 
issues are strongly held and then help the parties work out settlements 
over these issues. Another teacher felt that an objective outsider with 
"no axe to grind 11 can help the parties see similarities instead of dif-
ferences. Other teachers alluded to the idea that a mediator can diminish 
the occurrence of ''parallel monologues ... That is, the conflicting parties 
themselves often do not listen to one another. Each is too busy trying 
to be understood. By listening and understanding, a mediator can contri-
bute to the parties' understanding of each other's position. 
Teacher·negotiators disagreed with the proposition for a variety 
of reasons. Some explained that both sides tend to use the mediator as 
a cru~ch instead of doing the negotiations job themselves. Several ad-
mitted that they felt intimidated by the mediator because he pressured 
them to yield crucial issues; these feelings turned to mistrust and an-
tagonism towards the mediator. Other teacher negotiators felt that 
school management used the mediation process as a further means of 
"wearing down the teachers' demands. 11 • 
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
SA A u 0 so 
{I) 4.7% (10) 47.6% (3) 14.2% (7} 33.3% 0 
(Total points received +5) 
School management negotiators, like teacher negotiators, showed a 
divergence of thinking·on this proposition. ·Generally, negotiators.agreed 
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that mediation can promote negotiations because it mitigates some of 
that political-psychological phenomenon which happen in· the bargaining 
process. One negotiator used the term 11 negotiations syndrome 11 to ex-
plain that the parties can get locked into positions from which they 
cannot deviate because of the presence of constituency pressur·e. Ne-
gotiation representatives felt a need to 11 look good to their respective 
sides. 11 To maintain a political image of truly representing their mem-
bership, the bargaining teams cling stubbornly to positions. The influ-
ence of an impartial third party upon both the representatives and the 
represented, however, can allow the parties to withdraw from previous1y 
held bargaining postures and thus promote settlement. 
Those who disagreed with the pr.opos iti on 1 i sted the fo 11 owing reasons: 
(1) a mediator has no authority or power to influence; (2) inexperienced 
negotiators rely on the intervention of a third party to conclude nego-
tiations for them thus retarding pre-impasse negotiations; (3) when 
school management is convinced that the teachers• organization will pro-
ceed either to another step of the impasse procedure such as fact-finding 
or to the strike, it is a wise bargaining tactic to avoid mak·ing any 
concessions during mediation. 
COMBINED RESPONSES 
SA A u 0 so 
(1) 2.3% (18) 42.9% (Total points received +3.5) 
(8) 19% (15) 35.7% 0 
The data collected indicated there was discord among the nego-
tiators on the concept that mediation can promote sincere negotiations 
between the parties. Teachers especially showed a complete divergence of 
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thinking on this matter. Negotiators_agreed with mediation because it can. 
create positive communication channels between the parties in conflict. 
Also, mediation can diminish some of the political-psychological phenom~ 
enon which.accompany the bargaining interaction. Negotiators are crit-
ical of mediation because (1) the third party is perceived as showing 
preferential treatment; {2) the parties may use him as a crutch; and 
(3) subsequent steps like fact-finding dilute the effectiveness of medi-
ation. 
Proposition 12: The mediation process, without the additional step 
of fact-finding, can exert influence on each party to modify its bargain-
ing position. 
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVEs• RESPONSES 
SA A u D SD 
(2) 9.5% (10) 47.6% (2) 9.5% (5) 23.8% (2) 9.5% 
(Total points received +5} 
For the most part, teachers were in agreement with this proposition. 
The most important comments made by those who agree with the statement· 
focus on the phrase "without the additional step of fact-finding ... 
Evidence from the respondents indicated that mediation was of questionable 
efficacy if the fact-finding procedure was to follow. Several teachers 
felt that mediation bargaining is retarded because management is holding 
back their best concessions for later impasse steps like fact-finding; it 
should be noted that this suspicion was substantiated by the responses 
of management negotiators. One teacher expressed the idea that negoti-
ations would be more effective if mediation were both the first and last 
step in the impasse machinery. Furthermore, he confessed that mediation 
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bargaining was useless "because we were preparing to go to fact-finding. 11 
Those who disagreed with the proposition made the following comments: 
(1) "The mediator didn't understand the public education system;" (2) 
"He seemed to be pro-management and consequently, we began to mistrust 
him·" (3) "We need other pressure like binding arbitration or the strike 
' 
to make mediation effective." 
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
SA A u D so 
(4} 19% (13) 61.8% 
(Total points received +19) 
(2) 9.6% (2) 9.6% 0 
Nearly eighty-one percent of the respondents favored this proposition. 
A large group of negotiators agreed _because of the merits they perceived 
in mediation: (1) it is more difficult for the parties to place hostility 
on a mediator than on a fact-finder; (2) in the conflict environment of 
crisis bargaining, the parties can build up "blindness" to the other par-
ties' position. In this setting a mediator can bring insight or perspec-
tive which may promote a climate for agreement. Moreover, he can trans-
late the positions of each side, thus helping the parties reach agreement. 
Another group of management negotiators agreed with the proposition be-
cause of the phrase, "without the additional step of fact-finding." These 
respondents endorsed mediation as the final step in the dispute settlement 
process saying that additional steps like fact-finding only weaken medi-
ation. One negotiator, representative of this group, stated, "The more 
impasse steps available, the more likely that previous steps will not be 
used thoroughly." In sum, a ritual of reluctant bargaining occurs if 
their best offers for later impasse steps. 
COMBINED RESPONSES 
SA A u D SO (4) 9.5% (7) 16.6% (2) 4.7% - (6) 14.2% (23) 54.7% 
1 (Total points received +12) 
The data reveal tha~ most ~egotiatorsagreed with the proposition. 
There is substantial evidence from the respondents which suggests that 
mediation is not a useful impasse invention when followed by the fact-
finding process. Some teachers confessed that they were using mediation 
only as a stepping stone to fact-finding, which they felt was a more use-
ful tool for prompting concessions from management. Management negotiators 
insightfully perceived this tactic and thus reserved their concessions 
for later phases of the impasse procedure. 
Proposition 17: The effectiveness of mediation would be improved 
if fact-finding were not so readily available to the bargaining parties. 
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
SA A U D SO ~ ~(~1)~4.~7~%--------~(~4}~19~%~----~{~6}~28~.~g%~o--~{~9~)~42~.~8%~o~(~1~)~4~.7~% 
~ (Total points received -5) 
~ Theresponses show that teachers had a difference of opinion regarding 
j 
• i 
I 
I I 
this proposition. Those who agreed explained that both parties would bargain 
more meaningfully during mediation if it were the last step in the im-
passe machinery. Hhen teachers believe they can gain more bargaining 
concessions from management during fact-finding, there is a tendency for 
teachers to avoid modifying their positions in mediation. Management 
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negotiators, convinced that teachers are heading into fact-finding in an 
effort to gain more,·stand pat in the mediation process, thus making med-
iation an unsatisfactory device for resolving disputes. 
Among the respondents opposing this proposition were teachers from 
a district who did not have access to fact-finding. These teachers felt 
that mediation would have been improved by subsequent fact-finding because 
of their belief that fact-finding can bring more settlement pressure on 
school management. Other teachers, who had experienced both unsuccessful 
mediation and fact-finding, still believed that the two procedures should 
be maintained as sequential steps in the impasse machinery. 
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
SA A u D so 
(8) 38% (9) 42.8% (Total points received +25) 
(4) 19% 0 0 
Almost eighty-one percent of the respondents agreed with the prop-
osition. Some of the negotiators viewed mediation without fact-finding 
as a more mature process because it encourages the parties to do something 
for themselves. Others favored this form of mediation because they be-
lieved that fewer impasse steps expedite dispute settlement. Conversely, 
additional steps beyond mediation only decrease the effec_tiveness of pre-
vious steps; that is, as long as there's another step, the parties are 
reluctant to compromise in mediation. Other management negotiators ac-
knowledged complacency or reluctance to bargain seriously in mediation 
if they felt that the. teachers' organization was going to use the future 
step of fact-finding as· a lever to get more money. One negotiator con-
----------------------------------------------------~--------------
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fessed, "Since fact-finding was available and forthcoming, we held back 
and did not give our best offer in mediation." Another similarly admitted, 
"We behave differently in mediation when we know fact-finding isn't going 
to follow. We're more honest and serious in mediation if it is the last 
step." One other negotiator offered the idea that 11 the mediator can more 
effectively influence the parties when a fact-finder is not waiting in the 
wings. 11 
COMBINED RESPONSES 
SA A U D so 
{9) 21.4% (13) 30.4% (10)23.8% (9) 21.4% (1} 2.3% 
Total points received +10) 
While ·only a small majority of negotiators agreed with the propo- ~~ 
sition it is important to note that management representatives were almost · 
unanimous in desiring mediation without fact-finding. Teachers, on the 
other hand, were divided on this proposition and seemingly did not fully 
understand the "holding back 11 tactic which management is forced to engage 
in when fact-finding follows the mediation process. 
h 
P~~position.22~ ~1ediatio1 n accombpanied byh the t~rea~ or actualitty of 1 ~ .t e str1 e may st1mu ate sett ement etween t e part1es 1n contrast o · f · 
mediation in and of itself. f 
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
SA A U D so 
(3) 14.2% (14) 66.6% (2) 9.6% (2) 9.6% 0 
(Total points received +18) 
A significant number of teacher agreed with the proposition. The 
respondents were in agreement primarily because they felt that pressure 
is needed in the collective bargaining environment to induce settlement 
~ 
t 
i 
I 
I 
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attitudes~ For example, some felt that the mediator can use the forces 
of fear and apprehension which are generated by a strike to facilitate 
intergroup agreement. 
SCHOOL MA~AGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES• RESPONSES 
~ A U D SD 
11) 4.7% (12) 57.1% (2) 9.6% 
(Total points received +7) 
(5} 23.8% (1) 4. 7% 
J 
I 
i 
A majority of the respondents agreed \'lith the proposition. Similar i 
to teacher negotiators, management negotiators felt that a climate of 
pressure promotes serious bargaining. One negotiator stated that 11 the 
J 
I scare of an impending strike helps the parties listen more attentively to the mediator... Another articulated the idea that a mediator without I 
a 11 stick 11 is ineffective. One negotiator summed up management rationale ' 
when he said, 11 We all respond to pressure. We think and talk more seri-
ously when the strike pressure is imminent ... 
COMBINED RESPONSES 
SA A U D SD \,, 
(7) 16.6% (1) 2.3% (4) 9.5% (26) 61.9% (4) 9.5% (Total points received +11.5) 
t 
Nearly seventy-two percent of the respondents agreed with this prop-i 
I 
osition. Two general reasons surfaced: First, the mediator can be more ~ 
f· influential in effecting a settlement when a strike threat or its actu- r 
i 
ality hangs over the heads of the negotiators. Secondly, agreement- I 
f 
making attitudes are fostered by the fears associated with the strike.· !· 
I 
t ___ , ____________________________________________________________ __ 
·-
r ,,..,. . ....,..,., •--= ••••!!ilall 
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SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIS III 
The information elicited from the forty-two respondents suggests 
that mediation should be incorporated into an impasse resolution pro-
cedure. TABLE 6 pictorially shows that the two groups share a preference 
for this device. 
Both groups agreed with the basic idea that mediation should be 
available as a means to resolve disputes. This is rather surprising in 
view of the fact that mediation did not successfully terminate the 1972 
impasses. However, the ineffective aspects of mediation were signaled in 
proposition 7 as both groups questioned the ability of mediation to pro-
mote sincere negotiations. With respect to the questions, "Is mediation 
more effective by itself" and "Is mediation better without fact-finding 
following," school management agreed enthusiastically. Teachers, however, 
were divided with respect to these two important ideas. With·respect ·to 
the thesis that mediation is more effective with concurrent pressures 
such as an imminent strike, both groups agreed with management agreeing 
to a lesser extent. In sum: This hypothesis seems to be confirmed be-
cause the net total points amassed by the independent gr·oups was positive. 
Mediation is a preferred strategy to employ in public education bargain-. 
ing disputes. 
TABLE 6 
SUMMARY GRAPH FOR HYPOTHESIS III COMPARING TEACHER NEGOTIATION 
REPRESENTATIVES• RESPONSES WITH SCHOOL MANAGEMENT NEGOTIATION 
REPRESENTATIVES• RESPONSES RELATIVE TO THE USE OF MEDIATION AS 
A METHOD FOR RESOLVING SCHOOL BARGAINING DISPUTES 
Propositions, Respondents 
And Total Points Received 
Proposition 2 
Teachers ( +10} 
Management (+16} 
Proposition 7 
Teachers (0} 
Management (+5) 
Proposition 12 
Teachers (+5) 
Management (+19) 
Proposition 17 
Teachers (-5) 
~1anagement ( +25) 
Proposition 22 
Teachers (+18) 
Management (+7) 
Amount Of Agreement Or Disagreement 
r----- ,· 
L-,_........_ 
+42 + 0 +30 +20 '+10 0 -10 -20 -30 
AGREE DISAGREE 
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HYPOTHESIS IV 
Teac~er negotiation representatives and school management 
negotiation representatives both agree that the fact-find-
ing strategy is not an effective procedure for resolving 
public education bargaining disputes. 
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This hypothesis deals with another procedure commonly employed to 
resolve public employment bargaining disputes, namely, fact-finding, and 
suggests tHatthis procedure should be eliminated from either state statutes · 
or local collective bargaining agreements. Propositions three, eight, 
thirteen, eighteen, and twenty-three pertain to this hypothesis. 
Proposition 3: The assured availability of an impasse procedure 
such as fact-finding tends to inhibit the willingness of the parties to 
compromise prior to acknowledgement of an impasse and use of the procedure. 
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVEs• RESPONSES 
SA A u D so 
m 9.6% (1o) 47.6% (1) 4.7% (7) 33.3% (1) 4. 7% 
(Total points received +5) 
A majority of teachers agreed with the proposition. The basis for 
agreement rests on a teacher belief that if a community has knowledge, 
via a fact-finder•s report, about both the working conditions of teachers 
and the unreasonableness of the board of education, it will then exert 
pressure on the school board to grant concessions to teachers. This 
belief or opinion is ultimately manifested in a bargaining behavior 
characterized by delay or reservation. Teacher negotiators.verbalized 
this bargaining tactic in the following ways: One said, 11 We were afraid 
to give up too many demands too soon. 11 Another stated, 11 We can•t give 
anything away in direct negotiations or mediation. We must save our 
proposals for fact-finding because he will probably split-the-middle. 11 
• ae1- ...... 
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Teachers who disagreed with the proposition reflected two viewpoints:· 
First, as negotiati~n representatives they tried earnestly to reach agree-
ment in direct negotiations. Secondly, since the parties are uncertain 
if the fact-finder will favor their position, pressure is generated to 
settle prior to impasse to avoid a potentially unfavorable recommendation. 
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
SA A u D SD 
(6) 28.9% (13) 61.8% 0 (2) 9.6% 0 (Total points received +23) 
Management negotiators almost unanimously agreed with the idea that 
the availability of fact-finding inhibits concession-making in direct 
negotiations. Most of the respondents reported that they were reluctant 
to give their last, best offers in either direct negotiations or mediation 
when the .fact-finding step was potentially forthcoming.· As one negotiator 
said, "As a bargain tactic, if I think the teachers will try to gain an 
advantage in fact-finding, I only weaken my bargaining position by re~ 
vealing my best offers in earlier phases of bargaining. So I simply wait 
and do not bargain seriously." Another management neogtiator professed, 
''If I know I'm going to fact-finding, where the issues are usually com-
promised by the fact-finder, I hesitate to make concessi.ons early." 
Other negotiators agreed with the proposition because they felt that 
additional steps in the impasse procedure serve to protract bargaining 
conflicts. It is interesting to note that negotiator~ in the two districts 
which did not use fact-finding in the 1972 bargaining dispute were in 
accord with the propositfon. 
t~l<.~~·---·-----otl·---· ... -----""'-----· ----~I'J"!\ffiVCr :I' .......... "'7"'VT'M' -R'4t~G~lo~------·-"'""'' ___ ,., 
. ;. 
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The two negotiators who disagreed maintained that fact-finding is 
valuable because (1) the process can clarify the issues and facts, and 
(2) the report can be instrumental in obtaining community support for 
school management. 
COMBINED RESPONSES 
SA A U 0 so {8) 19% (23) 54.7% (1) 2.3% (Total points received +14) 
("9) 21.4% ( 1) 2. 3% 
Nearly seventy-five percent of the negotiatorsagreed that the avail-
ability of fact-finding tends to retard the willingness of the parties to 
make compromises in bargaining. Both groups of negotiators admitted a 
reluctance to bargain seriously in the early phases of bargaining if fact-
finding can be eventually used. In short, each side becomes complacent 
negotiators. 
Proposition 8: Fact-finding by itself, that is, without the use of 
either prior mediation or a subsequent strike threat is not a positive 
vehicle for resolving teacher bargaining disputes. 
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES• RESPONSES 
SA A U 0 so 
(2) 9.6% (11) 52.3% (1) 4.7% (6) 28.9% (1) 4.7% 
(Total points received +7) 
While most of the respondents agreed with the proposition, mixed 
opinions can be observed. Some of the teacher negotiators are opposed to 
isolated fact-finding because the advisory nature of this process permits. 
school management to reject the fact-finder•s recommendations. Further-
more, since the report can be rejected by either party, the process does 
not bring closure or termination to the dispute. As a consequence, the 
= 
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parties must choose among three alternatives: (1) return to the bargaining 
table; (2) ca·pitulate to the other side; or (3) prepare to engage in a strike 
confrontation. Other negotiators agreed with the proposition because they 
had experienced considerable frustration with the process in the past. In 
particular, it had been a waste of both time and money. 
Some who disagreed with the proposition claimed that fact-finding can be 
an effective way of communicating teacher welfare problems to·the public, who 
in turn, could motivate school management to make concessions to the teachers. 
One negotiator disclaimed the proposition because he felt that fact-finding 
can help the parties both eliminate the trivial issues and justify the sig-
nificant issues. 
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
SA A U D so 
(2) 9.6% (14) 66.6% 0 (5) 23.8% 0 
(Total points received +13) 
A large majority of the respondents agreed with the proposition. While 
the reasons vary, it is readily seen that these negotiators find ·serious de-
fects in the fact-finding process. Some of the negotiators reiterated the 
idea that it is not a useful mechanism for settling impasses because there 
exists the danger that serious negotiations may not begin until fact-finding 
is complete. Succinctly, the parties reserve their best proposals for im-
passe bargaining thus interfering with the success of pre-impasse talks. 
Another group of negotiators pointed out that since adoption of the fact-
finder's report is voluntary, that is, the parties are free to reject all or 
part of the recommendations, the dispute can easily be turned into a political 
war when one side chooses to reject the report. Moreover, either or both 
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sides may be angered by an unfavorable fact-finder•s report. In either sit-
uation, the fact-finding process is likely to increase hoStilities. Still 
another group of management negotiators found fault with fact-finding because 
it was a laborious, time-consuming procedure. 
The few respondents who disagreed with the proposition argu·ed that the 
process is a useful mechanism for dispute settlement because it can provide 
clarification of data and issues, and this understanding can serve as a basis. 
for settlement. 
COMBINED RESPONSES 
SA A ~~--~U~~~------~0~~~~--~S~D~~~---T4) 9.5% (25)59.5% (1). 2.3% (11) 26.1% (1) 2.3% 
(Total points received +12} 
A substantial majority of the negotiators agreed with the proposition. 
Agreement generally revolved around the awareness that the fact-finding report 
is advisory in nature and therefore the parties can voluntarily choose to 
accept or reject the report. In all districts which used fact-finding, school 
management did in fact reject the report and consequently provoked teachers 
to strike. Disagreement came from those who.felt that the fact-finding proc-
ess can (1) generate public pressure for settlement, and (2) facilitate com-
munication between the belligerents. 
Proposition_!l: Fact-finding, leading to the issuance of formal public 
recommendations, is not likely to reduce the impasse conflict which still 
exists between teachers and school management following unsuccessful mediation. 
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES 1 RESPONSES 
~ A U D so 
{2) 9.6% {9) 42.8% 0 (lo) 47.6% 0 
(Total points received +3) 
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The data show that there is divergence of thinking on this proposi-
ti on. · Negotiators who affirmed this statement cited three reasons: 
First, the advisory-voluntary nature of fact-finding only functions to· 
intensify"the intergroup conflict. Teachers explained that when school 
management rejected all or part of the fact-finder's recommendations 
while they accepted the report carte b 1 anche, the teachers • organization 
imnediately felt frustration. The frustration quickly turned to anger, 
organizational solidarity, and ultimately vented itself in a teacher 
strike. Secondly, some teachers believ_ed that even if a public fa_ct-
. finder's report had the effect of generating pro-teacher sentiment from 
the community, their board of education wouldn't listen anyhow. A similar 
feeling was expressed by another teacher who said, 11 In a small community 
like ours, public recommendations are useless because the community is 
already on the board's side. 11 Thirdly, a few teachers professed that 
their early bargaining plan was ultimately to go into fact-finding because 
they felt that the fact-finder would favor their positions; the community 
would then pressure the school board to g~ant concessions to the teachers. 
These teachers· admitted that while the fact-finder did endorse most of 
the teachers• demands, the assumption of community support did not 
materialize. 
Teachers who disagreed with the proposition did so for two reasons: 
First, many expressed a belief that when facts are released to the public, 
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community pressure will be exerted on both sides to settle. Furthermore, 
some felt that if school management knows that facts are going to be 
released, it may promote serious bargaining prior to the fact-finding 
process. Secondly, some teachers explained that a public fact-finding 
report can promote intra-organizational solidarity. That is, when a fact-
finder favors teacher positions, credibility is enhanced between teacher 
negotiation representatives and those they represent. 
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
SA A U 0 so 
(7) 33.3% (8) 38% (1) 4.7% 
(Total points received +17) 
(5) 23.8% 0 
The data signify that nearly seventy-five percent of the respondents 
agree with the proposition. Some of the negotiators held fact-finding 
in disrespect because the fact-finder generally favors the teachers. One 
respondent typified this feeling when he said, "We always lose in fact-
finding because the fact-finder is biased." A large number of negotiators 
claimed that public fact-finding increases internal or external conflict. 
Externally, the report can breed public discontent and this is particularly 
unnecessary since the taxpayers usually_ do not understand the report, 
school finances, or the issues involved between the parties. Internally, 
the report can (1) solidify or polarize the respective positions of the 
parties; some respondents alleged that the teachers tried to use the re-
port to embarrass them into a settlement which further entrenched school 
management's positions; and (2) create a win-lose environment which can 
provoke further controversy or a strike. In other words, fact-finding 
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had an incendiary affect upon negotiations. Other respondents pointed 
out that fact-finding delays negotiations and is unnecessary because the 
teachers know the facts anyhow. 
The few negotiators who disagreed with the proposition supported 
public fact-finding because the process can (1) foster political credi-
bility -- i.e., it can help the school board obtain community support 
especially if the report does not favor teacher positions; (2) generate 
public response which in turn may facilitate concession-making by both 
sides; and (3) make the parties responsible for the facts or evidence 
which they present to the fact-finder. 
COMBINED RESPONSES 
SA A U D so 
(9) 21.4% (17) 40.5% (1) 2.3% (15) 35.7% 0 (Total points received +10) 
The majority of negotiators, especially those from the management 
side of the table, agreed with the proposition. In general, agreement 
was based on the idea that the advisory-voluntary nature of fact-finding 
only intensifies crisis bargaining. Disagreement revolved around the 
assumption that the fact-finding process can generate public opinion 
pressure which prompts dispute settlement behavior. 
Proposition 18: Fact-finding with private recommendations is not 
likely to serve as an effective form of reconciliation when. teachers and 
management are still at impasse following unsuccessful mediation. 
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
SA A U D so 
0 (17) 80.9% 0 (4) 19% 0 
(Total points received +13) 
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The respondents, to a large degree, supported the above proposition 
for several reasons. Some teachers, still assuming that the fact-finding 
process can eventually coerce management into concessions, felt that pri-
vate recommendations would preclude community intervention. More to the 
point, these respondents believed that teachers need public support in 
order to achieve teacher welfare issues and that private fact-finding 
would not be instrumental in bringing community pressure to the bargaining 
table. Other teacher negotiators, while agreeing with the proposition, 
took a completely different approach. These teachers felt that school 
employers are impervious to any form of third-party intervention such as 
med·iation, fact-finding, or community pressure groups. Therefore, any 
kind of fact-finding, private or public, is ineffective in bringing an 
agreement-making atmosphere to the bargaining dispute. Furthermore, as one 
teacher asserted, 11 Since the board can reject the recommendations and did, 
fuel was added to the fire and a teacher strike was precipitated ... 
The minority of teachers \'lho disagreed with the propositi on be 1 i eved 
that the private form of fact-finding can (1) promote accurate communi-
cation between teachers and the board of education, and (2) keep community 
unrest and polarization to a minimum. For example, private recommendations 
reduces the possibility that a small community will 11 chouse up sides 11 
during the dispute. 
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
SA A u D SD 
(1) 4.7% (121 57.1% (2) 9.6% (6) 28.9% 0 (Total points rece.ived +8) 
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A majority of the respondents were in agreement with the proposition. 
some of the negotiators continued their opposition to fact-finding by 
maintaining that neither form of fact-finding, private or public, would 
facilitate termination of a school bargaining dispute; instead, third 
party intervention such as fact-finding only serves to add coals to the 
bargaining conflict because the parties end up quarreling over the verac-
ity of the fact-finder's report. Some offered the opinion that if fact-
finding is going to be used in the impasse machinery it should take public 
form rather than the private because the former can createmore pressure 
on the parties to settle. 
Those who disagreed did so because (1) they believed that an unbiased, 
third party can discover new facts and unrecognized alternatives which 
may facilitate impasse settlement, and (2) private fact-finding prevents 
the introduction of community forces which may interfere with the reso-
lution of intergroup conflict. 
COMBINED RESPONSES 
SA A U D SO 
(1) 2.3% (29) 69% (2) 4.7% (lo) 23.8% o 
(Total points received +11.5) 
A large majority of negotiators agreed that private forms of fact~ 
finding would not aid in the resolution of school bargaining conflict. 
While several reasons were given, it can be observed that participants 
on both sides of the table feel that the fact-finding process is not a 
solution to the impasse problem in public education. 
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Proposition 23: When the fact-finding process is available in a 
local collective bargaining contract, the parties at impasse are likely 
to wait for fact-finding rather than seriously endeavor to reach direct 
agreement by themselves. 
SA 
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
A 
( 11} 52.3% 
(Total points received +5) 
u (4} 19% 
D 
(6) 28.9% 
so 
0 
Only a- slight majority of teachers agreed with the above statement. 
Hany of the respondents made allegations that their bargaining adversaries 
did not negotiate seriously in the early phases of bargaining. One 
respondent typified the feeling of others in this way: "Our school man-
agement has a tendency to wait until the last minute to make realistic 
offers. They were stalling and dragging their heels hoping that we 
would give up our demands in the early rounds of bargaining. 11 Other 
teacher negotiators admitted that even their team deferred concession-
making until after impasse was declared. As one teacher confessed, 
"There's no doubt about it, we can always fall back on fact-finding as 
a solution to our bargaining problems." From these comments, one could 
conclude that both sides tend to avoid putting their last offers on the 
table during direct negotiations. 
Among those who disagreed, several reflected the position that since 
school boards fear loss of control because of the intervention of a third 
party, the threat of possible fact-finding may increase the.willingness 
on the part of management to make concessions in early phases of the 
bargaining interaction. It is important to note that this theory was 
advanced by teacher negotiators who did not use fact-finding in the 1972 
dispute. 
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SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES• RESPONSES 
SA A- D u SD 
18) 38% (9) 42.8% (Total points received +24) (1) 4.7% 
(3) 14.2% 0 
Appro~imately eighty-one percent of the respondents agreed with the 
proposition. Many of these individuals reiterated earlier acknowledge-
ments that they tend to withhold or defer concessions on major issues 
until the last possible moment. One respondent, seemingly a spokesman· 
for this group said, 11 He don•t bargain hard until deadlines are there, 
such as the opening of school. 11 Another respondent explained why manage-
ment must engage in a deferra 1 of early bargaining commitments: •~"He do 
not give our best offer in early negotiations because when the fact-finder 
comes, he begins at the parties• last offer. If we made early commitments 
in pre-impasse talks, we would be pressured by the fact-finder to give up 
more during impasse bargaining. 11 Two negotiators agreed with the propo-
sition because they felt that fact-finding is a crutch which allows the 
parties to avoid facing the issues themselves. That is, the opportunity 
to let a third-party solve the problem precludes intensive direct nego-
tiations between the parties. 
COMBINED RESPONSES 
SA A U D SD 
(8) 19% (20) 47.6% {7) 16.6% (7) 16.6% 0 
(Total points received +22.5) 
As shown by the above data and TABLE 7, both teachers and management 
negotiators agreed with the proposition with teachers showing agreement to 
a lesser extent. Both sides contended that the availability or inevita-
bility of fact-finding engenders the negative bargaining tactic which is 
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characterized by a deferral of concession-making in direct negotiations. 
SU~1MARY OF HYPOTHESIS IV 
Contrary to the research accomplished by Perry, the information elic-
ited from these forty-two respondents suggests that fact-finding is not 
a constructive social technology for resolving school bargaining disputes. 
Specifically, the fact-finding process was shown to have two serious de-
fects: First, the availability of the method can cause both parties to 
engage in complacent bargaining tactics characterized by a withholding of 
concessions during early bargaining sessions primarily because they hold 
an assumption that public dissemination of a fact-finding report will 
elicit consumer pressure; such can prompt employer acquiescence to teacher 
demands. While consumer reaction to school bargaining impasses may have 
been a facilitating force in resolving teacher-management disputes in the 
early and mid 1960s, community participation in the early 1970s is diffi-
cult to achieve. Teachers in this study generally conceded that notwith-
standing substantial efforts to involve the consumer in the dispute, such 
efforts failed to generate even minimal public concern. The source of 
this apathy may be that communities a~e becoming increasingly more 
tolerant of teacher disputes and work stoppages and are, therefore, less 
likely to react than they did in the last decade. Management tactics, 
also, take the form of reluctant bargaining. Under the assumption .that 
teachers use fact-finding and subsequent community pressures as negotiating 
power, school management negotiators defer their concessions for later 
phases of bargaining. 
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Secondly, fact-finding appears to be a troublesome device because it 
intensifies the overt conflict which already exists. The advisory-volun-
tary nature of fact-finding gives the parties freedom to reject all or 
part of the recommendations. In the school districts where fact-finding 
was used, school management did reject the report, thus protracting inter-
group confl, i ct. One teacher summed up the dynamics in this way: 11 The 
board's refusal to accept a fact-finder's recommendations created further 
disruption and employee unrest. Opinions polarized, teachers were radi-
calized, and a teacher strike burst forth. 11 Apparently, some public 
education negotiators are sensitive to the problems associated with fact-
finding because in two of the seven districts investigated, fact-finding 
has recently been eliminated from the impasse machinery. 
Finally, the data which are summarized in TABLE 7 seem to clearly 
support the thesis that fact-finding should not be used to resolve school 
impasses. Hypothesis IV is accepted. 
----·-·--·------~~-~-·---------------------~-~-· --------------------------~ 
TABLE 7 
SUMMARY GRAPH FOR HYPOTHESIS IV COMPARING TEACHER NEGOTIATION 
REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES WITH SCHOOL MANAGEMENT NEGOTIATION 
REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES RELATIVE TO THE USE OF FACT-FINDING 
AS A METHOD FOR RESOLVING SCHOOL BARGAINING DISPUTES 
Propositions, Respondents 
And Total Points Received 
Proposition 3 
Teachers (+5) 
Management (+23) 
Proposition 8 
Teachers ( +7) 
Management (+13) 
Proposition 13 
Teachers (+3) 
r~anagement (f-17) 
Proposition 18 
Teachers (+13) 
Management (+8) 
Proposition 23 
Teachers (+5) 
Management (+24) 
Amount Of Agreement Or Disagreement 
+4 +40 +30 +20 +10 0 -10 -20 -30 -
AGREE DISAGREE 
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HYPOTHESIS V 
Teacher negotiation representatives and school management 
negotiation representatives both agree that the arbitration 
strategy would not be an appropriate dispute settlement 
mechanism in public education bargaining impasses. 
This hypothesis deals with the umpiring device called arbitration 
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in which a third party determines salaries and other terms and conditions 
of employment. Arbitration is often advanced as a substitute for the 
strike. While this settlement device was not used in the school systems 
studied, it will be investigated to determine how school negotiators feel 
about the use of such a strategy. Propositions four, nine, fourteen, 
nineteen, and twenty-four pertain to this hypothesis. 
Proposition 4: Contract disputes between teachers and boards of 
education should not be resolved by an impartial, outside authority who 
makes a final and binding decision. 
SA 
0 
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES• RESPONSES 
A 
(3) 14.2% 
(Total poi~ts received -25) 
u 
(1) 4.7% 
D 
(6) 28.9% 
so 
(11) 52.3% 
The scale shows that almost seventy-one percent of the respondents 
disagreed with the proposition. Those who disagreed reflected two posi-
tions: First, because of the emotional heat, mistrust, and irrationality 
which surrounds a negotiations impasse, an impartial, objective third 
party is needed to decide.the issues. Secondly, the threat of third 
party intervention in the form of an arbitrator can promote more serious 
bargaining by school management. 
The few teachers who agreed with the proposition maintained that an 
arbitration-umpire lacks knowledge of the school district which may lead 
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him to make inappropriate decisions. 
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
SA A U D so 
T14) 66.6% (4) 19% a (Total points received +29) 
(3) 14.2% 0 
The data reveal that nearly all of the respondents agreed with the 
statement.· Rationale f6r agre~ment focuses on three main themes: 
(1) an itinerate arbitrator ''flying in and out of a local school district" 
could leave the parties to implement difficult or irresponsible awards; 
(2) since an arbitrator is neither familiar with the school district or 
with public education, he may make decisions out of ignorance which the 
parties have to live with; and (3) ·third-party arbitration is an unlawful 
delegation of school boards' rights. 
COMBINED RESPONSES 
SA A U D so 
(14) 33.3% (7) 16.6% (1} 2.3% (9) 21.4% (11) 26.1% 
(Total points received +2) 
There was a divergence of thinking on this proposition. Teachers 
generally disagreed with the idea while school management respondents were 
in agreement. 
Proposition 9: Compulsory binding arbitration, in which a third 
party intervenes to determine salaries and other terms and conditions of 
work, would tend to weaken the direct negotiations process. 
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
SA A u D so 
(1) 4.7% (2) 9.6% (3) 14.2% (11) 52.3% (4) 19% 
(Total points received -16) 
. I 
u 
~ 
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As indicated by the scale, a large majority of teachers disagree 
with the proposition. In general, teachers felt that arbitration would 
strengthen rather than weaken the bargaining process. Some of the re-
spondents.speculated that the fear of losing an issue via a third-party 
conclusion would give impetus to the parties to bargain more seriously. 
Teachers especially felt that such fear would prompt good faith nego-
tiations by school management. Briefly, this dispute resolution device 
may encourage settlement before arbitration. Three teacher negotiators, 
all from the same school district, favored arbitration because they had 
had a ~ood experience with it when it was used to resolve an earli~r im-
passe in 1970. 
Teachers who evidenced dislike for arbitration did so on the grounds 
that it would invite a waiting syndrome--i.e., neither side would agree 
in advance but would tend to wait for the final step of arbitration. 
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
SA A u D so 
(7) 33.3% (10) 47.6% (1) 4.7% (2) 9.6% (1) 4.7% 
(Total points received +20) 
The scale shows that more than eighty percent of the respondents 
agreed with the proposition. Management negotiators are critical of ar-
bitration for at least four reasons: (1) this device would interfere with 
true negotiations; rather than negotiate between themselves, the parties 
would tend to wait for the final step to perform for the arbitrator. 
Concurrently, the tendency to wait would interfere with communication--
i.e., the parties wouldn't listen to each other because they are pre-
occupied with arbitration preparation; (2) there is a tendency to ''hold 
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back 11 for arbitration. If arbitration lay at the end of the impasse pro-
cedure, neither party would give their best offers in direct negotiations; 
(3) the availability or possibility of an arbitrated settlement may prompt 
a 11 let-George·-do-it 11 syndrome; and (4) an elected public body like a 
school board cannot give away its rights and responsibilities to an ar-
bitrator. In addition to these perceived arbitration defects, several 
management negotiators displayed mistrust in the arbitration procedure 
because they had had a bitter experience with it in a previous impasse in 
which the arbitrator's awards favored the teachers' organization. 
Among the few negotiators ltJho disagreed, one stated, 11 If I knew an 
umpire was coming in to resolve the issue, I might negotiate differently 
in an effort to avoid an unfavorable a~tJard. 11 
COMBINED RESPONSES 
SA A u 0 so 
(8) 19% (12) 28.6% ( 4) 9. 5% (13) 30.4% (5) 11.9% (Total points received +2.5) 
The combined response scale shows that there is considerable dis-
~greement among the respondents with respect to the proposition. Teacher 
negotiators generally desired the use of arbitration primarily because 
they felt it would promote serious bargaining on the part of school 
management. Conversely, school management negotiators disapproved of 
compulsory binding arbitration; their lack of faith in this device was 
founded on several rationale. 
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froposition 14: As a means of impasse resolution, the parties should 
not have access to voluntarily submit the conflict issues to an impartial 
third party for a final and binding decision. 
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
SA A U D SO 
a--- (3) 14.2% (2} 9.6% ---,...0,.....,.2IT7-:1% ·-r(4.n-)__,l:;-;;9=%--
(Total points received -17) 
' More than seventy percent of the respondents disagreed \vi th the 
proposition. Some of the respondents disagreed with the idea because of 
the word "voluntarily." These teachers felt that arbitration must be 
compulsory or mandatory, otherwise school management would not agree to 
utilize this dispute settlement technique; that is, voluntaryism would 
promote another 11 impasse. 11 Other teachers remarked that the potential 
loss of control by school management via any form of arbitration would 
motivate management negotiators to make better negotiation efforts in 
earlier stages of bargaining. 
As to the few negotiators who agreed with the statement, one teacher 
thought that any form of arbitration would function to retard the nego-
tiations process--i.e., the parties wouldn't negotiate meaningfully until 
the arbitration step was reached •. 
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
SA A U D 
(9) 42.8~~ ----- (7) 33.3% (2) 9.6% '13Tl4.2% 
(Total points received +22) 
so 
0 
Approximately seventy-five percent of the respondents agreed with this 
proposition. Management negotiators found some similar faults with val~ 
untary binding arbitration as they did with compulsory binding arbitration. 
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For example, they perceive vo1untary arbitration as having the following 
defects: (1) it engenders a ''let-the-arbitrator-solve-the-problem" syn-
drome; (2) arbitrators may not be knowledgeable about the specific school 
system or public education bargaining problems; and (3) a school board 
cannot abdicate its responsibilities to outsiders. In sum, these nego-
tiatol'S expressed the idea that bargaining is best without a third party. 
One respondent favored the concept of voluntary binding arbitration 
but only if the arbitrator deals with salary issues and not curriculum 
issues. 
COMBINED RESPONSES 
SA A u D so 
(9) 21.4% (10) 23.8% (4) 9.5% (15) 35.7% (4) 9.5% 
(Total points received +4.5) 
The combined response scale reveals that the respondentswere in dis-
cord with respect to the use of voluntary binding arbitration. While 
teacher negotiators favored this impasse resolution device, school manage-
ment negotiators categorically rejected it. 
Proposition 19: As a means to resolve bargaining disputes, compulsory 
binding arbitration would deter the parties from reaching direct agree-
ment by themselves. 
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
SA A U D SO 
(1) 4.7% 0 (3} 14.2% (13) 61.8% (4) 19% 
(Total points received -19) 
More than eighty percent of the teacher respondents disagreed with 
the proposition. Rather than deter a direct agreement, teachers expressed 
a general feeling that the possibility of compulsory binding arbitration 
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would encourage early settlements. That is, the parties--especially school 
management--would negotiate earnestly to avoid an arbitrated settlement. 
SCHOOL t~1ANAGH~ENT REPRESENTATIVES 1 RESPONSES 
SA A u D so 
f4) 19% (10) 47.6% (Total points received +14) 
(3) 14.2% (4) 19% 0 
The scale shows that most management negotiators agreed with the propo-
sition. Several respondents voiced the idea that the arbitration process 
would force them to hold back offers in direct negotiations. As one nego-
tiator said, 11 We couldn•t expose our best offers until the third party comes. 11 
Other management negotiators were convinced that the teachers• organization 
would indiscriminately throw many demands into the arbitrator's 11 kettle 11 
in hopes that the umpire would split the differences. 
Among the negotiators VJho disagreed, several claimed that they would 
rather reach an early agreement than risk a dictated settlement by an 
arbitrator. 
COMBINED RESPONSES 
SA A u D so 
(5) 11.9% (10)"23.8% (6) 14.2% (17) 40.5% (4) 9.5% 
(Total points received -2.5) 
Respondents showed dissimilar opinion over this proposition. Teacher 
negotiators strongly endorsed compulsory arbitration while management nego-
tiators were equally opposed to the mechanism. The former group felt that 
such a device would motivate their opponents towards serious, good faith 
bargaining in direct negotiations. The latter group felt that an arbitrator 
"waiting in the wings 11 would slo\'J down the settlement process. Specifically, 
teachers would hold out to the very end in hopes of gaining more while 
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management would hold out in hopes of saving more. 
Proposition 24: Reliance upon third party arbitration, either com-
pulsory or voluntary, would weaken the incentive for the parties to agree 
at the bargaining table. 
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
SA A U 0 so 
0 (2) 9.6% (2) 9.6% (13) 61.8% (4) 19% 
(Total points received -19) 
Almost eighty percent of the teachers disagreed with the proposition. 
The general feeling expressed was that the threat of arbitration can 
function to promote concession-making and settlement behavior in the 
earlier phases of bargaining. One teacher remarked, ''To avoid the pos-
sibility that an arbitrator would rule against the association on any 
demand, I would bargain more seriously in pre-impasse talks. 11 Other 
teachers speculated that school management would similarly bargain dif-
ferently in order to avoid a possible negative arbitration award. In 
sum, deferment of compromises would be diminished by the potentiality 
of an arbitrator entering the scene. 
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
SA A U 0 so 
(3) 14.2% (10) 47.6% (3) 14.2% (5) 23.8% 0 
(Total points received·+11) 
A majority of management negotiators agreed with the cbncept that 
arbitration would interfere with the process of direct negotiations. In 
particular, some felt that both parties would postpone compromises for the 
arbitration step. As one negotiator said, 11 The parties would give up and 
not negotiate if arbitration were available in the impasse steps." 
Another negotiator suspected that teachers would be especially inclined 
to wait for arbitratiqn: "Why should the teachers• organization give in 
during mediation or fact-finding if binding arbitratipn is there to 
give them more.~~ 
Those in disagreement commented that arbitration would give incen-
tive to settle. One negotiator said, "The possibility of arbitration 
might make us move faster to avoid a third party from telling us what 
to do. 11 Another remarked, 11 If both sides know arbitration is there at 
the end of the tunnel, the uncertainty of his decision may stimulate 
earlier negotiations. 11 
COMBINED RESPONSES 
SA A u 0 so 
(3) 7.1% (12} 28.6% 
(Total points received -2) 
(5) 11.9% (18) 42.9% ( 4) 9. 5% 
This ·scale sho~t/s a diversity of viewpoints ·among negotiators. As 
is true in all of the propositions relevant to hypothesis V, teachers 
endorsed arbitration while management objected to its use. 
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIS V 
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The summary graph in TABLE 8 evidences the fact that the two groups 
of negotiators took opposite viewpoints with respect to the use of arbi-
tration. Teachers, seemingly frustrated with the stalling tactics used 
by school management, believed that arbitration would (1) speed up the 
bargaining process; (2) encourage concession-making by their adversaries; 
and (3) motivate the management team to take the bargaining process 
seriously. School management negotiators criticized arbitration because 
it (1) encourages the parties to defer their best offers until later 
phases of bargaining; (2) promotes a 11 let-the-arbitrator-solve-the-
problem-for-us11 attitude; (3) raises the problem of whether or not a 
board of education can delegate its rights and responsibilities to a 
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third party; and (4) permits decision-making by an umpire who may neither 
be knowledgeable of the school district or the peculiar problems of public 
education. In brief, management negotiators in this study were convinced 
that school bargaining is best vlithout a third-party arbitrator. In many 
respects, these negotiators offered the same criticisms as those advanced 
by authorities in labor-management relations. 
A necessary fact to point out is that arbitration was neither avail-
able or utilized in the school systems investigated, but one district had 
emoloyed this settlement device in a previous impasse. Therefore, it 
should be said that most of the respondents' rationale was based on 
speculation rather than direct experience. 
Coincidentally, TABLE 8 shows that the disagreement points per-
fectly counter-balance the agreement points. Hypothesis V is, therefore, 
neither acceoted nor rejected. 
TABLE 8 
SUMMARY GRAPH FOR HYPOTHESIS V COMPARING TEACHER NEGOTIATION 
REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES WITH SCHOOL MANAGEt1ENT NEGOTIATION 
REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES RELATIVE TO THE USE OF ARBITRATION 
AS A METHOD FOR RESOLVING SCHOOL BARGAINING DISPUTES 
Propositions, Respondents 
And Total Points Received 
Proposition 4 
Teachers (-25} 
~1anagement ( +29} 
Proposition 9 
Teachers (-16} 
11anagement (+20) 
Proposition 14 
Teachers . ( -17) 
Management (+22) 
Proposition 19 
Teachers ( -19) 
Management (+14) 
Proposition 24 
Teachers ( -19) 
Management (+11} 
Amount Of Agreement Or Disagreement 
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+ 2 +40 +30 +20 +10 0 -10 -20 -30 - 0 -42 
AGREE DISAGREE 
HYPOTHESIS VI 
Teacher negotiation representatives agree that the strike strategy 
should be available as a means to resolve collective bargaining 
disputes. 
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Hypothesis VI, as well as hypothesis VII, focused on the most con-
troversial strategy for terminating bargaining impasses in public education,' 
namely, the strike. This hypothesis suggests that teachers endorse the 
use of the strike; conversely, hypothesis VII estimates that school man-
agement negotiators are opposed to this device. Propositions five, ten, 
fifteen, twenty, and twenty-five relate to hypothesis VI and Hypothesis VII. 
Proposition 5: State legislatures should authorize strikes by teachers 
at least where public health or safety is not thereby endangered. 
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES 1 RESPONSES 
SA A U D SD 
(13) 61.8% {8) 38% (0) (0) (0) 
(Total points received +34) 
Teacher negotiators unanimously agreed with this statement. In 
general, agreement came from three viewpoints: First, since mediation 
and fact-finding failed to resolve the impasses and with binding arbi-
tration not available, some device is needed to bring closure to the 
dispute. The strike can serve this function. Secondly, many teachers 
expressed the concern that school management will abuse its power posi-
tion--i.e., they are reluctant to make compromises and concessions--when 
teachers are denied the right to strike. In other words, the strike makes 
the negotiations proc~ss function more efficiently because the parties 
have full equality at the bargaining table. Thirdly, teacher strikes do 
not imperil the health and safety of a community. 
.. 
1-
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Proposition 10: The threat or actuality of a strike can function 
to promote an agreement making atmosphere. 
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES• RESPONSES 
SA A U D 161 28.9% (12) 57.1% 0 (Total points received +21) (3) 14.2% 
so 
0 
Teacher respondents were in almost total accord with this propo-
sition. Agreement centered around the concept that collective bargain-
ing is a power relationship in which the parties must be able to exercise 
power tactics--such as the strike-pfor the purpose of facilitating agree-
ment. More specifically, strike threats and actual work stoppages bring 
pressures to both sides to settle. As one teacher said, "The strike was 
an instrument to get the school board•s attention, and when they began to 
listen to us, bargaining was easier. The strike also forced us to examine 
our demands more carefully." Another teacher emphasized the importance 
of the power relationship by saying, "with the absence of binding arbi-
tration and the choice of the school board to refuse the fact-finder•s 
recommendations, the only power tool we had remaining was the strike ... 
Regarding the three te~chers who disagreed with the statement, it 
is essential to note that·all three represented the same school district. 
In this school system the board of education threatened to fire 414 
teachers who engaged in the strike. 
--------------------------... 
Proposition 15: Concession-making, compromises, or modification of 
bargaining positions by school management are likely to be generated when 
a teacller.s • organization threatens to strike. 
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVEs• RESPONSES 
u D so 
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SA A 
\6) 28.9% (9) 42.8% (2) 9.6% (3} 14.2% (1) 4.7% (Total points received +16) 
Approxima-tely seventy percent of the respondents agreed with this state-
ment. Fundamentally, agreement centered on the belief that negotiations is 
essentially a compromise and balancing of opposing pressures of two social 
groups. Furthermore, as a means to achiev~ compromise, teachers must process 
specific forms of bargaining power--e.g., the strike threat or the actuality 
of the strike. Several teachers, h6wever, qualified their affirmative re-
sponses to this proposition by pointing out that strike threats are less 
effective when the other party is experienced in the bargaining process. In 
other words, a highly sophisticated school management can mitigate the effec-
tiveness of a teachers• strike. 
Among the teachers who disagreed with the statement, several offered the 
idea that threats by themselves do not influ~nce the opponent. Accordingly, 
one teacher reported, 11 The school board thought we were only bluffing and 
were not serious about a teacher walk-out ... 
Proposition 20: Teachers should be allowed the 11modified.right to 
strike. 11 That is, they could legally strike but only after either mediation 
or fact-finding procedures have failed to resolve the bargaining dispute. 
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVEs• RESPONSES 
SA A U D so 
(1) 4.7% (20) 95.2% 0 
(Total points received +22) 
0 0 
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The scale reveals that teachers unamiously agreed with the state-
ment. Agreement gen~rally came from two directions: First, the respon-
dents clearly reiterated their belief that teachers should be granted the 
legal right to strike. In particular, teachers should be entitled to 
strike because (1) a work stoppage by teachers does not endanger commun-
ity health or safety, and (2) the strike right has been granted to other 
employees in both the public and private sector. Secondly, the respondents 
maintained that all available alternatives or possibilities for impasse 
resolution--such as mediation--should be exhausted prior to a teachers• 
strike. · 
Proposition 25: The threat or actuality of a strike during or 
following the mediation process would tend to increase the number of 
settlements in mediation. 
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES• RESPONSES 
SA A u D so 
(4) 19% (13) 61.8% (3) 14.2% (1) 4.7% 0 
(Total points received +20) 
Nearly all of the respondents agreed with this statement. Agree-
ment focused on the belief that pressure is a prerequisite to good faith 
bargaining on the part of school management, One teacher typified the 
assumption in this manner: 11 0ur school board took a stubbprn, unyielding 
position in both pre-impasse and impasse talks and began to compromise 
only when we withheld our services.•• The need for a pressure environment 
was explained by another teacher in this way: 11 The strike threat or actual 
work stoppage gives the mediator pressure tools to use on both parties 
and this pressure encourages compromises.•• Another teacher argued that 
if strikes were legal and injunctions were not available, mediated 
settlements would be increased. 
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIS VI 
TABLE 9 graphically demonstrates that hypothesis VI is accepted. 
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It is not surprising that teacher negotiators who engaged in a work 
stoppage would rationalize such behavior. However, it is noteworthy that 
the rationale expressed by teachers is nearly identical to the rationale 
articulated by experts in the field of collective bargaining who are 
proponents of the right to strike. As examples, teacher negotiators and 
authorities agree on the following principles: 
(1) Teacher strikes must be differentiated from other public 
employee strikes because they do not usually precipitate a health or 
safety crisis. Consequently, teacher strikes should be legalized. A 
legislative ban on strikes, accompanied by penalties, would interfere 
with the effective development of teacher collective bargaining and 
specifically would not facilitate resolution of bargaining impasses. 
(2) Teacher strikes facilitate impasse resolution because they 
exert reciprocal pressures upon the parties which can produce a settle-
ment. Because strikes provide a proper balance of strength and risk on 
each side of the bargaining table, neither party can afford to act 
irrationally or irresponsibly. 11 The fruits of peace are generally far 
greater than the spoils of war. 11 1 Moreover, in some instances there is 
lr.w. Abel, 11 The Collective Bargaining. Environment In Two Sectors: 
In Private Nonregul a ted Industry, 11 Co 11 ecti ve Bargaining Today (Washing-
ton, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, 1970), p. 279. 
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evidence that school management negotiators, consciously or not, rely 
upon the ban on strikes as a license for the arbitrary exercise of pre-
rogatives and as immunity against their failure to negotiate in good faith 
with employees. 1 
(3) Collective bargaining in public education is a power relation-
ship which i~ stablized when the contending parties have equal bargaining 
power. Specifically, the threat or actuality of a power source such as 
the strike promotes the necessary power balance which underpins the 
successful resolution of school negotiation impasses. 
1M. Sami Kassem and Marcia L. Mutterer, 11A Critique Of Public Policy 
Toward Teacher Strikes And Some Alternatives, 11 Public Personnel Review, 
April, 1971, p. 83. 
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~ 
' 
,, 
' 
,, 
' ~ l 
School management negotiation representatives agree that the strike 
strategy should not be available as a means to resolve collective 
bargaining disputes. · 
In contrast to hypothesis VI, this hypothesis suggests that school ~ ! 
~ 
I management negotiators disagree with teacher negotiation representatives 
with respect to the use of the strike. Propositions used to test this 
hypothesis are the same as those used for hypothesis VI. 
Proposition 5: State legislatures should authorize strikes by 
teachers, at least where public health or safety is not thereby endan-
gered. · 
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
SA A U D so 
0 (4) 19% (2) 9.5% (7) 33.3% (8) 38% 
(Total points received -19) 
The.response scale reveals that a large majority of management 
negotiators disagreed with the above proposition. The respondents believed I' 
that strike prohibitions should continue in the school bargaining context 
J primarily because teachers provide an essential service which should not 
be disrupted. Other management negotiators would continue strike re-
strictions because teachers could utilize authorized work stoppages as a 
means to further erode the power of local boards of education. Several 
respondents would continue no-strike laws simply because alternate impasse 
resolution devices can be used. 
Among the few negotiators who agreed with the proposition, two did 
not object to dejure strikes because they were happening defacto anyhow. 
I 
~ 
.I 
·I ~ Another respondent expressed the idea that teacher strikes do not endanger I 
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Proposition 10: The threat or actuality of a strike can function to 
promote an agreement-making atmosphere. 
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVEs• RESPONSES 
SA A U 0 so 
13) 14.2% (7) 33.3% (3) 14.2% 
(Total points received +2) 
(5) 23.8% (3) 14.2% 
There is a diversity of thinking among the res-po'ndents witH: 
respect to the above statement. The negotiators in agreement commented 
that the inconveniences of the strike motivated them to negotiate more 
seriously towards an agreement. The "inconveniences" included complaints 
from parents, extra bargaining sessions, and the disruption of the educa-
tional program. 
Those in disagreement offered the following viewpoints: (1) Most 
importantly, teach~r strikes do not frighten school boards as they used 
to in the decade of the 1960s when the strike phenomenon was surrounded 
with mystery and fear; (2) threats and work stoppages polarize and 
solidify the sides even more and thus make agreement more difficult. As 
one negotiator reported, "Because the strike threat raised the temperature 
of the school board, barriers were bui1~ which interferred with agreement;" 
(3) when school management is supported by a majority of the community, 
the strike does not promote agreement; and (4) since a teacher strike can 
save the school board money, there is no hurry to reach agreement on the 
contract dispute. 
Proposition 15: Concession-making, compromises or modification of 
bargaining positions by school management are likely to be generated when 
a teachers• organization threatens to strike. 
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
A U D so SA (10) 47.6% (2) 9.6% (6} 28.9% (3) 14.2% 
(Total points received -2) 
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The response scale indicates that there is a considerable lack of 
agreement on this proposition. Negotiators who supported the statement 
alluded to the concept which is sometimes referred to as either the "cost 
of withholding consent" or the ''cost of disagreement." Specifically, these 
"costs" included the political embarrassment of allowing the disruption 
of the educational program. In other words, these respondents suggested 
that the costs, punishments, and embarrassments attendant a strike foster 
concession-making by school management. 
Negotiators who disagreed with the statement, reiterated their 
beliefs about the strike: (1) strike threats early in the bargaining 
season tend to solidify school management; (2) absence of public sentiment 
during a strike or strike threat reinforces a school board's adamant 
bargaining position; and (3) annual strike threats by a teachers' organi-
zation eventually lose their effectiveness, credibility, and mystique to 
the point where school management is no longer afraid of a strike actuality. 
In sum, the existence of these three strike~threat factors impede rather 
than generate settlement behavior by the school management team. 
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ProQQ_~_Q_: Teachers should be allowed the "modified right to · · 
strike~lfTS~they could legally strike but only after either mediation or 
fact-finding procedures have failed to resolve the bargaining dispute. 
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES~ RESPONSES 
SA A U 0 so 
-riJ 4.7% (6) 28.9% 0 (Total points received -11) (9) 42.8% (5) 23.8% 
About 67% of the respondents disagreed with the proposition. Among 
these respondents, the general feeling was that teachers should not be allowed 
to strike under any circumstance. One particular reason was given for this 
generalization, namely, that education is an "essential service" which should 
not be disrupted by a teachers' strike. 
Those in agreement accepted the concept of the limited or 11modified 
right to strike 11 basically because strike rights ·are enjoyed by other 
employee groups. 
Proposition 25: The threat or actuality of a strike during or following 
the mediation process would tend to increase the number of settlements in 
mediation. 
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES 
SA A U 0 so 
(2) 9.6% (9) 42.8% (5) 23.8% (3) 14.2% (2) 9.6% 
(Total points received +6) 
While management negotiators had mixed feelings about this idea, the 
scale reveals that a majority agreed with the statement. Agreement essentially 
centered on the idea that mediation under pressure leads more quickly to reso-
lution than mediation without pressure. One negotiator summed up the idea in 
this way: 11To be honest, I respond to the strike to get rid of it; therefore, 
the strike pressure would probably help the mediation process. 11 
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Most of the negotiators disagreed because they felt that the strike 
tends to polarize the parties into a ~win-lose'' situation. As one responden 
said, "A strike converts an economic dispute into a raw power struggle to 
find out who's stronger." 
Among the undecided, some argued that better ways than the strike must 
be invented to resolve bargaining impasses. 
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIS VII 
While the total net points amassed by the respondents and shown in 
TABLE 9 would confirm hypothesis VII, it is compulsory to point out that 
school management negotiators show some ambivalence toward the use of the 
strike .. For example, these negotiators agreed that (1) the ~costs" con-
comitant to a .strike facilitate more serious bargaining on their part,, and 
(2) the pressures of a strike may prompt more settlements in mediation. 
Management negotiators maintained that strikes should not be legalized 
in any form. Furthermore, with respect to the question, "should state leg-
islatures authorize teacher strikes at least where public health or safety 
is not endangered, 11 more than seventy perceilt answered in the negative not-
withstanding the fact that none of the management respondents claimed that 
the teacher strike which occurred in their district imperiled community 
health or safety. 
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIS VI AND HYPOTHESIS VII 
In comparing responses of teacher negotiators and school management 
negotiators to the same propositions, TABLE 9 indicates the following 
trends: (1) the two groups disagreed with respect to legalizing teacher 
strikes; (2) both groups agreed that the threat or actuality of a strike 
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can function to promote an agreement-making atmosphere; (3) the two groups 
took opposiie viewpoints relative to the thesis that strikes can prompt 
school management to make bargaining concessions. However, it is note-· 
worthy that management negotiators exhibited a divergence of opinion on 
this idea; (4) the two groups of negotiators assumed contrasting positions 
on the ''modi~ied right to strikeu concept; and (5) the two groups agreed 
that the pressures of a strike threat or actual work stoppage would in-
crease the number of settlements in mediation. 
TABLE 9 
SUMMARY GRAPH FOR HYPOTHESIS VI AND HYPOTHESIS VII CONTRASTING 
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES 1 RESPONSES WITH SCHOOL 
MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES• RESPONSES RELATIVE TO THE USE OF 
THE STRIKE AS A MEANS TO RESOLVE SCHOOL BARGAINING DISPUTES 
Propositions, Respondents 
And Total Points Received 
ProQosition 5 
Teachers (+34) 
Management (-19) 
Propositi on 10 
Teachers (+21) 
fltanagement (+2} 
Pro12osition 15 
Teachers {+16) 
Management (-2} 
Proposition 20 
Teachers (+22) 
Management { -11) 
Proposition 25 
Teachers (+20) 
Management (+6) 
+42 
Amount Of Agreement Or Disagreement 
r:~· -
+40 +30 +20 +10 0 -10 -20 -30 -40 
AGREE DISAGREE 
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-42 
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SUMMARY 
The presentation and analysis of data in this chapter has shown what 
f impasse resolution strategies teachers and school management negotiation I representatives prefer to employ in the event of a negotiations impasse, 
I 
f 
I 
I 
i 
~ ~ 
and consequently, has provided a clue to this important question: What are 
the most effeitive methods of imp~sse resolution in public education labor 
disputes? 
With respect to the five methods investigated, teacher negotiation 
representatives preferred to use the following four methods: (1) the strike; 
(2) arbitration; (3) the human relations method; and (4) mediation. The 
T-test statistical tool was used to refine this preference. TABLE 10 shows 
a pair-wise comparison which allows us to rank or prioritize the four pre-
ferences. In reading this TABLE, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
(1) In comparing the strike strategy to arbitration, the T-test shows 
no significant difference between the means of the two methods. Interpreted, 
~ it appears that teachers• preference between the two methods is evenly 
1 divided; that is, while they prefer both methods, they have exhibited no 
I 
:1 
significant preference for either method. 
(2) In comparing the strike strategy to the human relations method, 
q 
J 
l 
i 
~ 
' 
the T-test shows a significant difference between the two means. Inter-
preted, it seems that the difference of this magnitude is not due to chance 
variations in preference, but it is probably due to the fact that a real 
l difference exists in teachers• preference. That is, we have no reason to 
, think that teachers like the two methods equally well. The evidence seems 
r! to indicate a tendency to prefer the use of the strike to the use of the ~ 
•I 
l~~ ... -0, --.. --~~~1IM8ft!lftll5illa1W""'*'---------·--•M+ ....... -======-----------~ 
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{3) In comparing the strike strategy to mediation, the T-test shows 
a significant difference between the two means. Interpreted, it seems that 
the difference of this magnitude is not due to chance variations in pre-
ference, but it is probably due to the fact that a real difference exists 
in teachers' preference. To state the conclusion differently, we have no 
reason to think that teachers like the two methods equally well. 
(4) In comparing arbitration to the human relations strategy, the 
T-test shows no significant difference between the two methods. Interpre-
ted, it appears that teachers' preference betvJeen the two methods is equally 
divided; that is, whi1e they prffer both methods, it appears that teachers 
are undecided about which resolution device should be used during an impasse 
because they have exhibited no significant preference for either method. 
(5) In comparing arbitration to mediation, the T-test shows a signi-
ficant difference between the two means. Interpreted, it seems that a 
difference of this magnitude is not due to chance variations in preference, 
but rather, it is probably due to the fact that a real difference exists 
in teachers' preference. That is, the statistical evidence seems to in-
dicate a tendency for teachers to prefer the use of arbitration to the use 
of mediation when resolving school bargaining impasses. 
(6) In comparing the human relations method to mediation, the T-test 
shows no significant difference between the means of the two methods. 
Interpreted, it appears that teachers • preference betwee-n the tv1o methods 
is evenly divided; thaf is, while teachers prefer both methods, it appears 
that they are undecided about which resolution device to use in the event 
impasse because they have exhibited no significant preference for 
______ .,.,~,w.~~.-.._....,,. __ ,. _ ....__........,_,..."'illi..,_,.a;__._,.,_.,.., __ ..,.,.,__,........, _______ nn,_~-0'-----=--•l 
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either method. 
With respect to school management negotiation representatives• pre-
ference, this chapter revealed that these negotiators preferred to use only 
two of the five strategies investigated: (1) the human relations method and 
(2) mediation. While TABLE 11 shows the means as 2.57 and 3.38 respectively, 
the T-test used in the pair-wise comparison indicates that the difference 
in preference is not significant. Restated, while there is a difference 
in means, the difference is not significant to warrant a conclusion that 
these negotiators prefer one method over the other. In brief, in the event 
of a bargaining impasse, either method would be desirable. 
Other important conclusions can be drawn from the data in this 
chapter: 
(1) While teachers accepted the strike strategy, school management 
negotiators rejected the strike. 
(2) While teachers accepted arbitration, school management nego-
tiators rejected this method. 
(3) Both groups rejected fact-finding as a means to resolve public 
school bargaining disputes. 
(4) Both groups endorsed the mediation and human relations method 
as strategies to resolve bargaining impasses. 
8 Ttl!t.l>'tii'A:Wf-N'I•t iii4bJI s 
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TABL 
THIS TABLE SHOWS A PAIR-WISE CO 
METHODS AS PREFERRED BY TEA 
E 10 
MPARISON OF FOUR IMPASSE RESOLUTION 
CHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES 
Impasse Resolution 
Method a ~1ean 
Strike 
Method 
Arbitration Human Relations t'ledi ati on 
Method 11ethod t·1ethod 
Strike 5.38 .81 3.35* 4.59* 
Arbitration 4.52 - 1.66 2.86* 
Human Relations 2.85 - - 1.36 
Mediation 1.38 - - -
*Significant difference of prefere 
of confidence. 
nee in the two methods at the .05 level 
TABL 
THIS TABLE SHOWS A PAIR-
RESOLUTION METHODS AS P 
NEGOTIATION 
E 11 
WISE COMPARISON OF TWO IMPASSE 
REFERRED BY SCHOOL MANAGEMENT 
REPRESENTATIVES 
Impasse Resolution Human Rel ations Mediation 
Method Meana Method ~1ethod 
Human Relations 2.57 .93 
Mediation 3.38 
-
1n1ng the algebraic sum of the pluses 
s or total values by the number of 
a Means were computed by (1) determ and 
minuses and (2) dividi.ng these sum 
respondents, which is twenty-one. 
each respondent ranges from +10 t 
The total values possibly attained by 
0 -10. 
'------------~-.. - -
CHAPTER V 
CASE STUDIES: BACKGROU~ID DATA--POLITICAL FACTORS, BARGAINING 
RELATIONSHIPS, AND IMPASSE PROCEDURES IN THREE SELECTED SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
Chapters V and VI incorporate the third phase of the study which 
is a case study analysis of three of the seven school systems for the pur-
pose of clarifying or identifying any salient factors which may have in-
fluenced the impasse resolution process in those school systems. The in-
formation for the case studies was collected in personal interviews by 
using an open•ended questionnaire (see APPENDIX B). This guide was admin-
istered to eighteen negotiation representatives who also participated in 
the phase two interview. The data are placed in a modified case study form. 
These three districts were selected for case study analysis on the basis 
of (1) the quantity of information obtained about the district; (2) the 
number of impasse steps used to resolve the bargaining dispute; and (3) the 
representative nature of the districts. 
The purpose of this chapter is to present basic background informa- !. · 
tion of the three districts. The presentation will focus on three specific ~ 
I 
~ 
conditions operating at the time of the impasse occurrence: 
(1) the political factors affecting each of the parties at the time 
of the impasse; f f 
~ 
f 
I 
(2) the history of the collective bargaining relationship between 
the teacher organization and school management; and 
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(3) the impasse procedures called for in the formal collective bar-
gaining agreement under which the parties operated at the time of the 
dispute. 
Political Factors 
Power, which is broadly defined as the ability of one group to con-
trol, influence, or determine the behavior of another group, 1 is an integral 
part of the political structure and status of the parties and should be con-
sidered when evaluating the effectiveness of any impasse procedure. In par-
ticular, the ''political structure of the parties will determine the weight 
assigned to the demands of various constitutent groups in decisions as to 
bargaining positions and final commitments. The political status of the 
parties will determine the strength of commitments to positions and influ-
ence decisions regarding the use of power in support of those commitments."2 
The Collective Bargaining Relationship 
In the state of Illinois, notwithstanding the absence of a school 
bargaining statute, a formal teacher-board relationship can be established 
in a local school system as a result of negotiations between the two par-. 
ties. For example a local collective bargaining contract may force the 
board of education to recognize and negotiate an agreement with teacher 
representatives. In addition to such formal relationships, a number of 
informal relationships can be established; a summary of some·of the differ-
ent systems of informal bargaining relationships is shown in Figure 1. 
1Edwin B. Flippo, Management: A Behavioral Approach (Boston: Allyn 
and Bacon, 1966), p. 190. 
2Perry, op.cit., pp. 35-36. 
Conflict 
Militant 
Opposition 
Aggression 
and 
Resistance 
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FIGURE 1 
COMPARISON OF THEORETICAL MODELS OF COLL~CTIVE 
BARGAINING RELATIONSHIPSa 
Containment 
Armed 
Truce 
Repressed 
Hostility 
Model 1 
Model 2 
Accommodation · 
Working 
Harmony 
~1oderate 
Cooperation· 
Union-management 
Cooperation 
Joint Quiescence Cooperation 
Participation 
Model 3 
a Wortman and Randle, op.cit., p. 29. 
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Impasse Procedures In The Collective Bargaining Agreement 
The National Labor Relations Act, a 1935 law which made the collective 
bargaining process famous in the private sector, eventually became a model 
! to follow by public sector employment. 
~ 
This act, more commonly known as 
~ 
I 
the Wagner Act, includes the following important elements: (1) the right to 
f gaining units; (4) unfair practices; (5) the scope of bargaining; and (6) I the resolution of bargaining impasse. 
organize and bargain; (2) representation procedures; (3) appropriate bar-
As has been indicated, this latter 
element is the most critical issue in public education collective bargaining. 
Indeed, the heart of a teacher negotiations law or agreement is its pro-
vision for resolving disputes over wages and other contract issues. 1 
DISTRICT 1 
District 1 is a unified school district with a school population of 
10,600 students. The school system employs 675 teachers, who at the time 
of the impasse, were represented in negotiations by the local teachers• 
association, an affiliate of the Illinois Education Association. Since a 
major university is found in the community, education can be seen as the 
main 11 industry. 11 The community population totals 59,000. 
The Political Considerations 
Regarding political factors of the teachers• association, several 
administrative negotiators were aware that the parent association, the 
1Robert E. Doherty and Walter E. Oberer, Teachers, School Boards, And 
Collective Bargaining: A Changing of the Guard (Cornell University, Ithaca, 
New York: New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 1968), 
p. 96. 
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Illinois Education Association, was experiencing two significant internal 
problems, namely, fiscal problems of high debt and a dec~ease in membershi~ 
and that such problems had an impact on the 1972 negotiations. It was . 
apparent to these administrators that to surmount these two related problems, 
the Illinois Education Association, via its local affiliate, wo.uld need to 
demonstrate highly visible, militant, and productive negotiation services 
to its teachers. As one administrator stated, "We anticipated that the lEA 
local would try to build membership by asserting itself militantly and thus, 
we braced for its eventual display ... 
Regarding political factors affecting school management, the most sig-
nificant aspect revolved around community unconcern. Throughout the entire 
impasse proceedings of mediation, fact-finding, and the strike, the com-
munity in general, did not intervene to voice a demand for resolution of 
the bargaining conflict. All management negotiators interpreted the 
silence of the citizenry as support for their bargaining positions during 
the impasse, and thus, school management found it easy to take uncompro-
mising positions. One administrative negotiator judged that the community 
apathy partially resulted from the acquiescence shown by the university 
faculty relative to their own salaries and working conditions. In brief, 
his analysis was as follows: a militant and vociferous university staff 
can serve to inform and energize a community, which in turn, ~reates a com-
munity climate conducive to community activity in public education bar-
gaining disputes. University quietness, conversely, facilitates community 
quietness. While the community as a whole was not drawn into the impasse, 
one civic group did respond, namely, the Chamber of Commerce, who opposed 
any tax rates which may have resulted by increases in teacher salaries. 
Lr-u....,,_,., lllll<.,..-..r.,.et!=e&M~~~•==s'......,...~:n>~<~~-----' 
Their response was one of hostility toward the teachers' association and· 
their denunciation of teacher viewpoints further promoted school manage-
ment to be intransigent or immovable during the impasse procedures. 
The History Of The Collective Bargaining Relationship 
While the teachers• organization and school management have been ne-
gotiating since 1963, the period between 1963 and 196~ was perceived by one 
teacher negotiator as a time characterized as a 11mutual admiration society 11 
in which neither party negotiated from strong, demanding positions. The 
years between 1965 and 1972, however, were viewed by all respondent~ as a 
period of stress and escalation of intergroup bargaining conflict. At 
least one formal impasse was reached during this time--in 1971--in which 
mediation was used to resolve the dispute. 
The iDterviewees suggested several factors which may have contributed 
to the growth of employee-employer conflict: (1) teacher organization lead-
ers were being trained by the state teachers• association (Illir:wis Educa-
tion Association) to be 11 teacher union organizers 11 ; such training in how 
to effectively mobilize teacher collective power tended to radicalize 
teacher leaders and prompted teachers to aggressively seek more power; 
(2) the board of education resented the collective bargaining relationship 
because the process diluted the board•s "power pie~ 11 According to one 
teacher negotiator, the contractual obligations created by the formal col-
lective bargaining process cut into the power pie. As the board of education. 
realized that their power and decision-making autonomy were declining, there 
was a subsequent attempt· to protect their power position by assuming in-
creasingly inflexible positions during bargaining. Overt, intergroup con-
"""VIWI ...... 'O""'*C'WC! 
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1 flict began to evolve as the board and the teachers organization engaged 
I 
t 
I 
in a restructuring of power relations resembling a power ••tug-of-war;" that 
is, conflict was evidenced as the teacher organization sought more decis_ion-
making power via collective bargaining while the board fought to maintain 
its traditional power differential situation. 
Impasse Procedures Of The Collective 
Bargaining Agreement 
The collective bargaining agreement which was in effect at the time 
of the teacher-board impasse called for both mediation and fact-finding in 
the event of an impasse. As to mediation, the contract stated that if 
agreement was not reached on all items by May 1, 1972, either party could 
request the mediation services of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service. Furthermore, such a request must be honored by the other party. 
Regarding the mediation request, it should be noted that the teachers' or-
ganization initiated the request. The agreement further delineated how 
the mediator was to function; that is, he would have the authority to con-
fer separately or jointly with the parties and could take any other steps 
appropriate in order to persuade the parties to resolve their differences 
and effect an agreement; however, the mediator could not, without the con-
sent of both parties, act as a fact-finder or recommend terms of settle-
ment. 
The agreement then indicated that if mediation was unsuccessful in 
resolving the bargaining dispute, each party could invoke the fact-finding 
procedure by June 1, 1972; once again, it was the teachers• organization 
which called for fact-finding. Like mediation, the impasse provisions of 
1 T nn- --R t ·g S lU ....cl BLUS lUll 'IIW0 ......_ 
-r=er'M"':"-W""U'_..,. •• ""'rtiilt~~~ "-'1!111~...-.::arrt~~ ,_. 
i 155 
~ the contract spelled out several specific responsibilities of the fact-I finding process: (1) the fact-finder must be selected from the American 
f: Arbitration Association; (2) he would hold necessary hearings and thus pro-
vide adequate opportunity for both parties to testify fully and present 
evidence regarding their respective positions; (3) the fact-finder was then 
required to i,ssue a written report recommending a basis for the settlement 
of the disagreement within thirty days after his appointment; (4) within 
ten days from the receipt of the fact-finder's written report, both parties 
were required to notify the fact-finder of their acceptance or rejection of 
his recommendations and reasons for non-acceptance; (5) if no agreement was 
reached within ten days from receipt of the fact-finder's report, the re-
sponses of the parties would then be added to the fact-finder's initial re-
port and then released to the public. 
Regarding these two impasse resolution procedures, several salient 
observations are necessary: (1) the teachers' organization initiated both 
mediation and fact-finding; (2} the fact-finder's report covered fifty-five 
issues; (3) while the teachers accepted the report in total, the school 
board rejected most of the recommendations and accepted others. However, 
since the board did not accept the recommendations intoto, the report was 
essentially rejected; (4) total time involving the two impasse steps covered 
about seventy days; (5) impasse provisions in the contract did not provide 
for a third step in the event of unsuccessful fact-finding. In reality, 
however, the strike terminated the impasse; (6) the new contract, which is I a two-year agreement, now provides for one rather than two distinct impasse 
steps. Specifically, a mediator shall attempt to persuade the parties to I reach agreement, and if unsuccessful, he shall have the option of making a 
.t _________ ..., .. __,,...,,~ ..... -,__....,.s_.••...., . ..,n~'~•-•=' 7'tt'ZMMI!t..-ta 
______________ ,,_ ____ ...._.._.._,.a.~.., t ....., ..... r~J!:I. .. l(*!'-=--,.,...,.,._--•-• ._.,..,.._; 
156 
written public report recommending a basis for the settlement of the 
disagreement. In essence, the new impasse provision makes the individual 
mediating both a mediator and a fact-finder. This quasi one-step impasse 
procedure reflects the viewpoint that both parties perceived the 1972 fact-
finding as a nuisance procedure rather than a valuable asset in resolving 
bargaining disputes. In view of the fact that fact-finding was a time con-
suming process which exacerbated rather than reduced the 1972 impasse con-
flict, this is a favorable decision. 
DISTRICT 2 
District 2 is a unified school district with a school population of 
12,600 students. The school system employs 699 teachers, who at the time 
of the impasse were represented in negotiations by a local affiliate of the 
Illinois Education Association. The community population numbers 55,000. 
The Political Considerations 
Several political considerations need to be mentioned about this di·s-
trict. One of the most important political factors in this school district 
is the diversity of the community. The community is considered to be a 
"bedroom district" with most of the residents employed outside the district 
boundaries. Two-thirds of the land is farmed and manufacturing takes place 
along a river which runs through the district. In general, the community 
can be characterized as conservative, low middle-class, and blue collar. 
In addition, the community did not become involved in the teacher-board 
negotiations dispute. · 
Another significant political factor had to do with the president of 
the board of education. This individual had been board president for six 
------------------------------------------------~--------------------· 
r ....... _. ____ __.. __ ,.,_ .. ____ ..... _ ·--·--· 
~ yearsJ and according to several teachers, was a dominant personality who 
~I held an anti-union attitude. This alleged attitude seemed to be accurate 
because he (1) refused adamantly to hire union employees in his own place ~ 
of employment, and (2) encouraged the board of education to fire the 414 
teachers who engaged in the six-day strike. 
Another political factor was a reflection of the personality of the 
teachers' organization. One teacher respondent explained it in this way: 
11 0ur organization v1as once strictly a tea and cookie soci a 1 group, but in 
the mid-1960's, we developed into a militant pushy organization." This 
change in teacher organization ·behavior was resented by school manage-
ment who condemned not only the local teachers• organization but the Illinois 
Education Association, who as one management negotiator argued, "influenced 
and agitated the local teachers to be militant, aggressive, and irrespon-
sib1e. 11 
The History Of The Collective Bargaining Relationship 
Prior to the six-day strike in 1972, collective bargaining conflict 
had been in evidence. Formal impasses had been declared in 1971 and 1970 
with the mediation procedure used in both years to resolve the dispute. It 
is important to note that while a contract was agreed upon at the end of the 
1972 strike, the school board refused to bargain a 1973-74 contract with 
the teachers' organization, thus determining salaries and working conditions 
unilaterally. 
Impasse Procedures Of The Collective Bargaining Agreement 
The collective bargaining agreement which was in effect at the time of 
the teacher-school management bargaining dispute, called for both mediation 
COM ..... _..._ •• ,. ., 
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and fact-finding in the event of a bargaining impasse. As to mediation, 
the contract stated that if agreement. was not reached on all items prior to 
May 1, either party could declare an impasse and call for a mediator. The 
mediator, who was not restricted to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service, was required to meet with the parties either jointly o·r separately 
for the purpose of persuading the parties to resolve their differences. 
The mediator was prohibited from making public findings of fact or recom-
mended terms of settlement. 
If mediation was unsuccessful in resolving the dispute, the parties 
were required to utilize fact-finding. Fact-finding in this instance in-
volved a three man committee with one member selected by the Board of Edu-
cation, one member selected by the teachers' organization, and one neutral 
member, chosen by the other two members, served as chairman. This committee 
held hearings to provide opportunity for the parties to testify on and pres-
ent evidence regarding their respective positions. At the conclusion of 
the hearings, the fact-finding chairman--who was chosen from the American 
Arbitration Association--made a written report recommending a settlement. 
These recommendations were required to be made public by either party but 
were advisory only and could not be· binding on either party. Twenty-five 
issues were dealt with in the fact-finding report. Regarding endorsement 
of the report, neither party accepted the fact-finder's recommendations in-
toto; each side accepted what they liked and rejected what they did not like. 
While the teachers' organization desired to continue negotiations on the 
fact-finder's report, the school board instead, unilaterally adopted items 
in the report. This action, according to the teacher respondents, precip-
itated the six-day strike. 
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DISTRICT 3 
District 3 is a unified school district with a school population of 
The district employs 250 teachers, who at the time of im-
passe, were.represented in negotiations by a local affiliate of the Illinois 
Education Association. 
The Political Considerations 
The community, which has a population of 11,190, is labeled as a 
"bedroom district" with most of the working class employed outside of the 
community. Other members of the community are farmers and about 1000 people , 
are employed at the county court house. A state supported university is 
located within this school system which includes six townships. Most of the 
interviewees described the community as conservative~ In general, the com-
munity did not become visibly involved in the three-day teachers• strike. 
The History Of The Collective Bargaining Relationship 
The bargaining relationship from 1968 to 1972 was characterized as· 
conflictful. During this five-year period, impasses were reached each year 
with mediation and/or fact-finding used to resolve the disputes. Fact-
finding was employed in the 1970 and 1971 impasses, but each time, the 
school board rejected the recommendations or failed to act· on the report. 
"Eleventh-hour settlements" occurred during these two years. 
According to several management negotiators, the last five years has 
evidenced growing teacher militancy within the district~ These respondents 
were convinced that the new aggressiveness was prompted by the state teach-
~ ::~·.~::::d::h:.::l:~~::t::u::t::: ::::::·::::~;z:::o:~ns::~:n:::~i~;::n::s 
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expressed by one negotiator in this way: "He felt we were negotiating 
with the state education association rather than with our local teachers ... 
Impasse Procedures In The Collective Bargaining Agreement 
The impasse procedures available at the time of the 1972 dispute 
called for both mediation and fact-finding. Regarding mediation, the con-
tract stated that a mediator from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service would be jointly requested if agreement was not reached on all items 
before June 1. The mediator was required to meet with the parties either 
jointly or separately in an effort to persuade the disputants to resolve 
their differences. The mediator was prohibited from making findings of fact 
or recommendin~ terms of settlement. A unique element of the mediation·pro-
~ess required the parties to give their 11 last offers on unsettled.items"· if 
mediation had failed to resolve the dispute prior to June 25. The federal 
mediator ultimately transmitted the last offer of both parties to the fact-
finder. It is interesting to note that this mediation tactic was eliminated 
in subsequent impasse procedures. 
If mediation failed to resolve the impasse, a fact-finder from the 
American Arbitration Association was to be selected. The fact-finder held 
hearings to determine facts and subsequently recommended terms of settlement 
in writing to both parties. This report, which was advisory only, was re-
quired to be released to the public py the. fact-finder if agreement was not 
reached. 
In contrast to the number of issues submitted to the fact-finding 
process in the other two districts, this fact-finder deliberated on only 
Lfive issues: class size, si~e, b~nd:..:bitra:~~~he grievance 
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Regarding endorsement of the fact-~ procedure, severance pay, and salary. I I finder's recommendations, the teachers' association accepted the report but ! the board of education rejected it. The board's refusal to accept the r~-
I 
I port angered the teachers into a three-day work stoppage. 
SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter has presented a background of three school systems with 
respect to political factors, the collective bargaining relationship, and 
the impasse procedures available to the parties during the dispute. A 
summary of some of the data is shown in TABLE 12. Several speculations 
or conclusions could be expressed as a result of investigating these dis-
tricts. 
Political Considerations: 
(1) Anti-teacher organization attitudes held by school management mem-
bers will clash with militant teacher collective action, thus continuing 
the struggle for power in public education. Furthermore, such power strug-
gles will diminish the effectiveness of those impasse resolution devices 
which are political in nature--e.g., fact-finding. 
(2) A conservative, indifferent, or apathetic attitude by the consumers 
of education--i.e., the community--during a bargaining crisis will tend to . 
dilute the effectiveness of a political impasse procedure such as fact-find-~.~ 
i ng. J 
The Collective Bargaining Relationship: 
(1) All three districts show a bargaining relationship characterized 
by intergroup conflict. Indeed, ~1hen they are matched with Figure 1, the 
formal relationship resembles "conflict," "militant opposition,'.' and 
I 
"aggression and resistance." 
(2) During a pet1od when the collective bargaining process is decreas-
ing the board's power while at the same time increasing teachers• power,. 
any impasse.procedure which involves the aspect of voluntaryism--such as 
fact-finding--will probably be rejected by the party in pmver. 
The Impasse Procedures: 
(1) The impasse procedures used in the three districts are represent-
ative of dispute settlement procedures called for by either state legis-
lation or local collective bargaining agreements. 
(2) Fact-finding was not a solution to the impasse because the fact-
finder in most instances was burdened with an overwhelming number of issues 
to resolve. Furthermore, fact~finding seemed to be unsuccessful because 
its advisory nature permitted one or both parties to reject the report. 
In all three cases, the recommendations were unacceptable,and closure of-
.the dispute was not achieved until a teacher strike occurred. 
~----------------------------------------,-----------·--------· ______________ , 
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TABLE 12 1 
A SUMMARY CHART SHOWING PROMINENT BACKGROUND FACTS OF THE THREE DISTRICTS 
I 
Dist-1 Community Student Number Of Political Factors Collective 
rict Population Population Teachers And Community Bargaining Contractual Provisions 
Characteristics History for Resolving Impasse 
1 59,000 10,600 675 University town; Conflict- Mediation followed by 
conservative comm- ful voluntary fact-finding' 
I I unity; militant with advisory recommen-posture taken by I dations. I teachers 
I r : 2 I 55,000 12,600 699 Anti-teacher union Conflict- I ~1ediation followed by I 
i attitude by schoo 1 board I ful 
' 
required fact-finding 
president; board resent- I with advisory recommen-' l ful of collective bar- I dations. gaining process; growing 
I ! 1 mi 1 i tancy by teachers; , I 1 bedroom district; farm- I 
I I i ng; some manufacturing. I l 
' 
! 
111,190 ' 3 5,300 250 University town; school Conflict- l Mediation followed by I board resentful of bar- ful required fact-finding I 
! 1 gaining process; growing j with advisory recommen-
I 
I militancy by teachers; t dat:ions. , 
I j bedroom district; farm-I i I I I 1 ing; conservative. 
·I 
i i ! 
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Dist-
rict 
Number of Issues Community 
Taken Into Response To 
Fact-finding Fact-finding 
TABLE 12--Continued 
Teachers' Response School Managements' 
To Fact-finding Response To Fact-
Report Finding Report 
Teacher 
Reaction 
Length 
of 
Strike 
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CHAPTER VI 
CASE STUDIES: THE INTERACTION OF POHER AND GROUP DYf'W1ICS REU\TIVE 
TO IMPASSE RESOLUTION IN THREE SELECTED SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
The purpose of this chapter is to analjze the interaction between the 
exercise of power and group dynamics as they pertain to the resolution of 
bargaining conflict in the three districts. The ultimate goal of this anal-
ysis is to (1) achieve further insight into the effectiveness of the various 
impasse resolution strategies used in public education bargaining disputes, 
and (2) to identify any relevant forces which impede or facilitate the reso-
lution of bargaining disputes. 
The Exercise of Power 
The issue of power in labor-management relations is the cardinal factor 
in every contract negotiations. It determines, in the final analysis, how 
much school management will give and what the teachers' organization will 
yield, if anything. Its form or source may vary: it may be social, politi-
cal, economic, or psychological but the relative power of the contestants is 
nearly always the decisive factor. 1 Moreover, the exercise of power for the 
purpose of resolving bargaining disputes is often termed 11 coercive power 11 in 
which one party attempts to punish the other. 2 For example, in order to 
1Robert N. McMurry, 11 War And Peace In Labor Relations,.' Unions, 
Management, And The Public, 3rd edition, ed. by E. Wight Bakke, Clark Kerr, 
and Charles W. Anrod (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Publishers, 1967), 
pp. 225-226. 
2 Warren G. Bennis, Changing Organization (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), 
pp. 167-168. 
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command attention, or propose and achieve bargaining demands, a teachers• 
organization may threaten school management with harm, loss, inconvenience, 
or embarrassment via such tactics as sanctions, strikes, and unfavorable 
1 publicity campaigns. School management, on the other hand, may seek to in-
fluence teachers via an exercise of power·which includes threat of dismissal 
or securing an injunction forcing the teachers back to work. These t~ctics 
create a bases for negotiations and are attempts to resolve bargaining dis-
putes in the short run. 
Group Dynamics 
Impasse resolution in labor-management contract disputes can be improved 
by understanding the nature of groups or the dynamics of intergroup behavior. 
This assumption can be enlarged by considering Dunnette and Kirchner•s2 view-
point that collective bargaining is never a one man affair. Rather, groups 
of people and personalities are entwined in the negotiation process. Con-
sequently, it is important to briefly discuss some of the social and psycho-
logical characteristics of groups and then to determine if any of these 
characteristics affected the success or failure of the impasse resolution 
strategies used in the three districts under study. 
Blake and associates 3 point out that fundamentally, a group consists 
of a number of individuals bound to each other in some stage or degree of 
1Richard E. Walton, 11 Two Strategies Of Social Change And Their · 
Dilemmas, .. The Planning Of Change, edited by Warren G. Bennis, Kenneth D. 
Benne, and Robert Chin (Chicago: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1969), pp. 167-
168. 
2 
Marvin D. Dunnette and Wayne K. Kirchner, Psychology Applied To 
Industry (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965}, p. 186. 
3 Blake, op. cit.~ pp. 1-18. 
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interdependence or shared "stake.'' In this sharing, the group will develop 
norms, goals, and values which have pm,terful influence o·ver the members. 
Specifically, the problem of the group is to guarantee its survival in order 
to attain some purpose or goal. As a means to this end, the interdependence 
among individuals must then be "regulated to insure partial or ·entire 
1 
achievement of these goals." 
It logically follows that the behavior of an individual is frequently 
determined by his group. In negotiation, for example, when the bargaining 
spokesman speaks as a group representative, "his behavior is to some extent 
dictated by the fact that he is a member of that group." 2 Moreover, he is 
not free to act independently. Instead, the purposes and 11 laws 11 of his 
group control or handcuff his behavior. 
Additional factors come into play in situtations where an individual 
3 is interacting with another and both are representatives of groups. Cole 
states that one important motivation of the negotiation leader is the great 
desire to win the approval or respect of one's peers. This ambition is 
subtle but potent and helps to explain why the forces of conflict seem to 
be stronger than those of peacefulness. Blake describes some of the complex 
forces in leadership interaction as follows: 
1Blake, op. cit., p. 6. 
2Ibid., p. 2. 
3oavid L. Cole, The Quest For Industrial Peace (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1963), pp. 8-9. 
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Acting as an individual, a man is free to change his mind on the 
basis of new evidence. But as a group representative, if he changes 
his thinking or position from that of his group•s and capitulates 
to an outside point of view, he is likely to be perceived by them as 
a traitor. On the other hand, if as a representative, he is able 
to persuade a representative of the other group to capitulate to 
his point of view, his group receives him as a hero. In other words, 
when a man is acting as a representative of one group in disagreement 
vJi th another, the prob 1 em is no 1 anger a personal affair. It is an 
intergroup problem. And as sulh it can become a significant factor 
in accounting for his actions. . 
Regarding group norms and values, Leavitt2 observes that groups gener-
ally value or demand in-group conformity. That is, since a group can best 
survive:intact or solid, the group pressures or emotionally seduces its 
members to conform. The norm, therefore, is against deviancy. 
Furthermore, Leavitt analyzes conformity as essentially a problem 
of loneliness. The individual needs the group--its support and affiliation. 
The threat is so painfully strong that it permits a group to press the indiv~ 
idual to conform, even if that individual has authority or other kinds of 
power. 11 Even the president seems to want and need some sources of support, 
some assurance of psychological backing from his people. 113 . Likewise, i.f 
the bargaining leader is to keep his position and membership secure, he too 
must support his group•s standards. Thus, it is this fear of amputation 
and excommunication by the group that forces each negotiating representative 
1 B 1 a ke , o p • c i t . , p p • 3 -4 • 
2Leavitt, op.cit., pp. 268-282. 
3rbid. p. 280 .. 
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into battle on a win-lose basis. Indeed, it is the presence of 
incompatible group norms, objectives, values and the "we-they" orientation 
which generates a state of intergroup conflict at the bargaining table.· 
Experimental Approaches To Studying Intergroup Conflict 
The win-lose orientation to intergroup interaction just 
discussed has been experimentally verified with both children and adults. 
The prototype intergroup experiment was designed by Sherif. In his studies, 
two groups of boys were brought into competition. Phenomena generated by 
the competitive circumstances were then studied from both an ingroup and 
intergroup perspective. Following the competitive confrontation, effective 
and ineffective conditions for reducing competitive tensions and conflict 
between groups were identified and evaluated. Similar experiments have 
been conducted with adults and is explained below. 
Experimental Design, Setting, And Phenomena 
The intergroup competition exercise or experiment was pioneered and 
developed by Robert Blake and his collegues, and has for a number of 
years been a standard exercise in human relations laboratory training. 
Although the exercises are conducted under artificially constructed condi-
tions, the situations are, nevertheless, psychologically real for the 
participants. Regarding the exercise, Harrison says that "Basically, this 
design involves the assignment to each of two groups the task of producing 
a product. Each of the groups knows that it is in competition with the 
other to produce the better product. Repres~ntatives of the groups come 
f------------N--•-a•-u-•---------------------~---·------------------~------------1 
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together--usually in front of the groups which they represent--to 
negotiate a decision as to the better product. Typically, the represent-
atives fail to reach a decision and the products are turned over to a panel 
of judges for a final evaluation."l 
The setting of this experiment is obviously in the direction of a 
win-lose ortentation and is, therefore~ quite realistic and similar to 
teacher-school management conflict situations. In collective bargaining for 
example, both employee and employer frequently approach negotiation sessions 
with fixed win-lose positions: that is, "the intention of each side is 
not to compromise, but to win." 2 
Under the competitive circumstances of the exercise just described, 
certain predictable and measureable phenomena and consequences emerge. 
These win-lo?e dynamics of intergroup conflict, researched by Blake, are 
now summarized and paraphrased. 
1. Closing ranks and increasing cohesion. A rise in group cohesion 
is one of the first phenomenon to occur when groups begin to compete. 
Blake notes "The rule is, v1hen an adversary approaches, members close ranks, 
either to defend or to attack. Spirits go up! Former disagreements within 
the group tend to be put aside. Members pitch in. They pull together for 
the common goal of victory. 113 
1Roger Harrison, "Training Designs For Intergroup Collaboration)" 
Human Relations Training News, edited by Cyril R. ~1111 (Washington, O.C.:NTL 
Institute For Applied Behavioral Science, 1969), p. 51 
2slake, op.cit, p. 20. 
3Ibi d, p. 21. 
I. 
---------·-----------------------------·---·~--~----------------------------=1 
. ·• 
--------------------------·----------~·-,-------~~~~~~~----------~ 
i 
I 
fi 
' & 
' 
171 
This basic urge to win is so intense that disputes and discord 
among members tends to be snuffed out. Likewise, an individual group 
member who fails to go along with the group is pressured towards conformity. 
Indeed, group unison and in-group cooperation are ~o important that devia-
tion may lead to psychological or physical expulsion from the group. 
2. Leadership consolidation. Prior to intergroup competition, 
the power relations in a group are rather loose and poorly developed. 
However, when sharp competitive forces are exerted. the 11 pecking order 11 
becomes·more explicit. That is, some members begin to exercise more weight 
in defining group direction and character. 
3. Positions Contrasted: Own Position Enhanced: Adversary•s 
Downgraded. It should be remembered that in the intergroup exercise, each 
group•s decision, solution, or position is referred to as its product. 
After the groups have created their respective products and compared them 
with that of the contending group, Blake notes that the 11membe.rs quickly 
reassay their attitudes toward their own solution and toward that of the 
other group as well. But judgements concerning the quality of competing 
products are colored by membershipconsiderations."1 Thus, one•s own group•s 
product is judged superior to the other•s. In other words, group members 
strongly identify with their own product. Shortcomings in their own prod:-
ucts are rationalized and the competitor's product is downgraded. 
1alake, op.cit., p. 23 
~ l_ __________________________ __ 
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these experimental inter-group relations, the win-lose attitudes and con-
flict distort realistic judgement. Indeed, the escalated disagreement 
obliterates objectivity to such a degree that the possibilities of future 
cooperation are reduced or eliminated. 
4. Attack and Counterattack: Paper Bombs as Substitutes for 
Bul'lets. After the two positions or products are studied, the groups 
interact through representatives who will determine a winner and a loser. 
Before this final decision is made, however, a phase of public debate 
between representatives is provided for clarifying similarities and 
differences between the two products. During this stage, questions put to 
each group are answered through their representatives. 
Concerning the questions representatives ask each other, it 
typically happens that the content of the questions which group members 
write and hand to their representatives are not for the purpose of 
clarification. Instead, the motivation underlying such questions is to 
11 belittle the competitor•s position, to cast doubt on its validity, and to 
demonstrate its inferiority to one•s own group•s position. 11 1 As a 
consequence, . intergroup contact for purposes of clarification only serves 
to intensify the conflict' promote subjectivity, and increase suspicion. 
To state it differently, negotiation and debate neither reduces the con-
flict or increases objectivity. 
lslake, op.cit·., p. 24. 
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5. Negative Stereotypes Concerning One's Adversary. 
When intergroup contact is competitive and mutually frustrating, "the 
interactions of groups through their representatives lead to strong 
stereotype formations. Members of each group develop negative attitudes. 
They express hostility toward members of the other group ... The end 
result is the erosion of mutual respect and confidence in the construct-
iveness of the other's intentions."l 
6. The Perception of Representative Personality. Before they begin 
to interact, representatives, as persons, are usually viewed objectively. 
That is, they are seen as reasonably mature, intelligent, well-intended 
human beings. But as interaction proceeds, the process of provocation 
and reaction characterized by negative stereotypes and attitudes and 
expressed hostility soon destroys the initial perceptions. While one's 
own representative is seen as heroically defending his group against host-
ile attack, the opponent's representative is perceived to be less and less 
mature, less well-intentioned, less intelligent, etc. His behavior is 
governed by despicable personality traits; their own representatives 
Blake observes behavior as governed by praiseworthy personality traits. 
I 
that the "Group members are blind to the fact that representative behavior~ 
is largely determined by the forces of group membership and win-lose 
conflict."2 
lslake, op.cit., pp. 24-25. 
2Ibid., p. 26. 
1 ... ...-=-------"lt""'' --- ---------Pii---------=-'ttlliill-11''~--------·-·~ ......... -· ----"--1 
e 1M I 
I 
"' ~ 
r 
1 I 
• 
7. Commonalities minimized, differences highlighted. During 
intergroup competition, "similarities in group products are virtually 
ignored, but areas of difference are highlighted ... ·Blake describes thi-s 
phenomena as follows: 
The most common error is to misidentify items in both products as 
having been in only one. In other words, many items are seen as 
uniquely one's own product, even when they are present in both 
products. While group members correctly recogrii ze that such items 
belong to their own group's position, they fail to see that the same 
items are contained in the adversary's position. As a result 
commonalities tend to be overlooked and disparities increased when 
groups are in competition. Consequently1 needless barriers to understanding and agreement are created. 
8. Loyalty of Representatives. When the representatives meet to 
determine a winner and loser, the group deliberations are characterized by 
loyalty, subjectivity, and defensiveness of the representative. If a 
represent~tive were to take an objective point of view and admit that a 
competitor's product was superior to his own, he might be in danger of 
losing for his group. Since loyalty pressures often over\1/helm his logic, 
he fails to exercise impartiality. Moreover, rather than pursuing 
negotiation interaction objectively and 1 ogi ca lly, 11 the representatives 
soon fall to parrying, jabbing, feinting, and probing for weaknesses in 
the other's position. The motive to win and remain loyal becomes immedi~ 
ately paramount and intellectual objectivity disappears."2 
9. Hero-Traitor Dynamics. The emotional pressures of loyalty--
1Blake, op.cit.," p. 26. 
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his own group's product, 
and his derogation of the other, or identification with one group at the 
expense of the other is explained by Blake as the hero-traitor dynamic·: 
A traitor is a group member in good standing who, on contacting 
the adversary, capitulates to the enemy's position. He loses for 
his group. A hero, on the other hand, is a person who wins for his 
group by vanquishing his adversary. Being tagged a traitor means 
loss of face or prestige, being ridiculed and, in the extreme, being 
expelled from one's group. On the other hand, being a hero brings 
rewards of applause, warmth, increased status and heightened 
presitge. Yet, the behavior required to be heroic can vary from the 
actions requiring objectivity and problem-solving. Equally unfortun-
ate, behavior based on objective problem-solving may be withheld 
deliberately to avoid the traitor trap. Deadlock, though it does 
not carry with it the elevat1on 1n status accorded a hero, at least 
is one way to avoid the traitor trap.l 
The deadlock or negotiations impasse, which frequently results from 
intergroup competition experiments, provides study of additional intergroup 
problems including resolution through third party arrangements. Since it 
is difficult to determine a winner through representatives, an impartial 
judge is used to produce a verdict. Simply, he examines and evaluates each 
group's product and presents his decision. His judgement generates further 
phenomena. 
10. Impact of Victory and Defeat. on Group Leadership: Consolidation 
Vs Reelacement. In winning groups, those who led the fight to victory are 
congratulated, and their positions in the 11 pecking order" are strengthened 
and enhanced. 
In defeated groups, on the other hand, in-group fighting and 
splintering occurs. A shift in the pecking order commonly results in which 
1Blake, oo.cit., p. 28. 
11 ·- IIIIICa'Mlll. ....... .............. tl 
leaders lose status. That is, former leaders are occasionally replaced 
because their ability and integrity are in question. The replaced leaders 
feel unfairly attacked by their own group and consequently fight back to 
justify their actions and to remain influential. 
11. Post Victory-Defeat Reactions And Group Mentality. Blake also 
. 
notes that group mentality is dramatically different in winning and losing 
groups. For example, the victorious group members react to the 
arbitrator's decision with complacency. Ther-e is a "fat and happy" 
atmosphere as members rest on their laurels and enjoy the fruits of their 
success. 
In contrast, the defeated group tends to become "lean and hungry." 
The atmosphere is tense as the members critique their operations and 
efforts which led to failure and assign responsibility for them. 
12. Win-Lose Reactions to Resolution by Third-Party Judgement. As 
stated previously, when negotiations by representatives failed in the ex-
periment, arbitrators were brought in to break deadlock and to decide the 
winner. The decision which is rendered by the third-party is received 
differently by the groups in conflict, and as we shall see, does not 
truly solve the impasse. 
When the arbitrator's verdict favors one group's position, several 
phenomena occur. Blake describes these as follows: 
The arbitrator is experienced as being fair and unbiased because the judgment he proclaims "only proves that v1e were right in the first 
place." He is experienced as being a good arbitrator because he sees 
the situation as members see it. "If there were any doubt in our· minds·, 
--------------------·-----~·-·~-----------··--=-------------,---· :--------~----------·-----' 
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By comparison, those defeated by the arbitrator•s decision evidence two 
negative reactions in the experimental situation. First, in their initial 
reaction, the arbitrator is wrong , as shown by the fo 11 owing remarks: 11 The 
arbitrator is biased, unfair and incompetent. He has no grasp of the pro-
blem ... he does not possess the intelligence prerequisite to be fair and 
unbiased ... he doesn•t seem to know too much about the subject ... he didn•t 
take enough time. 11 2 Secondly, a delayed in-group reaction to third-party 
defeat is that the group is at fault. 11 Rather than venting their frustra-
tions from defeat on the arbitrator, they discharge it by attacking the other 
members. A consequence is that the group tends to splinter, to lose its 
former cohesion, and to disrupt. 113 
Finally, the phenomena which results when the resolution of conflict 
is placed in the hands of a neutral arbitrator under experimental conditions 
is similar to phenomena generated in real life arbitration. The third-party 
judge is applauded by the winners and conversely chastised by the defeated 
group who feel cheated and resentful. Also, while the winning team leans 
' toward self-congratulatory behavior, the losers experience in-group fighting. 
Furthermore, while the winning group feels highly committed to live by the 
third party•s judgment, the defeated frequently are not moved to alter 
their stand and comply only because the ground rules require· it. In 
the final analysis, the third-party judgment usually does. not diminish 
lslake, op.cit., · p. 52. 
2rbid., p. 52. 
3Ibid., p. 53. 
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178 l the win-lose nature of the disagreement. Rather, the decision I provides fertile soil for producing a further intensification of interperso-
• I nal and intergroup conflict. As a result, further win-lose barriers to co-
l operative group efforts are erected. 1 
~ 
13. The Win-lose Trap. While the victorious and defeated groups 
react differently to the win-lose experience, one similar phenomenon does 
occur. When the groups are asked to move almost immediately into situations 
requiring intergroup cooperation in the solution of a second problem on the 
heels of the intergroup competition experiment, the groups soon find them-
selves working as antagonists rather than as collaborators. Regarding this 
phenomenon, Blake notes as follows: 
Feelings of competitiveness and mutually disparaging attitudes have 
become so deeply ingrained that members of one group cannot perceive 
the offerings of the other group as well-intended. 
Only when the groups review the entire competition episode in detail, 
and together examine subjective attitudes of antagonism and how they 
were produced, as well as the objective data collected in the course 
of the experiment, are they able to regain perspective of themselves, 
their reactions, and the interrelationship. By analyzing and gain-
ing insight into the background of their past behavior, it is2possible for them to start working collaboratively across group lines. 
In summary, the social and psychological phenomena of intergroup com-
petition which are generated under experimental laboratory conditions closely 
resemble many of the win-lose union-management contests found in the annals 
of American industry. Blake.remarks that a study of these conflicts demon-
lslake, op.cit., pp. 54-57. 
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~~es a ~ubstantial failure of collective bargaining negotiators to und::r: 
-~ stand the dyn~mics and consequences of intergroup win-lose power struggles. 
r. ~ As Blake says, "The actions and reactions of the protagonists in such dis-i ! putes often deepen antagonism and destroy all avenues of resolution rather 
I 1 ~ than contribute to intergroup problem-solving.•• Thus, it is apparent that 
~ every negotiator should have an understanding of the dynamic aspects of inter-~ group conflict in order to constrtictively deal with them. In brief, there 
are obvious parallels between the experimental and actual intergroup win-
lose conflicts which occur in public education collective bargaining. Some 
of these parallels will be identified in this chapter. 
EXPERIENCE IN THE DISTRICTS 
DISTRICT I 
The Exercise of Power 
To induce school management to accept the teachers• demands, the 
teachers• organization exercised power in several ways. The teachers assumed 
that the community would be sensitive to a reduction in service due to a 
teacher strike and would consequently focus political pressure on the board 
of education to accept the demands of the teacher organization. Acting on 
this assumption, the teachers• organization invented a ••telephone bank" to 
communicate to parents what the issues were in the disoute and to solicit 
parental support. According to the teacher respondents, however, this de-
vice did not generate either an immediate or latent parent interest in the 
1Blake, op.cit., p. 18. 
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Unfavorable publicity campaigns were also attempted by the 
~ ~ teachers through picketing, press releases, and the distribution of door-to-
s" ~ ~ door 1 eafl ets. Still, the community was not motivated to take an active, 
i. 
~ 1 visible part in resolving the bargaining dispute. School management, it 
• 
should be noted, interpreted community silence as support. The most dramatic 
exercise of power employed by the teachers' organization was the strike in 
\vhich the teachers lost four days' pay. 
Regarding school management's exercise of power, the board of education 
reacted to the teacher strike by securing an injunction. The judge who gran-
ted the injunction, however, first ordered both parties to return to negotia-
tions and settlement was reached. According to the teacher interviewees, 
the injunction was an effective school management tactic. As one teacher 
acknowledged, 11 We did not want to violate the injunction for fear of in-
curring fjnes and felt that the injunction was a hammer which we wanted to 
avoid. 11 Another teacher said, 11 We were intimidated and helpless by the 
injunction threat, and since there was no collective bargaining law permit-
. . . 
ting strikes without punishments, we resumed bargaining to reach an agree-
ment. 11 
Group Dynamics 
Several group dynamics operated within the teachers' organization dur-
ing the bargaining dispute. Because the teachers accepted the fact-finding 
report totally while school management rejected or modified it, teacher 
leaders felt that organizational solidarity resulted. in particular, 
teachers felt insulted and angered by management's action and initiated a 
strike. Also, throughout the impasse, the teachers' association used 11 paper 
-------- --- --------, 
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n bombs 11 in an effort to downgrade school management's positions. 
' i 
I Several group dynamics also operated within the school management team. 
( For example, at the very outset of bargaining, management had formed a nega-
i 
~ 
i 
~ 
I 
tive stereotype concerning the teachers' organization. In particular, they 
perceived that the teachers would (1) utilize all of the impasse procedures 
available and (2) ultimately engage in strike activity. These perceptions 
encouraged school management to assume immovable bargaining positions through-
out the entire bargaining interaction. As one respondent stated, 11 Teachers 
planned to take their positions into fact-finding and not give in before or 
during mediation. And they were pre-destined to strike and were committed 
early to such action. 11 These perceptions, incidentally, seemed to be accu-
ii rate. I j 
A second· dynamic had to do with the ''attack and counterattack 11 factor. 
As a result of the strike attack, school management counterattacked by seek-
i ing an injunction. While this furm of counterattack intensified the inter-group conflict, it did motivate the teachers towards a settlement. 
One group dynamic was shared by members of both parties, namely, the 
1 reactions to third-party judgement. Notwithstanding acceptance of the fact-
~ 
~ 
'I i! 
~ 
finder's report by the teachers, some hostility was directed at the report 
because the recommendations did not completely favor the teachers• organiza-· 
tion. School management also was angered by the verdict of the fact-finder. 
It would appear, therefore,that intergroup conflict is reduced when the 
bargaining parties create solutions themselves instead of leaving it to a 
third-party. As a consequence to the feeling that fact-finding had outlived 
its usefulness, the parties agr,eed to eliminate the fact-finding step in 
future negotiations. 
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DISTRICT 2 
The Exercise of Power 
Two basic 11 power politics 11 were used by the teachers' organization in 
this contract dispute for the purpose of coercing management towards conces-
sion making. First, teachers used a variety of informational devices aimed 
at gaining immediate community involvement in the dispute. These included 
newspaper articles, telephone 11 trees, 11 house-to-house leafleting, and picke-
ting. All of the teacher interviewees were convinced that such tactics were 
ineffective in securing public support for their positions. It should be 
noted, i nci dentally, that schoo 1 management perceived the community silence 
as a mandate to hold firmly to their bargaining positions. The second ex-
ercise of teacher power was the six-day work stoppage. 
The primary exercise of school management power was the threat of dis-
missing all teachers who engaged in the strike. This dismissal threat was 
preceded by a letter of remedial warning. All of. the teacher negotiators 
admitted that this exercise of power--i.e., the actual dismissal threat, 
ultimately prompted settlement psychology on the part of the teachers' organ-
ization. 
Group Dynamics 
The presence of at least three group dynamics were reported by the 
teacher negotiators. First, intra-organizational cohesion occurred when 
school management (1) vetoed the fact-finder's report, {2) subsequently impos-· 
ed salaries unilaterally, and (3) threatened to fire the striking teachers. 
These three actions on tha part of school management seemed to solidify the 
~ -----------------,-
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r teachers either in defense or to attack. 
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The threat of dismissal parti-
cularly gave rise to teacher cohesiveness. One teacher reflected this 
position: 11The teachers were vehement due to the firing threat. It bound us 
together on a win-or-else basis and we only returned to class when both the 
IEA and a mediator from the state superintendent•s office influenced us to 
return. 11 
Secondly, there was the appearance of the 11 attack" dynamic which came 
on the heels of the board•s rejection of the fact-finding report and subse-
quent ref~sal to resume negotiations. The attack took the form of the strike 
One teacher explained, 11 We struck out of principle--the board didn•t show I'' 
respect for us; we had a right to be heard in further negotiations after the · I fact-finder•s report failed to resolve the dispute." Another teacher said, 
11 The board president•s refusal to meet with us after the fact-finding pro-
cess radicalized the teachers, and out of anger and provocation, we struck. 11 
Thirdly, most of the teacher negotiators admitted that they felt 
strong loyalty to their constituents. One teacher reflected the position 
that she supported or defended demands which were not hers but which were 
wanted by other teachers. 
School management alluded to the existence of three group dynamics. 
First, harrassing phone calls, original unreasonable demands by teachers, 
the influence of the state teacher•s organization, and the strike vote all 
acted to polarize school management into a cohesive group and intensify the 
adversary nature of the bargaining process. 
Secondly, followin~ the teachers• strike vote and initiation of the 
strike, school management reacted in counterattack by (1) sending letters 
of remedial warning to the striking teachers, and (2) threatening to fire 
I 
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~ all teachers who engaged in the work stoppage. This latter action initially 
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angered the teachers to continue the strike but ultimately facilitated ter-
mination and resolution of the teacher-school management dispute. 
Thirdly, school management had some negative reactions to third-party 
resolution because (1) the fact-finding process was too lengthy and was not 
available until just before school opened, and (2) the report recommended 
that the board adopt binding arbitration as the last step in the grievance 
procedure. 
DISTRICT 3 
The Exercise of Power 
To influence school management to make bargaining concessions, the 
teachers• organization exercised its power in t\'JO ways: First, they engaged 
in unfavorable publicity campaigns by using such tactics as picketing, 
leaflets, and discussion w·ith civic groups. Regarding their effectiveness 
in bringing public pressure on school management, the teacher negotiators 
generally agreed that these devices failed. While some PTA leaders privately 
gave support to the teachers• organization, they did not become a visible, 
lobbying force demanding that the school board concede to the teachers• de-
mands. Even if there had been community sensitivity to the bargaining 
crisis, it is doubtful that management would have modified its bargaining 
positions. One school management negotiator reported this attitude: 11 We 
didn•t feel any pressure by the community and even if they had taken the 
teachers• side, it wouldn't have disturbed us because our minds were made 
up." The second form of power exercised by the teachers was the strike. 
School management's singular exercise of power was to request an l------------------------·~-·-----------&~-------------------------1 
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i injunction forcing the teachers back to work. A restraining order was 
. ~ 
G issued by a j.udge who based his decree on the idea that the strike did have 
serious, adverse effects and could cause irreparable damage to the community 
and school system. Even though teachers' attorneys did argue against a 
temporary restraining order on the grounds that a delay in starting school 
wasn't that serious, the order did have a significant impact on the teachers • 
organization. Two of the teacher interviewees confessed that they wanted to 
avoid any fines or penalties associated with an injunction violation, and 
were, therefore eager to end the strike. 
Group Dynamics 
iw As indicated in the previous chapter, one step of the impasse proce~: J dure required that the parties issue their 11 last offer 11 to the other side. 
f As a result of this process, the two sides agreed that the fact-finder would 
I, recommend either the teachers' or the board's last offer. However, when the 
fact-finder's report recommended that the board accept the teachers' last 
offer, the board, by a vote of 6 to 0 rejected the report on the contract. 
As a result, several group dynamics were set in motion. For example, school 
management's repudiation of the report incensed the teachers to the point of 
increasing cohesion and group solidarity. As one teacher said, 11 We felt 
slapped down by the board's action and this pulled us together. 11 Another 
teacher explained, 11 When the board disregarded the report, it ·motivated us 
to strike. 11 
Another dynamic which was evidenced had to do with the loyalty of the 
representatives. One teacher recited his loyalty by saying, 11 During the 
bargaining sessions, I argued for things I personally opposed." A third 
-~«------------~-u•-•·-•~-~-mn~·~-·-=--------··-------------------
r,·. 186 dynamic, namely, the hero-traitor synarome affected another teacher who . 
admitted the urgency to represent his constituency even though some of their 
views were contrary to his. 
A final dynamic related to resolution by third-party judgement. As 
previously mentioned, the fact-finder was obligated to award his decision 
in favor of one side or the other. In finality, however, he chose to 11 Split-
the middle 11 and this deviation from the impasse procedure angered the teach-
ers. 
School management likewise displayed some group dynamics. Especially 
I ~ evident was the fact that they rejected resolution by a third-party fact-
I ~ 
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finder. These negotiators negatively reacted to the third-party recommen-
dations because they felt (1) the fact-finder didn't understand the true 
facts of the district; (2) he was biased in favor of the employee side; and 
(3) his decisions would erode or dilute the board's power to operate the 
district. 
Another significant dynamic related to the concept of attack and 
counterattack. As a result of the teachers • propaganda device , which anta-
gonized the board, and the strike, school management counterattacked by 
successfully securing a back to work order. Moreover, such teacher behavior 
united school management to protect their position . 
Dynamics relative to the loyalty of representatives as well as the 
hero-traitor responses also seem to be a part of this contract dispute. One 
management negotiator reported that the group decision-making ''locked me into 
supporting the board on every issue. 11 Another stated, 11 No one wants to lose-
I had to win for our sid~ ... 
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SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter has focused on the interaction of (1) the exercise of 
power; (2) the dynamics of intergroup and intragroup behavior; and (3) the 
resolution of school bargaining conflict. A summary of the data is shown 
in TABLE 13. Several conclusions could be expressed as a result of examin-
ing the three factors in this interaction. 
(1) In the three districts studied, both groups engaged in an exer-
cise of power. For·the teachers, such power tactics primarily included un-
favorable publicity campaigns, which were designed to gain community allies, 
and the strike, which was intended to coerce school management into making 
concessions at the bargaining table .. Both tactics seemed to be ineffective: 
publicity campaigns did not motivate consumers of education--i.e., the par-
ents--to become involved in the bargaining dispute. Regarding the effect-
iveness of the strike, while it did function to end the dispute, its useful-
ness as a conflict resolution procedure was mitigated because it was not a 
pure economic weapon bringing reciprocal pressures on the disputants. School 
management was not deprived of state aid money and thus were content to allow 
the strike to continue with impunity. Teachers, on the other hand, lost pay 
for days not worked; thus the economic pressures were lop-sided or unbalan-
ced. The strike could have functioned similar to a traditional private sec-
tor work stoppage if the teachers• organization would have postponed their 
strike activity into the school year when the costs of withholding consent--~ ~ e.g., loss of state aid revenue because schools did not operate there-
~ quisite number of days--would have mounted on ·school management. L (2) For school management, the exercise of power was primarily a 
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~ legal remedy, namely, the securing of an injunction forcing the teachers to 
§ 
~ return to work; in addition, dismissal threats were communicated to the 
'I striking teachers. I Both tactics by school management appeared successful: I teachers, fearing court fines from injunction violations and fearing loss 
! ! of job via dismissal, were motivated to settle. On the surface~ it seems 
i ! that the three teachers' strikes did not generate net economic gains because 
the salary money lost while on strike was not compensated by the new salary 
schedule negotiated. 
(3) All of the districts investigated exhibited some of the negative and 
I detrimental intergroup behavior which is a function of a competitive bar-
i gaining interaction. These group dynamics included: group cohesiveness, 
I attack and counterattack, hostility towards third-party judgements, and I 
i 
loyalty of negotiation representatives to those they represented. 
( 4) The appearance. of severa 1 of the group dynamics would tend to va 1 i-
date the elimination of fact-finding from impasse resolution machinery. ~ 
l ,_ 
Relative to group dynamics, school management's refusal to completely en-
dorse a fact-finder's report prompted teacher's to (1) solidify their ranks 
and (2) attack the 11 enemy. 11 Both dynamics may have been prevented or dim-
inished if fact-finding had not have been used in the dispute settlement 
process. Ironically, rather than serve to resolve the conflict, fact-· 
finding became an inflammatory process which intensified the intergroup 
bargaining conflict. One teacher seemed to agree with this conclusion: 
11 The problems with fact-finding served to convince us to eliminate this 
impasse step in future negotiations.'' In short, fact-finding is beset with 
both political and psychological problems. 
--
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(5) Community insensitivity to the bargaining dispute would also 
tend to confirm the conclusion that fact-finding is not a solution to the 
impasse problem. As noted, fact-finding is a political process made effec-
tive when th~ public places pressure on school management to concede to the 
demands of the teachers• organization. But as demonstrated in this chapter, 
community indifference only solidified school management•s bargaining posi-
tions. While the citizenry may have become immediate.ly involved in teacher-
school management bargaining conflicts in the decade of the 1960s when such 
conflicts were new and clothed in an aura of fear, publics will probably 
choose not to participate in bargaining conflicts in the 1970s. If this 
thesis is true, fact-finding success, which is based on the assumed involve-
ment of a community, 'r'ri 11 not be forthcoming. 
(6) Since there is a need for alleviating or preventing some of the 
undesirable.consequences of public education bargaining~ such as negative 
intergroup behaviors, the human relations method--with its emphasis on 
cooperation, systematic communication, and joint problem-solving~-would 
seem to be validated by this case study chapter. 
In sum: the interaction or relationship between power, group dynamics, 
and conflict resolution would suggest the elimination of fact-finding and the 
deliberate attempts to assure the workability of the human relations approach 
to impasse resolution. 
TABLE 13 
A SUMMARY CHART SHOWING THE EXERCISE OF POWERt THE EXISTENCE OF INTERGROUP DYNAMICS, 
AND GROUP RESPONSES AND REACTIONS 
Dist- Exercise Of Power Community Response Exercise Of Power By Teacher Reaction To Management•s 
trict By Teachers To Teachers• School Management Exercise Of Power 
Exercise of Power 
1 Unfavorable pub- Indifference Legal remedy: sought Intimidation and movement 
licity campaigns: and non-in- and secured an to settle dispute. 
picketing, pres·s volvement. injunction. 
releases, leaflet-
ing. Strike. 
Initial anger and subsequent I 2 Informational · Indifference Letter of remedial 
devices and un- and non-in- warning; threat of motivation to settle. 
. favorable pub- volvement. dismissal . .. I 
licity campaigns: I 
I newspaper art-icles, telephone 
11 trees 11 , leaf-
1eting, picketing. 
Strike. l 
3 Unfavorable pub- Some private Legal remedy: sought Motivation to settle. 
licity campaigns: endorsement, and secured an 
I picketing & leaf- but no mass injunction. 1 eti ng; i nforma- visible support. I 
tional devices I 
1 ike ta 1 ks with 1-' \0 
civic groups. 
I OJ l 
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TABLE 13--Continued 
----
Dist- I Group Dynamics Occurring In Teachers' Organization ' l • Group Dynamics Occuring With i 
rict I i School Ma~agement ! ~ 
1 I (1) group cohesion due to school management (1) negative stereotype toward 
I rejecti6n of fact-finding report; teachers' organization; (2) attack in the form of the strike; (2) counterattacked strike by seeking 
paper bombs to downgrade opponent's injunction; 
positions; (3) hostility toward third-party 
(3) hostility -toward third-party judgments judgments of fact-finder. 
of fact-finder. 
! 
i 
2 i (1) cohesion due to board's rejection of (1) group cohesion; I fact-finder's report, threat of dismissal, 
I 
(2) counterattack teachers• strike ! 
I 
I and unilateral determination of salaries; with dismissal threat; 
i (2) attack via the strike; (3) hostility toward third-party 
I (3) loyalty to constituents. I judgment. I ! i 
i i 3 I (1) group cohesion due to board's refusal (1) hostility toward fact-finder; to accept fact-finder's report; l (2) counterattacked teachers' strike I I ! (2) loyalty of negotiation representatives; by securing injunction; (3) hostility toward third-party judgment. ! (3) combination of loyalty & hero-i I ! traitor dynamics. 
t I 
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CHAPTER VII 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE HYPOTHESES 
Af'ID THE CASE STUDIES 
The reader is reminded that the two major sections of this paper, 
namely the fixed-response questionnaire data and the case study data, had 
distinct purposes: the former was aimed at determining what impasse machine-
ry public school negotiators preferred to employ in a bargaining dispute. 
As a means to this end, seven hypotheses were tested via a fixed-response 
questionnaire. The purpose of the case studies was to clarify or identify 
any signifi~ant factors or relevant forces which may have influenced the 
success or failure of the impasse resolution process. To facilitate this 
purpose, three school systems were investigated with respect to five factors-
. . 
political fact~rs, the history of the collective bargaining relationship, 
the impasse procedures called for in the collective bargaining agreement, 
the exercise of power, and the emergence of group dynamics. 
Notvlithstanding the differences in purpose, relatiot:Jships exist 
between the t\'10 major sections of the paper. These relationships focus on 
the five methods for resolving public education bargaining disputes, all 
of which were placed in hypothesis form. 
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Hypothesis I 
Teacher negotiation representatives agree that the human relations 
strategy would function to minimize, prevent, or resolve collective 
bargaining disputes. 
In one important respect, the case study data related to teachers 
and their use of the human relations strategy. In order to diminish inter-
group conflict and reduce negative group dynamics, the human relations 
strategy advocates that the parties approach the bargaining table from a 
11win-win 11 or mutual gain orientation. The case studies revealed that 
teachers engaged in a competitive 11Win-lose 11 orientation rather than a 
11Wi n-vri n" approach, and as a consequence, severa 1 group dynamics emerged 
which interfered with impasse reso"lution: teachers solidified their ranks 
and attacked school management with a strike. In short, the impasse 
conflict was intensified in part because teacher negotiators did not utilize 
the human relations strategy. In other words, the case studies did support 
the above hypothesis. 
Hypothesis II 
School management negotiation representatives agree that the human 
relations strategy would not function to minimize, prevent, or 
resolve collective bargaining disputes. 
From several viewpoints, the case study data related to school 
management negotiators and their use of the human relations strategy. Among 
other components, the human relations strategy is characterized by (1) a 
mutual gain or 11Win-win 11 orientation, and (2) mutual problem-solving or 
bilateral determination of issues. Relative to the first characteristic, 
the case studies disclosed that when school management engaged in a 
. ?-
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"win-lose 11 rather than "win-win" orientation, some group dynamics 
emerged which inflamed the impasse conflict; specifically, school management 
solidified their ranks and counterattacked teachers with dismissal threats 
and court injunctions. Regarding the second characteristic, the case studies 
showed that a unilateral rather than a bilateral determination of contract 
issues by one school management did provoke a teacher strike. In sum, the 
conflict surrounding the bargaining dispute could have been reduced if 
school management had utilized the human relations strategy. The hypothesis 
is, therefore, not supported by the case studies. 
~pothes is II I 
Teacher negotiation representatives and school management negotiation 
representatives both agree that the mediation strategy is an approp-
riate mechanism to use in resolving school bargaining disputes. 
Evidence was found from the fixed-response questionnaire data which 
indicated that mediation w~uld be improved if fact-finding were not so 
readily available to the bargaining parties. That is, when mediation is 
followed by fact-finding in a sequential arrangement, "holding back" bargain-
ing tactics are engaged in by the parties. With respect to the relationship 
of mediation to fact-finding, the case studies revealed that the contra~tual 
provisions for resolving impasse in the three districts studied did, in 
fact, encourage complacent, reluctant, or holding back bargaining tactics on 
the part of the negoiiators, especially school management. Specifically, the 
contract provisions called for mediation followed by either voluntary or 
required fact-finding. In short, while the case studies did not lend 
support for the hypothesis, they did indicate what fot'm mediation should 
not take. 
~5 
Hypothesis IV 
Teacher negotiation representatives and school- management negotiation 
representatives both agree that the fact-finding strategy is not an 
effe~tive procedure for resolving public education bargaining disputes. 
In a number of ways, the case studies confirmed the idea that fact-
finding should not be utilized to resolve school bargaining impasses. First, 
with respect to "holding back•• tactics, it should be reiterated that the 
contractual provisions for resolving impasse in the districts studied called 
for mediation followed by either voluntary or required fact-finding. Relative 
to this arrangement, a mandatory fact-finding procedure set into action a 
cycle of tactical operations by both parties which cancelled each other out 
and delayed'serious efforts to arrive at prompt resolution of their differ-
ences. Second, because of the voluntary nature of fact-finding--i~e., the 
recommendations of the fact-finder can be rejected by either party--it is 
significant to note that when school management refused to accept the fact-
finders• reports intoto, teachers were provoked to counterattack in the 
form of a strike. Third, the effectiveness of political-public approaches 
to impasse resolution, such as fact-finding, are dependent upon the sensi-
tivity of the community and/or the teaching staff to rational persuasion as 
exercised by a neutral third party. However, while the teacher organizations 
were sensitive to the fact-finding reports, community sensitivity to the 
same reports was absent. Briefly, the case studies supported the hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis V 
Teacher negotiation representatives and school management negotiation 
representatives both agree that the arbitration strategy would not 
be an appropriate dispute settlement mechanism in public education 
bargaining impasses. 
In relating the case studies to the hypothesis, only a theoretical 
relationship was observed. That is, while third-party arbitrators were 
not utilized to resolve the bargaining impasses, third-party fact-finders 
were used. Since hostility was directed toward the fact-finders by both 
parties in nearly all the school systems studied, thus intensifying the 
impasse conflict, it is reasonable to speculate that had arbitrators been 
called in to award a decision, they too would have reaped a harvest of 
hostility. From this speculation, the case studies supported the hypothesis. 
Hypothes·is VI 
Teacher negotiation representatives agree that the strike strategy 
should be available as a means to resolve collective bargaining 
disputes. 
From two perspectives, the case study data supported the hypothesis. 
First, teacher negotiators reported that strikes did not imperil the health 
or safety of the school district community. Second, teachers acknowledged 
that the economic "costs" concomitant to the strike--i.e., the loss of 
salary while on strike--did motivate them toward settlement. In this 
matter, the strikes did function to bring closure or termination to t.he 
impasse conflict. 
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Hypothesis VII 
School management negotiation representatives agree that the strike 
strategy should not be available as a means to resolve collective 
bargaining disputes. 
Evidence from the case studies was not supportive of the hypothesis. 
In particular, all of the management negotiators interviewed acknowledged 
. . 
that the teacher strikes did not endanger the health or safety of the 
school district corrmunity. Furthermore, it should be reiterated that the 
work stoppages did serve to bring the bargaining impasses to an end. That 
is, the presence of pain, inconvenience, or 11costs 11 due to a strike did 
motivate the parties--especially teachers--to\'tard settlement. 
CHAPTER VIII 
SUM\'V\RY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECQMvlENDATIONS 
SUf~MARY 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the various impasse resolu-
tion strategies which are available to public education negotiation repre-
sentatives for the purpose of providing a clue or answer to the following 
critical question: 11 What impasse resolution methods should be employed to 
resolve public school labor disputes? 11 To answer this question, primary in-
formation was collected from two sources: First, the experience of forty-
two public education negotiators who had utilized several alternatives to 
resolve school bargaining disputes. These negotiators represented both 
teacher organizations and school management in seven Illinois school districts 
where strikes had occurred in 1972. Seven hypotheses were tested via a fix-
ed-response questionnaire for the purpose of determining what impasse machin-
ery these negotiators preferred to employ in a dispute. Second, three of 
the seven districts were investigated for the purpose of clarifying or iden-
tifying any significant factors which may have influenced the success or 
failure of the impasse resolution process in those school systems. This in-
formation was derived from an open-ended questionnaire and placed in case 
study form. The case studies also helped to validate some of the hypotheses. 
Both questionnaires were administered during personal interviews. A sum-. 
mary of the data derived from the two questionnaires follows: 
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Hypothesis I 
Teacher negotiation representatives agree that the human 
relations strategy would function to minimize, prevent, or 
resolve collective bargaining disputes. 
199 
Based on all the accumulated data--i.e., data from both the fixed-
response questionnaire and the case studies--this hypothesis is accepted. 
This hypothesis assumes that teacher negotiators have positive viewpoints 
tm'/ard increased intergroup communication, a 11win-win" approach to bargain-
ing, bilateral determination of salaries and other terms and conditions 
of employment, intergroup problem solving styles and joint sub-committees, 
and post-negotiation committees as useful social technologies for manag-
ing the conflict inherent in the collective bargaining relationship. 
While teachers did voice some objections to joint sub-committees and 
post-negotiation committees primarily because they had experienced frus-
tration with such committees in the past, the results of the fixed-
response questionnaire showed that teacher negotiators, for the most 
part, agreed that the human relations approach should be included in 
.the process of managing school bargaining conflict. The case studies 
revealed the existence of two negative group dynamics on the part of 
teachers--group cohesiveness and attacking behaviors--both of which 
could have been reduced had teachers utilized the human relations · 
strategy. 
~-A~ .. ---------------------------------------~----------·----------~ 
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Hypothesis II 
School management negotiation representatives agree that the 
human relations strategy would not function to minimize, pre-
vent, or resolve collective bargaining disputes. 
In light of the accumulated information, this hypothesis is 
rejected. Data from the fixed-response questionnaire showed that school 
management ~alued the human relations approach. In addition, the case 
studies disclosed the emergence of two negative group dynamics on the 
part of school management--group cohesiveness or psychological "fences•• 
and counterattacking behaviors; both of these dynamics could have been 
minimized had school management negotiators employed the human relations 
strategy. 
This hypothesis assumes that management negotiators would take a 
different posture towards the human relations approach than do teacher 
negotiators. However, both groups of negotiators are generally in 
agreement with the human relations strategy. In fact, the data indicated 
that school management negotiators have a higher regard for this approach 
than do teacher negotiators. It is encouraging to note that both groups 
value regular meetings as a means. to improve communication, mutual gain 
or 11Win-win 11 decisions, and the collective bargaining process itself. 
Both groups showed some reservation for the use of joint sub-committee 
approaches during actual bargaining sessions. This reservation is pro-
bably due to the fact that neither group is trained in the use of such 
a bargaining style. Also, both groups were suspicious about post-negotia-
tion committees. In brief, both groups of negotiators endorsed the 
human relations strategy. 
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Hypothesis II I 
.~ 
Teacher negotiation representatives and school management 
negotiation representatives both agree that the mediation 
strategy is an ~ppropriate mechanism to use in resolving 
school bargaining disputes. 
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On the basis of the fixed-response questionnaire results, this 
hypothesis is accepted. Most of the negotiators supported mediation be-
cause it can increase inter-group communication. Also, negotiators stress-
ed the point that mediation can function to diminish intra-organizational 
political pressures which often "lock" negotiation representatives into 
untenable positions. Regarding the relationship of mediation to fact-
finding, school management negotiators strongly affirmed the idea that 
the effectiveness of mediation is eroded if fact-finding is to follow. 
This opinion is consistent with the professional thinking of labor rela-
tions authorities. While some teachers perceived that fact-finding can 
handicap the mediation process, the information elicited in the fixed-
response questionnaire data seemed to indicate that teacher organizatipns 
are not fully cognizant of the ••holding back" tactic which school manage-
ment is forced to engage in when fact-finding follows the mediation 
process. 
While the case study data did not help in accepting or rejecting 
the hypothesis, the data did indicate what form mediation should not take. 
In particular, the case study data revealed that the contractual pro-
visions for resolving impasses called for mediation followed by either 
voluntary or required fact-finding, an arrangement which interfered with 
the impasse resolutiori process. 
te•cu•"' -----------~----------~ 
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Hypothesis IV 
Teacher negotiation representatives and school management nego~ 
tiation representatives both agree that the fact-finding strategy 
is not an effective procedure for resolving public education 
bargaining disputes. 
All of the available data converged to accept this hypothesis. 
An analysis of the accumulated data pointed out two major defects in 
fact-finding: First, both sides of the bargaining table are tempted to 
engage in reluctant bargaining behavior during pre-impasse dialogue. 
Teachers• reluctance was generally based on the assumption that a fact-
finding report, when issued to a community, will prompt the consumers 
of education to pressure school management to make bargaining concessions. 
However, community sensitivity to school bargaining problems and the 
fact-finders• reports was absent. Management•s reluctance to bargain came 
from a different source: If a management team committed its best offers 
early in the bargaining talks, they may be pressured into making further 
concessions during fact-finding. With this possibility facing manage-
ment, it is, therefore, wise to be complacent in pre-impasse talks. To 
·sum up the "reluctancy dynamics," teachers fail to bargain early in 
order to get more later, while management fails to bargain early in 
order to save more later. As a consequence, these bargaining tactics 
by the parties cancel each other out and delay serious efforts to arrive 
at a prompt resolution of their differences. 
. " 
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Secondly, since fact-finding is advisory and acceptance volun-
tary, the rejection of the recommendations by one party may alienate 
the other party to the point of retaliation and counterattack. In the 
five districts using fact-finding, this is essentially what h~ppened. 
In brief, the teacher• strikes in these districts can be blamed in 
large part because school management refused to accept the third-party 
judgment. 
In summarizing these difficulties, it can generally be said 
that the fact-finding process inhibited the resolution of collective 
bargaining conflict. More specifically, it intensified the adversary 
relationship of the collective bargaining process, was inflammatory, 
and led to a quasi- 11 civil war ... Moreover, it diminished the effective-
ness of the collective bargaining process in the school systems which 
were studied. 
Hypothesis V 
Teacher negotiation representatives and school management nego-
tiation representatives both agree that the arbitration strategy 
would not be an appropriate dispute settlement mechanism in 
public education bargaining impasses. 
Taking into consideration all of the accumulated data, a definitive 
conclusion cannot be reached relative to accepting or rejec~ing this hypo-
thesis. On one hand, the fixed-response questionnaire data neither con-
firmed nor disproved this hypothesis. Indeed, strong antipathy between 
teachers and school management was manifested. While teacher negotiators 
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held the opinion that arbitration should be available in the impasse 
resolution machinery, school management negotiators rejected this device. 
Teachers,. often frustrated by their opponent's intransigence, found it 
easy to lean toward the use of a third-party umpire because they felt his 
potential presence may make the bargaining process more effective as 
well as extract additional concessions from management. Management nego-
tiators, conversely, were convinced that an arbitrator has no right to 
dictate salaries and other terms and conditions of employment during a 
dispute. On the other hand, case study information would only mildly 
support acceptance of the hypothesis. Specifically, the case studies 
suggested that third-party arbitrators, especially in the compulsory form, 
would not be an appropriate dispute settlement process in school bargain-
ing impasses. 
A necessary point should be noted with respect to the fixed-
response questionnaire data: Arbitration was neither available nor util-
ized in the school systems studied, but one district had used this device 
in a previous impasse. Therefore, it can be stated that most of the 
respondents' rationale was based on speculation rather than direct exper-
ience. The use of arbitration in resolving school bargaining disputes 
will continue to be a matter of conjecture until more data is gathered 
from school systems experiencing this settlement tool. 
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Hypothesis VI 
Teacher negotiation representatives agree that the strike strategy 
should be available as a means to resolve collective bargaining 
disputes. 
Based on the accumulated data, this hypothesis is accepted. In 
particular, the hypothesis was amply confirmed by the fixed-response 
questionnaire data. reachers based their approval on three factors: 
(1) teacher strikes do not impose a threat to the health and safety of the 
community; (2) work stoppages exert mutual pressures on the parties which 
can be productive of a settlement; and (3) strike possibilities encourage 
a balance of power which subsequently makes the collective bargaining 
process more effective, more efficient, and less conflictful. Labor 
relations experts tend to agree with all three rationale. 
The case study data additionally supported the hypothesis. For 
example, information collected from both parties indicated that a teacher 
strike did not endanger the health or safety of the community. Further-
more, the strikes did function to bring closure to the bargaining impasses 
because pressures or costs were exerted on the disputants. As stated in 
an earlier chapter, the motivation to agree in collective bargaining is 
conditioned by the presence of potentfal pain or pressure--e.g., the loss 
of salary for teachers and the loss of state aid for school management 
because of a strike. The case studies, however, indicated that the pres-
sure and costs of the strike weighed more upon striking teachers than 
management simply because (1) the latter did not lose state aid money dur-
ing the strike, and (2) the injunction was _available to coerce teachers 
back to work. 
Hypothesis VII 
School management negotiation representatives agree that the 
strike strategy should not be available as a means to resolve 
collective bargaining disputes. 
Because the accumulated data are contradictory, this hypothesis 
is neither accepted nor rejected. With respect to the fixed-response 
questionnaire data, this hypothesis was supported. It is significant 
to report,however, that school management negotiators were not in 
complete accord with respect to the use of the strike. For examplef 
some respondents emphasized that state legislatures should not legal-
ize teacher strikes even though (1) community health is not thereby 
endangered, and (2) all previous impasse steps--e.g., mediation and/or 
fact~finding--have been exhausted. On the other hand, some management 
negotiators agreed that (1) mediated settlements could be advanced 
by strikes or strike threats, and (2) the inconveniences or "costs" 
of a strike can strengthen "settlement psychology." Since the case 
study data supported the viewpoints of the latter group of school man-
agement negotiators, the hypothesis was not supported. 
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While some of the case study data were referred to in the previous 
section, it is appropriate to directly summarize the relevant factors 
which influenced the process of impasse resolution in the three districts 
studied. These factors included political factors, the history of the 
collective bargaining relationship, the impasse procedures called for in 
the collective bargaining agreement, the exercise of power, and the emer-
gence of group dynamics: 
(1) Certain political factors can weaken the effectiveness of 
the fact-finding process. For example, the confrontation between collec-
tive teacher·militancy and school board resistance to the collective 
bargaining process can function to increase the struggle for power in 
public education.and consequently retard any impasse resolution device 
which is political or advisory in nature. Also community indifference 
or insensitivity to a teacher-board contract dispute can dimihish the 
effectiveness of fact-finding. 
(2) The informal collective bargaining relationship in all three 
4istricts could be alternatively characterized by ••conflict," "militant 
opposition," and "aggression and resistance.•• When collective bargaining 
takes place in such a climate, any impasse procedure which involves the 
aspect of voluntaryism--such as fact-finding--will probably be ineffec-
tive in resolving the labor dispute. 
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(3) The contractual provisions for resolving impasses in the 
three districts called for sequential steps of mediation and fact-
finding. This arrangement prompted both parties to be complacent during 
pre-impasse negotiations thus delaying serious efforts to conclude nego-
tiations. 'Furthermore, since this arrangement provided for fact-finding 
with advisory recommendations, one or both parties could reject the 
report. In all three cases, the recommendations were rejected, and 
closure of the bargaining dispute was not achieved until a teacher strike 
occurred. 
(4) In the three districts studied, both groups engag~d in an 
exercise of power. Teachers used unfavorable publicity campaigns such 
as picketing, newspaper articles, and leafleting, plus the strike. 
School management exercised power by seeking court injunctions and by 
threatening to dismiss striking teachers. Management power tactics were 
more effective than teacher power tactics primarily because the strike 
weapon did not bring reciprocal economic pressures on the disputants. 
That is, while teachers lost pay during the strike, school management 
did not lose state aid money and could, therefore, allow the strike to 
continue with impunity. 
(5) In the districts investigated, several examples of group 
dynamics were manifested: group cohesiveness, attack and counterattack, 
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hostility towards third· party judgments, and loyalty of negotiation 
representatives to ·'those they represented. The appearance of some of 
these dynamics were attributable partly to fact-finding. For example; 
when school management negotiators refused to endorse the fact-finders' 
reports intoto, teachers were prompted to solidify their ranks and attack 
the "enemy" with a work stoppage. Ironically, rather than serve to 
resolve the impasse, fact-finding became an inflammatory process which 
intensified the intergroup bargaining conflict. These dynamics could 
also be attributed to the fact that the human relations method--with its 
emphasis on cooperation, regular communication~ and joint problem-solving--
was not systematically employed during pre-impasse and/or impasse nego-
tiations. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has analyzed the critical problem of impasse resolution 
in public education bargaining disputes. Data for the analys~s came ~rom 
a fixed-response questionnaire and a case study tnvesttgati:on from which 
a number of conclusions can be drawn: 
(1) Teacher negotiators preferred to use the strike, arbitration, the 
human relations method, and mediation to resolve school bargaining im-
passes. 
(2) School management negotiators preferred to use only the human 
relations and mediation method to resolve contract disputes. 
(3) Both groups. of negotiators rejected the use of fact-finding as 
a dispute settlement method. 
(4) Political factors and an informal collective bargaining 
r 
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relationship characterized by excessive intergroup conflict can hinder· 
the effectiveness of fact-finding. 
(5) Fact-finding is not as effective as the strike in bringing 
closure to a school bargaining dispute. 
(6) The absence of reciprocal economic pressures on the disputants 
can reduce the effectiveness of the strike in resolving public education 
bargaining disputes. 
(7) The inclusion of the human relations method and the exclusion 
of the fact-finding method can diminish the potentiality for the appear-
ance of negative group dynamics. 
Reco~nendations 
An analysis of the results of the fixed-response questionnaire 
and the case study data would justify the following recommendations: 
(1) Since both groups of negotiators responded positively toward 
the human relations strategy on the fixed-response questionnaire, it seems 
wise to incorporate the elements of this strategy into the collective barg 
aining relationship between teachers and school management .. It is. 
questionable if the human relations approach can be legislated into 
law, but some components, .especially those which enhance intergroup 
communication, can be negotiated into local contracts. An example of 
a regular communication device is as follows: 
r 
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MONTHLY CONTRACT MEETINGS 
Representatives of the superintendent and the Association will 
meet once a month during the regular school year at a time con-· 
venient to both parties for the purpose of discussing the admini-
stration of the contract and to resolve problems that may arise. 
These meetings are not intended to bypass the negotiations or the 
grievance procedure. Further, each party will submit to the other, 
at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to the n1eeting, an agenda 
covering what they wish to discuss. This agreement shall be sub-ject to change or supplement at any time by mutual consent of the 
parties hereto. Any such change or supplement agreed upon shall 
be reduced to writing, signed by the parties hereto, and submitted 
to the Board and the Association for approval, the same as this 
Agreement. 
Such contractual clauses may be advantageous because they resolve immedi-
ate problems, function to settle problems before contracts expire, and 
serve to keep the communi~ation lines open. 
Other elements of the human relations approach are not so easily 
implemented because they deal with attitudes as well as bargaining tac-
tics. For example, the integrative ••win-win" element involves an atti-
tude of trust, openness, good will, and a search for mutual gain. Also, 
joint sub-committee approaches and the intergroup problem-solving tech-
nique, which can be employed during actual bargaining sessions, will be 
difficult to achieve in the near future. These two elements, as well. 
as other elements of the human relations approach can be learned by the 
bargaining participants. Specifically, negotiators could take advantage 
of laboratory workshops in which the participants learn the human rela-
tions approach by engaging in conflict management laboratories, role-
playing, and intergroup problem-solving exercises. Such workshops are 
available and are instructed by behavioral scientists knowledgeable in 
the dynamics of the human relations approach. 
l 
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(2) Mediatipn should be employed as the first step in the machi-
nery for resolving school bargaining disputes. Since both groups generally 
agreed that fact-finding inhibits the mediation process, state laws or 
local collective bargaining agreements should not require fact-finding to 
follow on the heels of mediation. Furthermore, mediation should be accom-
panied by the threat or actuality of a legalized teacher strike simply· 
because it provides pressure which induces settlement attitudes. While 
this recommendation may be unwelcomed and distasteful to the reader, the 
evidence from both the fixed-response questionnaire and the case studies 
makes this recommendation appropriate. 
{3) Fact-finding with advisory recommendations should not be used 
in the machinery for resolving disputes. Since it can become a substitute 
for dire~t negotiations, it makes the collective bargaining process less 
effective. Furthermore, it can become a vehicle which intensifies impasse 
conflict. In other words, state legislation or local agreeme~ts could 
help to avert some of the conditions which lead to increased intergroup 
conflict, such as the strike, by eliminating fact-finding from the impasse 
resolution procedures. Fixed-response questionnaire data and case study 
analysis validate this recommendation. 
(4) On the basis of the accumulated information, it is difficult 
to pronounce a firm recommendation regarding the use of arbitration. From 
one set of data, teachers and school management nego~iators took contrast-
ing viewpoints towar.ds this dispute settlement device. Furthermore, since 
none of the districts·used arbitration to resolve their 1972 impasse, 
many questions remain unanswered about this resolution device. Neverthe-
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less, a recommendation is 'made that voluntary binding arbitration be 
available to the parties at any time during the dispute. This recommen-
dation is based on the following rationale: The very fact that school 
management negotiators rejected the strike necessitates a search for the 
most effective 11 strike substitute 11 --that is, some device which will bring 
finality and closure to the bargaining deadlock. As noted, since fact-
finding does not seem to be the best strike substitute, some form of 
arbitration would seem advisable. Moreover, voluntary binding arbitration 
would not be an unreasonable recommendation since several states now per-
mit its use to resolve teacher-school management disputes. These states 
include Oregon, Pennsylvania, Nevada, Hawaii, Maine, and New Jersey. 
(5} Categorical recommendations relevant to the use of the strike 
are also difficult to make because the accumulated data was mixed. That 
is, while the fixed-response questionnaire results showed a pronounced 
contrast between the two groups of respondents, the case studies supported 
the use of the strike strategy. Nevertheless, recommendation is made that 
the strike strategy be authorized by state and/or national legislation. 
This, recommendation is based on the following rationale: First, school 
management negotiators did not denounce the strike in every respect. On 
the contrary, they agreed to some extent with professional literature 
that the costs, inconveniences, and pressures concomitant to the strike 
can serve to (1) facilitate meaningful, good faith bargaining, and (2) in-
crease the likelihood of mediated settlements. Secondly, the strike did 
not create imminent peril or risk to the health and safety of the commun-
ity in any of the seven school districts investigated. Thirdly, strikes 
r 
~--------------------- ------~------------------------~ 
l 
! 
'l 
~ 
~ 
1 ~ ~ 
1 
~ 
I ~ 
~ 
:1 
214 
did terminate the impasses. 
(6) Due to the above recommendations, the most functional impasse 
resolution procedure to be legislated into either state law or the local 
collective barga·ining agreements would incorporate a combinatjon of 
mediation, the legal right to strike, and voluntary binding arbitration 
available at any time during the collective bargaining dispute. In 
addition, the entire collective bargaining process would be generously 
sprinkled with elements of the human relations approach. 
Implications For Further Study 
(1) Similar research should be conducted in states having teacher 
bargaining laws to determine if impasse resolution procedures within the 
context of state legislation are more effective than impasse resolution 
procedures outside the confines of a state law. Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
and Hawaii would be appropriate states to study. 
(2) Research might be conducted in school systems which have 
utilized forms of binding arbitration for the purpose of determining 
the effectiveness of such a method. 
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APPENDIX A 
* COLLECTIVE BARGAINING QUESTIONNAIRE 
Following are some statements with which you may agree or disagree. 
Please select one of the five alternatives which best represents 
your position on each statement and briefly state your reason for 
your particular choice. 
SA--Strongly Agree 
A--Agree 
U--Undecided 
0--0isagree 
SO--Strongly Disagree 
· SA A U 0 SO 1. To reduce conflict and promote agreement during 
actual negotiations, the parties should meet regularly 
throughout the year outside the bargaining table to 
study problems. 
SA A U D SO 2. In the event of a negotiations impasse, mediation 
should be used as a means to resolve the dispute. 
SA A U 0 SO 3. The assured availability of an impasse procedure such 
as fact-finding tends to inhibit the willingness of the 
parties to compromise prior to acknowledgement of an 
impasse and use of the procedure. 
SA A U D SD 4. Contract disputes between teachers and boards "Of 
education should not be resolved by an impartial, 
outside authority who makes a final and binding · 
decision. 
SA A U D SO 5. State legislatures should authorize strikes by teachers, 
at least where public health or safety is not thereby 
endangered. 
*This questionnaire includes propositions designed to test the 
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school management negotiators should attempt to make 
decisions which permit both sides to gain in contrast . 
to decisions where one party gains at the other 
party•s expense. 
~ 
SA A U D SD 7. Mediation, as an impasse resolution procedure, tends 
to promote rather than retard meaningful, sincere 
negotiations between the parties. 
~ SA A U D SD 8. Fact-finding by itself, that is, without the use of 
either prior mediation or a subsequent strike threat, 
is not a positive vehicle for resolving teacher bar-
gaining disputes. 
SA A U D SD 9. Compulsory binding arbitration, in which a third 
pal~ty intervenes to deternli ne sa 1 aries and other 
terms and conditions of work, would tend to weaken 
the direct negotiations process. 
SA A U D SD 10. The threat or actuality of a strike can function to 
promote an agreement-making atmosphere. 
SA A U D SD 11. To settle differences amicably, the style of bar-
gaining should resemble mutual problem solving 
rather than independent decision making in which 
school management unilaterally sets salaries and 
other terms and conditions of employment. 
SA A U D SD. 12. The mediation process, without the additional step 
of fact-finding, can exert influence on each party 
to modify its bargaining position. 
SA A U D SD 13. Fact-finding, leading to the issuance of formal 
public recommendations, is not likely to reduce the 
impasse conflict which still exists between teachers 
and school management following unsuccessful media-
tion. 
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~ ~ ~ SA A U D SO 
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~ SA A U D SO 
A SA A u D so 
SA A U D SO 
SA A U D. SO 
SA A U D SO 
SA A U D SO 
SA A U D SO 
14. As a means of impasse resolution, the parties should 
not have access to voluntarily submit the conflict 
issues to an impartial third -party for a final a~d 
binding decision. 
15. Concession-making, compromises or modification of 
bargaining positions by school management are likely 
to be generated when a teachers' organization threat-
ens to strike. 
16. A joint sub-committee approach, in which there are joint study teams composed of an equal number of 
teachers and school management representatives, 
would be a useful means of facilitating collective 
bargaining agreements. · 
17. The effectiveness of medi.ation would be improved if 
fact-finding were not so readily available to the 
bargaining parties. 
18. Fact-finding with private recommendations is not 
likely to serve as an effective form of reconcil-
iation when teachers and management are still at 
impasse following unsuccessful mediation. 
19. As a means to resolve bargaining disputes, com-
pulsory binding arbitration would deter the parties 
from reaching direct agreement by themselves. 
20. Teachers should be allowed the "modified right to 
strike. 1' That is, they could lega-lly strike but 
only after either mediation or fact-finding proce-
dures have failed to resolve the bargaining dispute. 
21. Post negotiation committees, in which final reso-
lution of some particularly thorny bargaining issue 
is discussed, would tend to diminish future bar-
gaining conflict. 
t 
' ~ 
i 
~ ~ SA A u 0 so ~ 
I 
i 
~ SA A u D so i 
I 
I 
r SA A u 0 so ,, 
~ SA A U 0 SO 
22. 
23. 
24. 
I. 14 f£&1144'1 
222 
Mediation accompanied by the threat or actuality of 
the strike may stimulate settlement between the 
parties in contrast to mediation in and of itself~ 
When the fact-finding process is available in a local 
collective bargaining contract, the parties at impasse 
are likely to wait for fact-finding rather than 
seriously endeavor to reach direct agreement by them-
selves. 
Reliance upon third party arbitration, either com-
pulsory or voluntary, would weaken the incentive 
for the parties to agree at the bargaining table. 
25. The threat or actuality of a strike during or follow-
ing the mediation process would tend to increase the 
number of settlements in mediation. 
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APPENDIX B 
CASE STUDY INTERVIEW GUIDE 
ADDITIONAL OR RELEVANT FACTORS INFWENCING BARGAINING IMPASSE 
1. What has been the history of the collective bargaining relationship 
between the teachers' organization and the school management? 
2. Were there any significant political issues or factors which had an 
impact on the bargaining impasse relative to the teachers' organization? 
3. Were there any significant political factors which had an impact.on 
the bargaining impasse with respect to the community or board of 
education? 
4. What were the basic or key issues surrounding the bargaining impasse? 
5. What impasse procedures were called for in the local collective bargain-
ing contract? 
6. What impasse resolution mechanisms were used and the considerations 
which led to the choice of those mechanisms? 
7. How did each party react to the declaration of impasse? 
8. ~!hat influence techniques were used by the teachers' organization to 
induce the school board to accept the teachers' demands? 
9. What influence techniques were used by school management to induce the 
teachers to accept management's demands? 
10. Describe the success or failure of mediation. 
11. Describe the success or failure of fact-finding. 
12. Were there any-harmful effects of the strike with respect to relation-
ships or the health and safety of the community? 
13. Were there any psychological factors which had an impact on the dispute? 
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APPENDIX C 
December. 5, 1973 
Dear 
The Graduate School at Loyola University of Chicago has given formal 
approval for a research dissertation topic submitted by Mr. Larry Halter, 
a candidate for the Doctor of Philosophy Degree in the Department of 
Educational Administration. 
Mr. Halter is using the personal interview method to collect the data 
needed to complete this research project and you have been selected 
as one of the interviewees. As director of this dissertation, I hope 
you will cooperate with Mr. Halter as he meets with you to gather 
appropriate data relevant to his topic: "Conflict Resolution Strategies 
in Public Education Bargaining Disputes." 
The information you provide during the interview will be kept in con-
fidence and hopefully will be used to assist both teachers and admini-
strators manage the delicate relationships involved in the collective 
bargaining process. Mr. Halter will be contacting you in the near 
future to schedule a convenient interview time in your local area. 
Thank you for your help in this matter. 
Cordially, 
/11 (t[)f~-'1 
Max Bailey \ 
Assistant Professor 
Educational Administration 
·• 
APPROVAL SHEET 
The dissertation ~submitted by Larry L. Halter has been read 
and approved by the following Committee: 
Dr. Max A. Bailey, Chairman 
Assistant Professor of Education, Loyola 
Dr. Melvin P. Heller 
Professor and Chairman of Administration, Loyola 
Dr. Jasper J. Valenti 
Professor of Administration~ Loyola 
The final copies have been examined by the director of the 
dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the 
fact that any n-ecessary changes have been incorporated and that the 
dissertation is -now given final approval by the Committee with . 
reference to content and form. 
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The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
